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Abstract 
This thesis examines how American and German constitutionalism, as shaped by the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 
have mediated the tension between threats to stability and the imperative of renewal 
through occasional or constant interventions in their democratic processes. To do this, it 
primarily assesses the 1960s U.S. reapportionment cases and the European Parliament 
electoral threshold cases of 2011 and 2014. It also considers the ideas of four thinkers, 
theorists and jurists who have wrestled with the dilemma of how to maintain the bond 
between citizen and state: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Hannah Arendt, Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexis de Tocqueville.  
Stability and renewal represent the twin orientation points for constitutionalism 
and the courts against which they must adjust to possible democratic threats, or new 
political and social forces in need of recognition. Threats to the state can emerge either 
from a surfeit of illiberal views in politics and society aimed at destroying an existing 
constitutional order, or when democratic channels become starved of new opinions 
through the constitutional or unconstitutional exclusion of voters and parties.  
A distinctive feature of the approach taken is the conceptual division between 
the ‘legal/institutional’ space in which the Supreme Court and 
Bundesverfassungsgericht interpret constitutional meaning, and the ‘civic space’ in 
which citizens accept or reject constitutional meaning. One central question is how 
American and German constitutionalism, and the U.S. Supreme Court and 
Bundesverfassungsgericht shape and influence the vital civic space that is integral to the 
democratic relationship between citizen and state, and the survival of the state itself. 
Ultimately it is concluded that without acceptance of the importance of law and 
constitutionalism by citizens in the civic space, the influence of the Supreme Court and 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht becomes purely institutional and effectively consigned to 
the courtroom. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Non sub homine, sed sub deo et lege. (Bracton) 
Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in 
the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occupied 
with their own business are extremely well informed on general 
politics - this is a peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who 
takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; 
we say he has no business here at all.
1
 (Pericles’ Funeral Oration) 
A constitution is a standard, a pillar, and a bond when it is 
understood, approved and beloved. But without this intelligence 
and attachment, it might as well be a kite or balloon, flying in the 
air.
2
 (John Adams) 
 
  
                                                          
1
 M. I. Finley and Rex Warner, Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1972), p. 147. 
2
 Cited in Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 146. 
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Constitutionalism in Germany and the United States reflects different forces, threats and 
unique historical experiences, yet common to both is Carl Friedrich’s idea that it is 
“rooted in certain basic beliefs; the belief in the dignity of man and in the belief of 
man’s inclination to abuse power.”3 American and German constitutionalism have been 
primarily concerned with the attempt to constrain public power in the name of the 
people. Stephen Griffin notes that “modern constitutionalism involves a tension 
between the constituent power of the sovereign people and the constitutional forms that 
are intended to express and check this power.”4 The manifestation of the people in 
constitutional, democratic and social forces has shaped political and legal institutions 
and the evolution of states. Yet constitutionalism is also, I suggest, oriented towards a 
view that ‘the people’ are, and remain, an unpredictable force, sometimes requiring 
restraint, at other times in need of protection and representation. 
The establishment of stability is generally common to constitutionalism in 
different countries. But the degree of stability constitutionalism in a particular country 
seeks and the tools it uses to preserve it may differ. The ability of citizens in modern 
liberal democracies to plan their lives with minimal state interference presupposes a 
certain level of political stability. Since the late eighteenth century one clearly accepted 
basis for the establishment of both political stability and a sphere of private autonomy 
for citizens immune from state interference is the crafting of a written constitution. The 
“special virtue of constitutionalism,” writes Richard Kay, “lies not merely in reducing 
the power of the state, but in effecting that reduction by the advance imposition of 
rules.”5 Such criteria allow the subject of state power  
to place every planned action in one of two categories, one subject 
to undoing by the state, the other immune to such authority. […] 
Within that second category, however narrow, a person may 
construct his or her own life.
6
  
Of course, while constitutionalism can provide some stability for the state and 
the individual, so too could a totalitarian system; albeit, one involving far more stability 
for the state than the individual, for whom the midnight knock at the door from the 
                                                          
3
 Carl J. Friedrich, Limited Government : A Comparison, (Englewood Cliffs ; London: Prentice-Hall, 
1974), p. 123. 
4
 See for example Stephen M. Griffin, 'Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American 
Constitutionalism', in The Paradox of Constitutionalism : Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, 
ed. by Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 49.  
5
 Richard S. Kay, 'American Constitutionalism', in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, ed. by 
Lawrence A. Alexander (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 23. 
6
 Ibid. pp. 23-24. 
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authorities remains a remote but fearful prospect. Within a liberal democracy governed 
according to the precepts of constitutionalism, however, a civic space must also be 
permitted for the emergence of new opinions and the associated values which these 
opinions reflect, embody and draw sustenance from. Moreover, the very concept of a 
liberal democracy presupposes that an opinion and the values it reflects should have a 
chance to become more widely accepted, even to become a majority opinion.
7
 
Constitutionalism, however, has something to say about how opinions emerge in a 
society for as a mechanism for government and as a concept, it is decidedly not value 
neutral.  
Threats to the stability of the liberal state can emerge when the civic and 
democratic space is allowed to ‘boil over’ with opinions which may be illiberal or 
aimed at attacking and destroying the existing constitutional order.
8
 Equally, the liberal 
state may be at risk when the democratic processes become starved of either new 
opinions, or when oligarchical tendencies in a political system seek to exclude certain 
voters, parties, and minority groups, constitutionally and unconstitutionally, from 
democratic participation. Striking the appropriate balance between these two poles of 
stability and renewal has been, I contend, a central concern of American and German 
constitutionalism as understood by the U.S. Supreme Court and Germany’s Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG).  
I shall generally argue that American and German constitutionalism have been 
primarily concerned with mitigating the threats to the liberal state, either from 
individuals and groups being able to participate in the democratic process without 
restraint, or from their not being able to participate enough. This raises the question of 
how the particular characteristics of American and German constitutionalism shape the 
civic space within which political participation and the formation of majority opinions 
takes place. When people are excluded from that space by their communities or the state 
itself through the denial of the vote, what should the response of constitutionalism be? If 
too many of the wrong opinions are bad for the liberal state and too few of the right 
opinions are equally bad, how do we decide what is ‘just right’?9 What is ‘right’, as will 
                                                          
7
 Tim Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View, (Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 123. 
8
 See for example Arendt, p. 93. In the eyes of the American founders, observes Arendt, “the rule of 
public opinion was a form of tyranny.” 
9
 The men of the American Revolution, wrote Arendt, “knew that the public realm in a republic was 
constituted by an exchange of opinion between equals, and that this realm would simply disappear the 
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be assessed in Chapter 2, is greatly determined by whether opinions are in conformity 
with the particular facets of America’s ‘liberty’ oriented constitutionalism and 
Germany’s ‘dignity’ oriented constitutionalism. In other words, this analysis is based 
not on a Dworkin type ‘moral’ or normative reading of constitutional principles, but on 
whether certain court decisions can be said to be in conformity with the understanding 
of American and German constitutionalism outlined in the succeeding chapters. One 
important focus for the analysis in the legal case studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 is 
the role of each court in supporting voters, groups or parties that have been excluded, 
unconstitutionally and constitutionally, from the political process.  
The thesis is thematically divided on several levels which are useful 
conceptually. Most obviously is the dichotomy between stability and renewal which is a 
constant thread in the succeeding chapters, representing constitutionalism’s orientation 
point, or rear view mirror, against which it must adjust to possible democratic threats, or 
new social and political forces in need of recognition. Put slightly differently, the focus 
throughout the thesis is on both the civic space where individuals fight for access to the 
political process, contest constitutional meaning, and uphold, challenge, or destroy their 
government, and the legal / institutional space within which particular conflicts over 
issues such as voter exclusion must be resolved in the courts. It is the civic space which 
is crucial to the quality of, and survival of, the state. The degree to which American and 
German constitutionalism, and each court, can exert influence over this civic space is a 
key question as we proceed. As I will suggest, this question is partly dependent on 
whether law and constitutionalism are accepted in the relevant national, or local, civic 
space.  
A common theme with respect to both countries which, I argue, holds in many 
Western liberal democracies is that representative democracy has become almost 
entirely detached from any civic and communal sphere. This carries serious implications 
if citizens cannot connect the significance of their votes in the ballot box every four 
years with their communities and their own lives. Such disengagement breeds apathy, 
recklessness and also contempt for the principle of equal respect which constitutes the 
very basis of citizenship. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
very moment an exchange became superfluous because all equals happened to be of the same opinion.” 
Ibid. 
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This thesis examines how various thinkers, and the political and legal 
institutions of the United States and Germany have wrestled with this existential 
dilemma. The particular emphasis of each country has largely been determined by its 
approach to constitutionalism, and how the polis upon which the survival of the state 
depended was constituted. As will be examined in Chapter 2, while the American 
concept of what I term ‘liberty’ constitutionalism generally left the creation of the polis 
with the people by simply fencing off the state and letting the people ‘get on with it’, 
Germany’s normative ‘dignity’ oriented constitutionalism left the creation of the polis 
in the hands of the BVerfG. This difference is central to how the values of the respective 
‘constitutionalisms’ are mediated and interact with more traditional forces of identity 
and social cohesion. Crucially, the liberty-dignity distinction also determines how 
interventions in the processes of representative democracy by the courts occur, and 
whether values arising from social struggles are merely ‘formalised’ as law in court 
decisions, or whether the values of a predominantly normative constitution are 
‘inculcated’ in state institutions and society.  
1.1 Overview 
One of the complexities of constitutionalism is the division between a 
constitutional charter to keep a government in order and the need for a state to update its 
understandings and prevailing value orientations by successfully mediating the political, 
civic and social space within which opinions become more widely held or more widely 
rejected. Michael Brenner argues that  
the modernity and success of a constitution […] depends on 
whether it proves able to facilitate social and political changes and 
thus the formation of the future quite independently from daily 
political routine and changing times.
10
 
The development of American constitutionalism has been driven to a far larger extent 
than its German counterpart by evolving currents in society and politics. This should not 
on one level be a surprise. A glance at the twenty-seven ratified constitutional 
amendments reveals a historical record of the struggles for equality, the fruits of a 
slowly expanding suffrage, and of a government that slowly responded to the 
developments of a maturing society.
11
 That part of the egalitarianism of America’s 
                                                          
10
 Michael Brenner, 'The Constitutional Framework of Democratic Representation', in Constitutionalism, 
Universalism and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis, ed. by Christian Starck (Baden-Baden: Nomos-
Verlag-Ges., 1999), p. 136. 
11
 The Reconstruction amendments after the Civil War, and the Seventeenth (direct election of senators) 
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founding documents was, as Justice William Brennan put it, “more pretension than 
realised fact”12 is hardly contentious. Yet if the divergence between the values 
suggested by the Constitution and those emanating from political and societal practice is 
so plain, we are left with the simple but crucial question of whether theory and ideals 
have the political force to drive praxis, or the reverse?
13
 However, if society’s values are 
the driving force behind law and politics, then the moral fate of a constitutional order 
would be determined largely by whether society’s direction of travel is towards progress 
and human dignity, or a more unpleasant direction.  
 Reduced to its core, this is essentially a question of value strength: whether 
citizens identify more with their constitutional values or “internal bonding forces”14 
such as religion, nation or other forms of identity. As will be illustrated, these internal 
bonding forces can sometimes reinforce constitutional values and principles of 
democratic engagement, or they can weaken them. Where they point in significantly 
different directions, such as during the Weimar Republic―where nation was a more 
potent force of social cohesion than constitutional values―then, as Böckenförde notes, 
the liberal state is vulnerable, particularly in a “time of crisis”15. This discussion will be 
expanded upon at length in Chapter 3, which examines the contestation and 
interdependence between constitutional and traditional values, and their effects in 
reinforcing or weakening the liberal state and its democratic relationship with its 
citizens. It does this with reference to the ideas of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 
Hannah Arendt, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Thomas Jefferson. 
A constitution is a legal as well as political instrument. For constitutionalism to 
be sustained, it has to enjoy the confidence of enough people in society who must be 
willing to sacrifice their will on some issues to ensure that their own rights are protected 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Nineteenth (equal suffrage for women) Amendments are some examples. See also Richard Bellamy, 
Political Constitutionalism : A Republican Defence of The Constitutionality of Democracy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 135.  
12
 William J Brennan Jr, 'The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification', in 
Interpreting the Constitution : the Debate over Original Intent, ed. by Jack N. Rakove (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1990), p. 23. 
13
 German constitutionalism in the form of the militant democracy might suggest this question is 
irrelevant because it assumes that constitutional institutions such as the BVerfG are there for those 
moments when illiberal forces are in the ascendancy. However, for such institutions to have the force to 
be able to suppress illiberal tendencies, even in opposition to the popular will, necessarily means as 
Böckenförde pointed out, that the liberal state can only guarantee itself by sacrificing its liberalness. See 
Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, 'The Rise of the State', in State, Society, and Liberty: Studies in Political 
Theory and Constitutional Law, (New York; Oxford: Berg Pub Ltd, 1991), p. 45.  
14
 Ibid. p. 46. 
15
 Ibid. 
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on some issues where they might not be in the majority. This highlights, of course, the 
problem of how one assesses majoritarianism in practice since theoretical accounts tend 
to elide the reality of how groups in society coalesce on some issues and break apart on 
others.
16
 As Richard Bellamy puts it, “most majorities turn out to be shifting coalitions 
of minorities.”17 For the members of any political community, as Lawrence Sager notes, 
“there is the certainty that some questions of considerable importance will be decided 
against their interests” and this includes democracies where someone may be on the 
losing side in elections or in legislative votes.
18
  
This picture reflects the experience in Western liberal democracies since 1945, 
where being on the losing side over a particular issue did not result in incarceration or a 
more unpleasant fate. For the purposes of the present enquiry, however, the elephant in 
the room remains 1930s Germany. Hitler never secured a majority of the popular vote, 
either in the election before or after the National Socialist power grab in January 1933.
19
 
One lesson that post-1949 German constitutionalism learned from 1930s Germany is 
that tyrannies can take hold even absent majority support. The Nazis required only the 
legitimacy which the organs of state authority provided to complete their dismantling of 
constitutional democracy. The 1960s reapportionment cases examined in Chapter 5 tell a 
similar story. While the malapportioned state legislatures fell some way short of Nazi 
tyranny, by January 1962, 45 states across the United States were under the control of 
state legislatures, where majority control of at least one house could be theoretically 
achieved with legislators representing less than 40 percent of the state population.
20
 
As we will see in Chapter 3 and later chapters in the context of Germany’s 
recovery after 1945, constitutional dangers for the fledgling Federal Republic were 
identified in 1964 by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, a political theorist, protégé of Carl 
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Schmitt, and a justice on the Bundesverfassungsgericht from 1983 to 1996. 
Böckenförde’s concern was how the liberal democratic state could sustain itself in a 
secular age without the type of indoctrination of the citizenry which would make a 
mockery of the idea of ‘liberal’ democracy. Böckenförde’s question was directed at 
essentially the same problem addressed in different ways by Jefferson, Tocqueville, and 
Arendt: how the bond between the emancipated citizen and the state could be 
maintained. While Jefferson’s focus was on how the bond between citizens and state 
could be maintained through civic participation and increasing the presence of the state 
in the lives of the citizens, Böckenförde’s concern―reflecting the modern difficulty of 
broad civic participation in large complex states―was about whether that same bond 
could be maintained in a secular age through liberal constitutional values alone. 
Böckenförde’s critique was aimed at the objective value order of the Court which he 
would later sit on, a value system which he thought, firstly, sacrificed some 
“liberalness” in the interests of the “prescribed state ideology, the revival of the 
Aristotelian polis tradition”, and secondly, might be insufficiently cohesive to bind 
Germans to, what remained in 1964, a fragile liberal democracy.
21
 Arendt’s 
interpretation of Jefferson, Tocqueville’s view on how despotism occurs, and, 
implicitly, Böckenförde’s view on the bonds of social cohesion are all pointing, I 
contend, to the same general conclusion. That representative government, or the secular 
liberal state, as Böckenförde puts it, are at risk when citizens and the state become 
foreign to one another, either through a lack of participation in government or when the 
values and interpretations of each diverge.  
The task, then, is how to ensure that participation occurs, and, in terms of what 
American or German constitutionalism permits, that it is participation that supports, and 
does not threaten, the constitutional order. As already stated, between the legal / 
institutional space―in which the reapportionment and electoral threshold cases take 
place―and the civic space, it is the latter that, I contend, is most crucial to the health 
and survival of the polity. This dichotomy sets up several conclusions related to the 
activity and success of each court in each of these two spaces. Firstly, though, I must 
establish some premises before stating the conclusions. 
The focus of the legal case studies is on citizens who have been 
unconstitutionally excluded from the civic space either by local political majorities and 
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their representatives, or constitutionally excluded by the state in the interests of 
stability. The first scenario reflects the debasement of urban citizens’ votes in the U.S. 
due to malapportionment, and the second, the German electoral threshold cases related 
to European Parliament elections where the votes of German citizens voting for parties 
garnering less than 5 percent of the vote are effectively nullified because the parties do 
not get a seat in parliament. Although the legal cases are argued in the legal / 
institutional space, the effects of the decisions have the potential to be felt in the civic 
space in terms of whether they improve electoral participation, the constitutional 
culture, the overall quality of the polity, and the relationship between the citizen and the 
state.  
Beyond this question of how court decisions in the legal / institutional space 
affect the civic space is the broader and more central question of how American and 
German constitutionalism, and the U.S. Supreme Court and Bundesverfassungsgericht 
shape and influence the vital civic space that is integral to the democratic relationship 
between citizen and state, and, sometimes, the survival of the constitutional order itself. 
In other words, what is the judicial role in creating, maintaining or repairing the civic 
space within which opinions and values emerge in a liberal democracy? This idea raises 
multiple questions, not least whether the creation and maintenance of such a civic and 
political space by judges in the context of a liberal democracy is itself a non-sequitur? In 
other words, does a judicially created ‘civic space’ constitute a negation of liberalism 
itself? Germany is, following Böckenförde’s critique, the most obvious example of such 
a judicially created polis.
22
 As I examine in Chapter 2, the very idea that the BVerfG can 
create a polis stems principally from the dignity oriented nature of German 
constitutionalism, the Court’s objective value order, its wide ranging powers under the 
Basic Law, and its control over public and private law. 
Exogenous rather than endogenous exclusion of voters is the subject of the legal 
cases, either through malapportionment by the U.S. states, or through electoral 
thresholds maintained by the sovereign state of Germany. Endogenous exclusion (or 
self-exclusion) of citizens due to their own apathy, lack of interest in politics or in 
participating in the civic space is a real issue in modern liberal democracies, as 
evidenced by a generally downward trend in voter turnouts at elections.
23
 Although 
‘self-exclusion’ is not considered directly in this thesis, it is indirectly through the lesser 
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or greater capacity of American and German constitutionalism to shape and influence 
the quality of the civic space in which citizens choose to engage (or not).  
The legal cases and the effects of American and German constitutionalism in 
their respective civic spaces reveal some paradoxical conclusions, but ones which 
nevertheless follow from the liberty-dignity dichotomy. Through its decisions in the 
reapportionment cases, Baker v Carr and Reynolds v Sims, the Supreme Court was able 
in the legal / institutional space to successfully correct flaws in the political process to 
end malapportionment. This had a broadly positive effect on the civic space due to a 
rebalancing of political power from rural to urban areas. Moreover, the knowledge of 
urban and suburban voters that their votes were no longer being debased could only 
improve democratic participation. However, the effects of the reapportionment cases in 
the civic space were, I think, limited. The Court’s inability to deal with the issue of 
gerrymandering, to bridge the differences between urban and rural areas, and to 
positively improve American democratic practices illustrates its limited reach in the 
civic space. By contrast, in the legal / institutional space, the BVerfG's interventions in 
the European Parliament electoral threshold cases have sometimes been 
methodologically suspect, counter-productive and, potentially a risk to stability at the 
EU level; but in the civic space, due to its objective value order, the respect for law in 
Germany, its powers in the Basic Law and through the positive effect on ‘civics’, from 
the constitutional complaint mechanism, the BVerfG has been much more successful 
than the Supreme Court at creating a strong democratic and constitutional culture.
24
  
The intervention by the Supreme Court in the reapportionment cases and its ‘one 
person one vote’ decision can be explained through a changed understanding of the idea 
of equality within American constitutionalism, and of the groups and persons to whom 
equality applies. This logic formed the basis of the reasoning of both the Court and the 
submissions of the Solicitor General’s office25 in the reapportionment cases, which 
highlighted the expanding suffrage and the significance that successive constitutional 
amendments implied.
26
 However, this decision took place in the legal / institutional 
already mentioned; in other words, the courts. Malapportionment arose out of a 
breakdown in the civic space where local majorities held onto power unconstitutionally. 
While the Supreme Court could remedy the situation and compel every state legislature 
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in the U.S. to reapportion, the value schism between urban and rural areas which caused 
malapportionment remained.  
The Supreme Court’s formalisation of this ‘liberal’ or ‘equality’ narrative of 
constitutional development concealed an increasing geographic and regional value 
schism between urban and rural areas, and northern and southern regions after the 1930s 
which reached its peak during the period of the Warren Court (1953 – 1969). This 
geographic value schism which became unmistakable from the 1960s onwards, is 
vividly represented in the campaign by civil society actors against malapportionment 
which is examined in Chapter 5. Malapportionment was ostensibly a power battle 
between state legislatures dominated by rural lawmakers representing a declining 
number of voters, and urban politicians and civil society actors demanding more equal 
numerical reapportionment between electoral districts. The conflict over 
malapportionment, however, also reflected a clash of interests and values. On one side, 
the wealthy rural areas supported by big business interests that were vehemently 
opposed to the social reforms ushered in by the New Deal. On the other, cities with 
under-represented and growing populations, where unionization created a political 
consensus demanding improved rights for employees.
27
   
While the important interventions in American representative democracy by the 
U.S. Supreme Court have been generally episodic to deal with specific issues like 
malapportionment, those of the BVerfG since the founding of the Federal Republic have 
been as constant as they have been significant. The German judicial involvement in 
representative democracy represents a paradox. It is characteristic of the militant 
democracy at the heart of the constitutional order since 1949, but this stretibare 
Demokratie also marks the maturation of Germany’s liberal constitutionalism that was 
extinguished in 1849, and which was again snuffed out with the demise of the Weimar 
Republic. The Court’s intervention in the European Parliament electoral threshold cases 
thus represents an attempt to balance fundamental goals which lie at the heart of 
Germany’s constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz): upholding the architectonic 
principles of human dignity and the free democratic basic order and preventing the 
constitutional order from committing democratic suicide, as happened to the Weimar 
Republic.  
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The title of Chapter 2 with its main focus on constitutionalism is ‘Taking 
Democracy Seriously’. This means recognising the importance of democratic 
participation as a means of governance and a mark of human dignity, but also being 
alert to its deficiencies and the capacity of individuals and groups with the most anti-
democratic instincts to exploit those vulnerabilities. In Germany, this has meant a 
reliance on the BVerfG and the defence mechanisms of the militant democracy to 
maintain stability. The Court’s role as guardian of the Basic Law means that it must 
decide whether new political parties represent forces of renewal which can be safely 
integrated within the constitutional order as the Greens were in the 1980s, or whether 
they must be banned as the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) and German Communist Party 
(KPD) were in the 1950s.
28
 
Understanding how both countries have mediated this balance requires a focus 
on how the values of constitutionalism have developed through interpretation and social 
struggle in society, and the extent to which the citizens and groups in both countries 
identify with these values, or only with what Böckenförde calls “internal bonding 
forces”29, such as religion or nation. The initial emancipation of the individual from the 
state which the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man’ ushered in was initially short-lived as 
the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century provided a means to reintegrate people 
into the state. However, the relative decline of the force of nation since 1945 raises the 
question of how representative democracy and liberal values can maintain the bond 
between citizen and state. Individualism too has increasingly alienated people from one 
another, leaving societal cohesion and the liberal democratic constitutional state reliant 
on those values of human dignity, equality and fundamental rights, reflected in the post-
1945 human rights instruments and in the rulings of the Supreme Court from the late 
1930s onwards.  
The ‘international’ dimension is highlighted in Chapter 2 because of its 
relevance to two recurring ideas which will be referred to in the following chapters. 
First, is the question, unique to Germany, of whether the Federal Republic (FRG) after 
1949 was simply a ‘fair weather’ democracy, blessed with economic growth and an 
international cold war context which provided stability but which disguised the absence 
of a supportive framework of liberal values or democratic inclination in German 
society? Second, is the question which, I contend, has implications for all liberal 
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constitutional democracies, of whether the liberal democratic state, following 
Böckenförde, rests “on presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee”30. The fact that 
the values being promulgated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also reflected the values of the 
Basic Law and other new constitutions after 1945 was cause for optimism, but also 
caution. Was the dialectic of rights and human dignity at the international level simply a 
veneer which disguised the basic fragility of liberal values within states?  
1.2 Enquiry 
The scholarly interest in democracy in the early years of the 21st century was 
palpable. Partly this was a response to the end of the Cold War and the burgeoning of 
democratic forces in eastern Europe. Democracy was, as one writer put it, “the only 
game in town.”31 This academic focus reflected the underlying reality that “there have 
been more governments that would be termed ‘democratic’ in place over the past two 
decades than at any point in human history.”32 Yet even as democracy appeared to enjoy 
a resurgence with the collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, concerns were 
raised about the illiberal nature of some of these emergent democracies.
33
 Since World 
War Two democracy and liberalism had become almost interchangeable as labels for a 
government committed to upholding the civil, individual and political rights of its 
citizens.  
The growing disjuncture between the two concepts in recent years caused by 
growing illiberalism―illustrated by the current anti-liberal trajectory of Hungary and 
Poland, and the ‘unknown unknowns’ of a Trump presidency―brings into sharp relief 
the role of the courts in maintaining rights when political channels either become 
corrupted or actively hostile to individual liberty and democracy itself. Ongoing threats 
to constitutionalism in Hungary and Poland from their ruling parties, countries where 
the roots of liberalism have been only recently planted, are a reminder of the challenge 
of entrenching liberal values against nationalist and other extremist forces. That 
Germany’s post-war constitution served as a model for these two countries34 is a further 
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reason to assess whether the successful German model of constitutionalism as 
manifested in fundamental rights, restrictions on state power and a powerful 
constitutional court is still effective at preventing a country committing ‘democratic 
suicide’.  
Even more than the question of the legitimacy of judicial review in the United 
States, which was the inspiration for Alexander Bickel’s so-called ‘Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty’35, the judicial involvement in the processes of representative democracy 
raises important questions about the justification for such interventions, confidence in 
democratic processes, and the substantive values that a constitutional order stands for. 
Constitutionalism adds a further layer of complexity to these questions of democratic 
legitimacy by seeking to ensure that political processes are conducted in conformity 
with duly enacted law and are compatible with the higher law values that a 
constitutional order recognises through its courts. To what extent do fundamental values 
of human dignity and equality eclipse the right of democratic participation, or justify the 
courts intervening in rules governing democratic or electoral processes, even to protect 
minority groups? And if participating in the democratic process is itself an intrinsic 
mark of human dignity, under what circumstances may that right be restricted in the 
interests of either stability or the survival of the state? 
The distinction between the focus on liberty in American constitutionalism and 
that on dignity in German constitutionalism is crucial to the relationship between 
democratic institutions and the citizens because of the comprehensive normative control 
that I argue the BVerfG has over both the legal / institutional (i.e. court) space and the 
civic space. The Supreme Court only has influence over the former, its own domain. 
This is due to a variety of factors including the liberty-dignity dichotomy, the BVerfG’s 
control over the entire German legal system (public and private law), and the German 
‘constitutional complaint’ and ‘organ of state proceeding’ mechanisms. Whereas the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s role in American democracy is essentially corrective for when 
something goes badly wrong with the system (i.e. voter exclusion or voter 
disenfranchisement), that of the BVerfG has been far more comprehensive in shaping 
the relationship between citizen and state. Thus, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has been 
much more successful than the U.S. Supreme Court at establishing a strong liberal 
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democratic culture.
36
 As will be addressed in later chapters, this is why the German 
court’s influence over German democracy has been more significant and far reaching 
than that of the U.S. Supreme Court over American democracy.  
Ultimately, what happens in the civic space is far more crucial to the 
maintenance of a healthy representative democracy, and the survival of the state itself 
than what happens in the legal / institutional space. Germany ostensibly has an 
advantage over the United States because of the way that German constitutionalism has 
been able to shape that civic space, and majority opinion, to create a mature liberal 
democracy. The advantage that American constitutionalism has had, at least up to 2016, 
is that the variations in majority sentiment in such a large country has meant that while 
the conditions of liberal democracy have not been nurtured as in Germany, the ability of 
majorities and minorities in the U.S. to live their lives within a broad tableau of 
constitutional meaning has prevented anything from going too badly wrong. This 
picture of constitutionalism in both countries is primarily rooted in the liberty-dignity 
dichotomy which will be elaborated upon more fully in Chapter 2. 
A shift in the BVerfG’s jurisprudence can be observed from some aspects of the 
traditional ‘militant democracy’ stance of German constitutionalism to a greater focus 
on electoral equality between voters and equal opportunity between parties.
37
 In these 
cases from 2011 and 2014, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 7, the Court 
made a controversial decision to strike down the 5 percent threshold for elections to the 
European Parliament.
38
 The decisions were contentious because such electoral hurdles 
have been seen since 1949 as a tool to prevent legislative fragmentation as was seen 
during the Weimar Republic. The spectacle of a constitutional court taking steps to 
reduce voter inequality and widen the plurality of democratic choices available, against 
the wishes of, and to the consternation of, Germany’s democratic legislature and 
government, is only one of the paradoxes that these cases raise.  
The role of each Court in supporting groups and voters that have been excluded, 
constitutionally and unconstitutionally, from the political process is a key focus of this 
enquiry. In the U.S., the famous footnote four of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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Carolene Products
39
 signalled a process of more searching judicial review where 
political processes had excluded minority groups from participation in the political 
process. In the U.S. malapportionment cases, this exclusion, through the debasement of 
voting strength, was manifestly unconstitutional as a consequence of the failure of many 
state legislatures to reapportion for almost sixty years. Since the BVerfG’s establishment 
in 1951 it has seen its role as giving support to the parliamentary opposition in 
discharging their responsibilities and, as already mentioned, in support of the integration 
of parties like the Greens. In the German electoral threshold cases related to European 
Parliament (EP) elections, the exclusion of voters and parties had been entirely 
constitutional as a result of the Federal Republic’s intense focus on stability since 1949, 
but in its decisions of 2011 and 2014 the Court ruled that the thresholds (Sperrklauseln) 
could no longer be justified. 
Key Definitions: Malapportionment and Gerrymandering 
There are essentially two forms of malapportionment: numerically based, which is 
referred to as ‘malapportionment’ hereafter; the second is geographically based 
malapportionment, which is known as ‘gerrymandering.’ The main focus of Chapter 5 
is on numerically based malapportionment which was the primary problem in the 
United States prior to the 1960s reapportionment cases including Baker v Carr
40
. This 
form of malapportionment occurs when there are significant variations in the 
populations of legislative districts in a state, resulting in some legislators representing 
many more constituents than other lawmakers. Gerrymandering became even more 
common in the U.S. after numerically based malapportionment was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. It is characterised by the attempt to gain 
electoral advantage for one party by the drawing of the boundaries of electoral districts 
to include certain preferred voters and exclude others voter groups.
41
 
1.3 Methodology 
Constitutionalism in its post-1776 American and post-1949 German 
manifestations was fundamentally built around institutions. Even if human virtue was 
absent or corrupted, what mattered was that the institutions held firm.
42
 Institutions 
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form the bedrock of the American and German experiments in constitutional 
government. Both sets of institutions were intended to control the more venal instincts 
in human nature, whether they emanated from the rulers or the people. Germany’s 
institutions after 1949 had to cope with the continued dangers emanating from the 1932-
1945 period,
43
 as well as the dismal legacy of the Weimar Republic, and the failed 
liberal constitution of 1849.  
Jeremy Waldron, for one, thinks institutions matter a great deal for political 
theorists, and for democracy.  
We need institutions to frame the hard choices and decision-
making that our disagreements give rise to. And we need to find 
ways of respecting one another in our politics in the environment 
that those institutions provide.
44
  
Moreover, institutions are not simply frameworks for argument, or restraints on a 
corrupt people or government; they can also help deliver positive goods. Even if 
principles such as justice, liberty, security and equality remain our main preoccupation, 
Waldron adds, we must understand the institutions, (or “mechanisms”), through which 
these ‘ideals’, as he calls them, are pursued.45  
Waldron’s emphasis on the importance of institutions is one which I concur 
with. This thesis adopts an analytical-historical approach that assesses American and 
German constitutionalism through one or more of these three understandings of 
institutions: as a restraint on government and the people; as a framework for ongoing 
deliberation among people of different views; and as mechanism through which the 
state may attempt to advance certain values including justice, liberty, security and 
equality. However, institutions are not enough. 
That is to say, while institutions are hugely important in American and German 
constitutionalism, they do not in themselves tell us what is happening in the civic space, 
or reveal the health of the relationship between a people and their constitutional 
government; nor do institutions sufficiently explain why some constitutions succeed and 
others fail. In the context of the central enquiry, a focus on institutions alone does not 
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explain the value systems, ways of life, forms of identity and “internal bonding 
forces”46 in the civic space, and the ways in which they may reinforce or undermine the 
enunciation of constitutional values in the legal / institutional space. While an emphasis 
on institutions is important in constitutionalism, it is a dangerously incomplete picture if 
it leaves out of the equation the crucial civic space in which citizens participate in their 
democracy, or challenge it.  
A number of other writers have also highlighted, implicitly or more clearly, the 
importance of democratic practice, political culture and civic society in supporting 
formal political institutions. In his study of 22 democracies that have remained steadily 
democratic since at least 1950, Robert Dahl noted that the key factors which seem to 
favour democratic stability include “effective control by elected leaders over the 
military and police, a political culture supportive of democratic beliefs, and a relatively 
well functioning economic order.”47 If some conditions in a country are favourable to 
democracy while some are unfavourable, then Dahl argues that the particular features of 
constitutional institutions could tip the balance one way or the other, “toward 
democratic stability or democratic breakdown”.48 Dahl’s study indicates that “no 
constitutional system can preserve democracy in a country where the other favourable 
conditions are absent.
49
 In other words, while institutions may sometimes tip the 
balance “where the underlying conditions make democracy rather chancy”50, they are 
only part of the picture. 
With Dahl’s somewhat bleak take duly noted, it would seem that 
constitutionalism will often have its work cut out in certain countries at certain times. 
Dahl’s emphasis on a “political culture supportive of democratic beliefs” highlights the 
need for an analytical approach that recognises the importance of both the civic space, 
and legal / institutional space. This is the analytical approach that will be adopted in the 
succeeding chapters. Though expressed slightly more enigmatically than Dahl, Sheldon 
Wolin points to an emphasis on the civic and cultural conditions that support 
constitutional democracy.  
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Rites are cultural rather than legal artefacts. Their value lies in the 
responses that they evoke, and these depend upon the store of 
beliefs, memories, customs, and values in the society―all that 
makes up the political culture. A political culture sets standards of 
performance not only for its authorities and rulers but for its 
members.
51 
Wolin’s division in the final sentence between the legal and the cultural space, between 
the performance of the authorities and of its members―the people, highlights a 
distinctive feature of the approach taken in this thesis: the division between the legal / 
institutional space in which the Supreme Court and Bundesverfassungsgericht interpret 
and shape constitutional meaning, and the civic space in which ‘its members’ accept, 
reject, and contest constitutional meaning, or even challenge the existing constitutional 
order. 
 The idea of performance in the above excerpt from Wolin highlights how the act of 
citizenship and of participating in a civic or legal / institutional space and upholding the 
polis may require one to don a certain garb or mask. One writer who addressed the need 
for a structure within which political conversations and participation could take place is 
Hannah Arendt. As Waldron notes, Arendt “invokes the imagery of construction outside 
the house: fences and boundary walls, which make politics possible by securing a space 
for the public realm.”52 Waldron emphasises Arendt’s idea of isonomy―the “capacity 
of positive laws to make people equal in the political realm, even if they are in other 
respects different and unequal”.53 This idea of law creating a common language within 
which citizens can relate to one another as equals is one I will come back to. Arendt’s 
focus on the role of law in the act of citizenship or persona seems particularly relevant 
for both the United States and Germany, although in different ways. The role of law has 
been intrinsic to their institutional development and, to a greater or less degree, their 
national narrative.  
The term ‘civic space’ that I use throughout the thesis refers to the place where 
citizens participate in politics and their democracy by voting, or where they uphold or 
contest the values of their society through discourse and argument. For a civic space to 
exist, I argue that it must be based on an “exchange of opinion between equals”54, such 
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as Arendt described the American founders as desiring. Law occupies an important 
place in the thesis that I have called the ‘legal / institutional space’, which is an 
important part of constitutionalism. It is primarily the courtroom, but also wherever the 
influence and value of law and the constitutional interpretations of the respective courts 
are accepted. Thus, the law may be, in Böckenfördean terms, an internal bonding force 
of civic and societal cohesion, or a common language within which citizens can regard 
one another as equals. Here, I see law as providing a framework and nomenclature 
which helps individuals see themselves as embodying and sharing certain values.  
Although written about England in the 1940s, George Orwell’s description of 
constitutionalism and law as cultural and social artefacts, and a language of cohesion, is 
exactly how I see the potential for the legal / institutional space to extend into the civic 
space. 
Here one comes upon an all-important English trait: the respect for 
constitutionalism and legality, the belief in ‘the law’ as something 
above the State and above the individual. […] Everyone takes it 
for granted that the law, such as it is, will be respected, and feels a 
sense of outrage when it is not. Remarks like “They can’t run me 
in; I haven’t done anything wrong”, or “They can’t do that; it’s 
against the law”, are part of the atmosphere of England. […] 
Everyone believes in his heart that the law can be, ought to be, 
and, on the whole, will be impartially administered. The 
totalitarian idea that there is no such thing as law, there is only 
power, has never taken root.
55
 
Without acceptance of this sense of law and constitutionalism in the civic space, the 
influence of the Supreme Court and the Bundesverfassungsgericht becomes purely 
institutional and effectively consigned to the courtroom. Their decisions still have the 
force of law and must be obeyed, but the courts’ potential to improve the processes and 
values of democratic politics and support the relationship between citizen and state is 
greatly reduced.  
 The health of the civic space and the relationship between citizen and state would 
seem to rest, then, on one or more of the following: civic and associational activities in 
Tocquevillean and Jeffersonian terms; Böckenförde’s internal bonding forces such as 
religion, nation, and, perhaps, Orwell’s cultural artefact view of law and 
constitutionalism above; or the sheer vibrancy of political life and its participatory 
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potential. With respect to the latter, generally poor voter turnout in elections across 
Western democracies suggest all is not well in this department, although Germany 
seems in a rather better position.
56
 
 The thesis approach adopted does not make any normative judgments as to 
whether the language of law is more potent or important than the language of politics. It 
assumes, though, that an understanding of the rule of law in society as a whole can only 
strengthen a democratic politics based on equal respect. One current problem in the U.S. 
is that there no longer seems to be any civic (or civil) language that is currently able to 
fill the gap that the decline of civic, religious, and associational activity has left. Richard 
Bellamy’s argument that democracy “embodies and upholds” the values of 
“constitutionalism, rights [and] the rule of law” provides an important framework for 
conceptualising what I see as a key question which orients the distinction between 
America’s ‘liberty’ oriented constitutionalism, and Germany’s ‘dignity’ infused 
model.
57
 This is the question of whether democratic ideas and practice provide the 
conditions for rights and the rule of law to emerge, or the reverse: whether fundamental 
rights and the rule of law are the sine qua non for the emergence of liberal democracy? 
The latter view is embodied in the principles and practice of German constitutionalism 
since 1949.  
 In Germany’s case, some of the roots of this understanding lie in the Kant infused 
development of the Rechtsstaat in the early nineteenth century. The translations ‘rule of 
law’ state or the ‘law governed state’ do not quite do justice to the original idea of the 
Rechtsstaat as a “state governed by the law of reason” which  
insisted on the freedom, equality, and autonomy of each individual 
within the framework of a unified legal order defined by 
legislation and administered by independent courts of law.
58
  
As will be addressed in Chapters 6 and 7, after 1949, this older focus on the Rechtsstaat 
was fused with a set of constitutional values derived from “the dialectic between […] 
liberal, socialist, and Christian natural-law traditions”59. Moreover, the older emphasis 
on law and natural rights as a precondition for democracy found fertile ground in the 
                                                          
56
 U.S. turnout in the 2016 election was 58%. In Germany in the Bundestag election of 2013, it was 
71.5%. By way of comparison, voter turnout in the U.K. rose from a low of 59% in 2001 to 66.1% in 
2015. 
57
 See Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism : A Republican Defence of The Constitutionality of 
Democracy, p. 260. 
58
 Donald P Kommers and Russell A Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of The Federal Republic of 
Germany 3rd edn (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2012), p. 48. 
59
 Ibid. p. 70. 
34 
 
widely held German cultural view that politics was “a dirty business” and law a “clean 
one”60. 
 In the U.S. by contrast, the free space that the constitutionalism of liberty initially 
provided opened up boundless possibilities for the development of various forms of 
self-government and various value systems, including less savoury ones like slavery. 
The fencing off of government which created this zone of liberty created a profound 
divergence between what Wolin saw as the “sophisticated theory of a Constitution” as 
represented by The Federalist Papers, and the “flourishing political cultures and 
practices” as represented by the colonial and revolutionary history of the several 
states.
61
 
 What I am interested in examining are the modern heirs, or consequences, of this 
divide between theory and practice for the relationship between citizen and state, and 
the possibility of liberal representative democracy. This divergence between theory and 
practice influences, without determining, the separation between the legal / institutional 
space and the civic space. Regardless of their different national histories, the strength of 
the relationship between citizen and state in the U.S. and Germany seems much more 
determined by the health of the civic space. However, the potential and possibility of 
law shaping or improving the processes and values of that civic space is one that I 
believe is important as this analysis proceeds. This does not have to mean the 
domination of the civic space by the legal / institutional one. It merely means preserving 
within the civic space an understanding of the values of constitutionalism and law as 
being the antithesis of pure power, in the sense Orwell captured so well.  
 There is, though, an important difference between the U.S. and Germany which 
takes us back to Waldron’s point about how institutions can be a means to pursue 
certain “ideals”. American constitutional institutions were fundamentally conditioned 
by the idea of restraining the state―what I call ‘liberty’ constitutionalism―and thus 
leaving a zone of freedom for the citizen. By contrast, the highly normative ‘dignity’ 
constitutionalism of Germany’s Basic Law and its institutions sought to establish a 
relationship between the individual and their community based on “a person’s 
dependence on and commitment to the community, without infringing upon a person’s 
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individual value”62 In other words, while American constitutionalism sought to fence 
off the institutional space (i.e. government) from the civic space, German 
constitutionalism has sought to reunite them. This understanding shapes the context 
within which judicial interventions in representative democracy occur, the extent to 
which the respective ‘constitutionalisms’ are able to influence the civic space, and 
dictates the methodological approach that is adopted. 
1.3.1 Theoretical and Methodological Approach Adopted 
The thesis will examine why judicial interventions in the institutional processes 
of representative democracy occur, and more broadly the extent to which American and 
German constitutionalism have influenced, positively or negatively, the quality of 
constitutional democracy and the relationship between citizen and state. The thesis 
predominantly adopts an analytical rather than normative approach, focussing on how 
constitutional systems can unblock political channels which have become ossified 
through the constitutional or unconstitutional exclusion of voters and the parties they 
support; these excluded voters may support either existing or emerging political forces. 
This enquiry assesses legal cases and the role of the U.S. Supreme Court and 
Bundesverfassungsgericht as tools for the application of constitutionalism in their 
respective political systems and societies. The reason for the analytical and historical 
approach is that the relationship between citizen and state in the U.S., Germany, and 
other countries, has been shaped by the same impulses arising out of, firstly, the 
emancipation of the citizen after the French Revolution, and, secondly, the social 
cohesion problem of how the state reintegrates the emancipated citizen back into 
society.
63
 This analytical approach is not, however, undertaken from a purely legal 
perspective, rather it is focussed squarely on examining the intersection between 
politics, law, history, and theory, and how this intersection plays out both in a legal / 
institutional and civic space.  
Of particular interest within this analytical approach is the idea of 
constitutionalism as a process of historical development within which emancipatory 
advances take place. As Stanley Katz puts it, “true constitutionalism […] is the product 
of political struggle within particular societies, not a set of universal values or 
prescribable institutions.”64 Constitutionalism is a legal and a political idea; both will be 
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brought forth in the chapters ahead. However, it does so by way of an analysis based on 
political theory, but which also examines the historical context within which American 
and German constitutionalism and each of these important courts have developed. 
Overall, the analysis seeks to tease out how a changing emphasis on stability or renewal 
within American or German constitutionalism can affect interactions between the 
respective courts and litigants in cases, and more broadly how constitutional values can 
be reinforced or undermined by more traditional value systems and forms of identity in 
the civic space and society.  
Although the methodological approach adopted is predominantly analytical and 
historical, there are some potential ‘normative’ difficulties that must be clarified and 
overcome. In arguing that the strength of the relationship between citizen and state also 
depends on whether each court can influence the civic space and inculcate the values of 
the respective constitutional orders in the political culture, some judgments must 
inevitably be made in terms of whether the influence of these prominent courts has been 
positive or negative. Ostensibly, such an evaluation might appear to be normative if it 
was based on some notion of ‘the good’. Stephen Elkin argues that “political institutions 
are educative and thus have an ethical dimension.”65 While such an ethical evaluation of 
institutions is not germane to the present enquiry, this nevertheless highlights the 
question of whether the legal / institutional space and the civic space have a normative 
function or disposition that is intrinsic to them? The clear argument offered here is that 
they do not. While institutions may be designed to better achieve certain normative 
values as, indeed, those established by Germany’s Basic Law were, the value 
orientation of institutions is, I contend, principally based on the actions of those 
operating within them. If the institutions of the state are rotten it is predominantly 
because the values of the people inside them are rotten.
66
  
Institutions such as the malapportioned state legislatures or those of the Nazi 
state have the potential to exert a negative influence on the values of the civic space. 
Equally, the possibility also exists for the civic space to influence the political and legal 
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institutions of the state positively or negatively, dependent on the values of the citizens 
within the civic space.
67
 It may not be possible to escape entirely from the normative 
implications of this chicken/egg scenario, yet the intrinsic normativity in 
constitutionalism offers a possible solution.
68
 One test of the influence of the legal / 
institutional space in the civic space is certainly the degree of acceptance in the civic 
space of the values of constitutionalism as enunciated by the respective courts. 
However, common to American and German constitutionalism, and to the decisions in 
each of the case studies, as I will outline, is the importance of equality, the acceptance 
or rejection of which in the civic space represents another important test of the influence 
of the legal / institutional space in the civic space, and of the overall health of the polity.  
One reason, it is suggested, that the Supreme Court has not been able to 
positively influence all of the multiple civic spaces in a continent sized country such as 
the U.S. is the liberty-centric nature of American constitutionalism with its hyper-
individualism and its deep ambivalence towards government. Thus, the predominant 
value orientation operating within a given American civic space at any time is likely to 
be determined as much, if not more, by the value orientations of those citizens and civil 
society actors who are active in that civic space. As I will illustrate in Chapter 5, it was 
the activities and values of civil society actors such as the League of Women Voters in 
the United States that reached across from the civic space into the legal / institutional 
space and precipitated the litigation that resulted in malapportionment being declared 
unconstitutional. A further aspect of the analysis in Chapter 7 involves assessing the 
decisions of the BVerfG in the European Parliament (EP) electoral threshold cases 
against the stability oriented account of German constitutionalism that I have set out 
earlier in the thesis, particularly in Chapter 6. Such an assessment inevitably involves an 
evaluative judgment of those EP decisions, particularly given the normative nature
69
 of 
German constitutionalism. Ultimately, I suggest that the BVerfG’s normative 
exuberance in advancing one value in the Basic Law, equality, is in tension with the 
Court’s prior emphasis on stability. 
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Constitutionalism depends on the right balance between liberal and republican 
ideas to be effective. A purely liberal approach which focused on rights and which 
attempted to restrain state power through only legal approaches could run the risk of 
stagnating as the people become reliant on courts rather than political channels to 
maintain their democratic rights. As will be illustrated in Chapter 7, the ability of 
citizens to file complaints with the BVerfG has been seen over 130,000 people file 
complaints since the Court’s establishment in 1951. While the process, and the 
knowledge that it is available, has undoubtedly contributed to Germans becoming good 
constitutional democrats, there are dangers as well. A constitutional situation where 
citizens increasingly turn to the courts to resolve their economic or political problems is 
replete with problems, particularly the danger of lethargy among the citizenry in being 
awake to threats to liberal democracy that might emerge through political channels, as 
happened in 1930s Germany. Thus, as part of the analytical approach adopted one of the 
questions asked in Chapter 7 is whether the central role of the BVerfG in Germany 
represents a risk to the country’s democracy or its surest foundation? Yet we must also 
recognise that a republican approach dependent entirely on a stagnating political system, 
perhaps characterised by gridlock and a weak centre-ground as seen in U.S. politics 
over the last twenty years may contribute to the sort of apathy or anger among voters 
which appeared to explain the result of the 2016 presidential election. Thus, either an 
over reliance on the courts or the failure of normal politics to address voter concerns 
increases the likelihood that citizens may vote for more extreme parties or candidates to 
deal with their problems if normal democratic channels have ossified.  
In its focus on the intersection between politics, law, history and the civic space 
within constitutionalism, the thesis seeks to assess whether specific court decisions 
serve to reinforce or undermine 1) the relationship between the liberal democratic state 
and its citizens, 2) the processes and principles of liberal constitutional democracy, and 
3) the country’s underlying constitutional culture. Such decisions may promote stability 
or renewal, or sometimes both. Ensuring the participation of new political parties and 
excluded
70
 voters may function to renew the political landscape and aid stability by 
ensuring that tensions and pressures arising from political exclusion are reduced. 
However, as will be addressed in Chapter 7, allowing some voters and parties to 
participate in the political system may cause instability and a breakdown in democratic 
processes if legislative fragmentation prevents a parliamentary majority from being able 
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to form, as during the Weimar Republic. The important emphasis on ‘constitutionalism’ 
and ‘liberal democracy’ in this evaluation reflects the stability-renewal dichotomy 
which must also be considered both in the civic and legal / institutional space. A court 
decision reinforcing the relationship between citizens and their state, and improving 
democratic participation which leads to the rise of an illiberal democracy
71
 and then the 
collapse of constitutional government would, clearly, involve too much renewal and not 
enough stability.  
The three part assessment above cannot be made, however, purely on the basis 
of the judicial interventions in the U.S. reapportionment cases or the German electoral 
threshold cases. It must also take into consideration the particular characteristics of 
American and German constitutionalism. This would include the historical development 
of constitutionalism, how particular decisions such as reapportionment fit into a larger 
narrative of court decisions, and indeed the larger narrative of the Court’s history 
including its role in the political system, and how its actions, and the law itself, are 
viewed by political actors and citizens.  
The emphasis in this thesis is overwhelmingly on the domestic historic 
development of constitutionalism and democracy in each country. The interventions by 
the judiciary in Germany and the United States in their democratic processes have 
invariably involved the enunciation of important constitutional principles such as 
equality, human dignity and justice, which have primarily emerged out of each 
country’s own political and historic development. Thus, in the U.S. long unfulfilled 
principles of equality promised from the founding period to the Fourteenth Amendment 
were slowly realized by the Supreme Court in law in response to social struggles.
 72
  
Thus, I argue the fundamental importance of historical development within 
constitutionalism cannot be neglected, particularly if we are to see how constitutional 
understandings of equal protection and judicial methods of constitutional interpretation 
have evolved.  
In Germany, the fundamental respect for law in German society, the principle of 
the Rechtsstaat from the early nineteenth century, and the unfulfilled liberal principles 
of the country’s 1849 constitution, which militarism had crushed, for almost a century, 
contributed to the strong resurgence of constitutionalism after 1949. Additionally, and 
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to a far greater extent than the U.S.― the values of German constitutionalism were 
influenced by comparable principles emerging from the post-1945 rights instruments 
and regimes, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
founders of the Federal Republic who established the Basic Law in 1949 were 
especially concerned with binding the country to international institutions. This was 
partly because they shared the values of these instruments and wished Germany to 
rejoin the community of nations, sentiment that is expressed in the Basic Law’s 
preamble.
73
 However, a secondary motive behind binding Germany to the Western 
alliance, the ECHR and the emerging European community was also to reinforce the 
country’s fragile democratic institutions.74  
My analysis of the German Constitutional Court has intentionally relied on 
criticisms made within Germany, since to anyone outside Germany, the placing of so 
much trust in a court might seem problematic. However, the Court has undoubtedly 
worked for Germany. While the Court itself is sui generis in terms of its power over the 
German political system, the flaws in constitutional democracy that it was created to 
counter have existed from classical times to the present day. Although at no point in 
human history have those flaws been as badly exposed and with such an ultimately 
heavy human cost as in the Weimar Republic.  
1.3.2 Case Selection 
Issacharoff notes that there is “a recurring pattern through which courts in many 
different constitutional regimes have had to confront surprising similar issues, 
regardless of the precise constitutional regime at play.”75 While rejecting any claim of 
universal applicability, important lessons can be drawn from the United States and 
Germany given that both countries’ constitutions have acted as models for constitution 
formation in scores of states around the world.
76
 
The constitutional legal cases looked at in the U.S. and Germany both illustrate 
the involvement of civil society groups and citizens in attempting to ensure their voting 
rights and constitutions were upheld. The political campaign against malapportionment 
in the U.S., which initially went nowhere due to the intransigence and vested interests of 
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lawmakers, eventually became a legal struggle in the federal courts. In Germany, it was 
the constitutional complaint mechanism which provided the means for citizens and 
political parties in the two European Parliament cases to petition the BVerfG. 
 The cases studies will be drawn from the period during which the courts have 
existed in parallel: from 1951 when the Bundesverfassungsgericht was established to 
the present day. Although the case studies will be drawn from this period, the analysis 
of the development of American and German constitutionalism will cover the period 
from the late eighteenth century to today. The focus on the period beginning in 1951 is 
not merely for reasons of temporal convenience. As Lietzmann notes, “the orientation of 
judicial activities on topics such as freedom of speech and assembly, the dignity of men 
and women, and the putative values of the constitution, in short, the manifestation of the 
traditional civil-democratic rhetoric, is formative for both courts.”77 
The cases that I will look at are instances where the courts have responded to a 
demand for relief from civil society actors, political actors and individual voters. In 
Baker v Carr and the other reapportionment cases, legal action was preceded by many 
years of demands from civil society, and from the executive branch, for action from 
state legislatures to end the malapportionment. No actions were forthcoming since 
legislators elected by a minority of the population were hardly likely to reapportion 
themselves out of employment. In the German cases, a challenge was made to the five 
percent threshold for electoral success for EU elections which came through a 
combination of constitutional complaints from German citizens 
(Verfassungsbeschwerden) and complaints made by organs of the state 
(Organstreitverfahren). These cases, which were brought by individual voters and 
smaller political parties, provide a useful illustration of the Court’s influence over the 
German political system, but equally highlight the central themes of the thesis: of voter 
exclusion (unconstitutionally or constitutionally), and how constitutionalism mitigates 
the dangers to the system of either too much of the wrong participation or not enough of 
the right kind. 
1.3.3 Structure 
From here, then, the thesis will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will begin by 
establishing some parameters for understanding American and German 
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constitutionalism as being broadly rooted in the principles of liberty and dignity, 
respectively. The development of a predominantly normative constitutionalism after 
1945 grounded in human rights norms and the individual in law will be considered, 
particularly with respect to Germany where the international context was more keenly 
felt than the U.S. However, while post-1945 constitutionalism reinforced the idea of the 
rise of the individual, it also contributed to a further weakening of the homogenising 
bonds between citizen and state which are an important part of this enquiry.  
The question of civil association, civic participation and the values of the civic 
space will be considered in Chapter 3. How resilient are constitutional values such as 
human dignity in comparison to traditional values or forms of identity? Do political 
activities and more traditional forms of association and identity in the civic space serve 
to reinforce or undermine constitutional values and the relationship between citizens 
and their state? With reference to the writing of Tocqueville, Böckenförde, and Arendt’s 
interpretation of Jefferson, the chapter addresses whether liberal constitutional values 
such as human dignity and fundamental rights are sufficiently cohesive to hold a society 
together and create a bond between citizens and their state without traditional forms of 
identity or “internal bonding forces” which can supplement and strengthen 
constitutional values (or at least not undermine them). Such differences in interpretation 
between institutions and civil society are unproblematic provided the local majorities 
still obey the Supreme Court’s interpretation. The problem for a state is when its values 
and interpretations are challenged by its entire population, as during the Weimar 
Republic.  
After Chapter 3’s focus on values in the civic space, Chapter 4 considers the 
legal / institutional context within which constitutional values have been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court. The chapter then assesses the problematic concept of 
majoritarianism in a country like the United States with various different local and 
regional majorities, the views of which can, as the Civil War and segregation illustrate, 
often differ from national majority opinion. Madison’s and Jefferson’s fears about the 
threats arising from ‘local majorities’ in state legislatures illustrated the divide in the 
United States between constitutional value systems and those which threatened the rule 
of law.
78
 Ultimately, it is the very flexibility in the Constitution which provides for the 
possibility of renewal, but which can also prompt such intense arguments over 
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constitutional meaning. Through an assessment of the Court’s complex relationship 
with national majoritarian politics we can observe its shifting jurisprudence in 
incorporating the Bill of Rights, and better understand the significance of Carolene 
Products footnote four in protecting political processes and minority groups. The effect 
was a seismic change between the late 1930s and 1960s in the idea of equality and an 
expansion of the groups and individuals to whom it applied.   
In Chapter 5, I address the reapportionment cases that Chief Justice Earl Warren 
regarded as the most important during his time on the Supreme Court. It was the 
concerted political action of civil society actors for two decades in the civic space which 
was instrumental in getting Baker v Carr heard in the federal courts. However, the legal 
/ institutional space of the Supreme Court became the only place in which a remedy to 
malapportionment could be secured. In its reapportionment decisions the Court fulfilled 
the principles embodied in footnote four of Carolene Products
79
, and by doing so 
unblocked the stoppages in the democratic process that Ely saw as the Court’s main 
purpose.
80
 As significant as the decisions were at the time, and remain in hindsight, they 
were, though, unable to correct the fundamental value differences between urban and 
rural areas in the civic space which caused malapportionment. Within a couple of 
decades, the gains of the decisions were partially eroded by the continuing problem of 
gerrymandering.   
The successful emergence of German constitutionalism and the country’s 
representative democracy depended greatly on the high regard for law within German 
society. This deep respect for law boosted the standing of the BVerfG, allowing it to 
consolidate its position as guardian of the Basic Law and German democracy. Chapter 6 
will assess the theoretical, historical and jurisprudential supports for stability and 
renewal within the Basic Law, with a particular focus on how the ‘value of law’ was 
important in establishing the BVerfG’s legitimacy in 1951. This was at a time when 
Germans had little faith in political institutions even as the country’s new constitutional 
institutions had equally little faith in the democratic inclination of the German people.  
Chapter 7 assesses the relationship between German representative democracy 
and the German people as it is shaped by the BVerfG. I will assess how the Court has 
involved itself in Germany’s political and electoral processes, often on behalf of 
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opposition groups and smaller political parties. In the European Parliament electoral 
threshold cases, the court controversially struck down the long-standing 5 percent 
threshold that parties have to clear to gain a seat. Overall, the chapter takes a more 
critical look at the role of the BVerfG in its interventions in these cases, even as the 
Court’s standing and respect among the German people remains unequalled by any 
other institution in the German state. 
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Chapter 2 - Taking Democracy Seriously 
What has changed since the Second World War is the acceptance 
that there is an overriding body of legal principle which limits the 
powers of the sovereign state; and that, in the German perspective, 
is very fundamental precisely because they saw what could be 
done with an unscrupulous government, using conventional 
legislative methods. So the idea of an overriding and encircling 
body of “law" is something which has developed and 
constitutionalism is part of it. 
81
 (Judge David Edward) 
It ought not to be regarded as slavery to live according to the 
constitution, but rather as self-preservation. (Aristotle) 
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In this chapter the degree to which a polity tolerates the emergence of certain 
values and opinions in the formation of majority rule will be considered in terms of the 
differences between American ‘liberty’ oriented constitutionalism and German ‘dignity’ 
oriented constitutionalism. As will be addressed, this distinction shapes how in the 
United States, most values and opinions are able to form, while in Germany there are 
absolute checks on whether opinions and values hostile to the constitutional order may 
emerge. One consequence of the liberty-dignity dynamic is that while the U.S. Supreme 
Court has tended to formalise emerging majority opinion on issues like segregation and 
reapportionment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s role as the guardian of Germany’s 
highly normative constitution has been more pedagogic in inculcating the values of the 
Basic Law in the civic, political and institutional space.  
The chapter then assesses how the stability renewal paradigm at the heart of this 
enquiry shapes how German constitutionalism has had to balance threats to the state, the 
integration of new political parties into the political system and whether to maintain 
aspects of the militant democracy such as the thresholds for electoral success discussed 
in later chapters. A fine line exists between stability and ossification which the BVerfG 
has sought, not always successfully, to mediate. American constitutionalism has also 
come to recognise equality and human dignity in important court rulings.
82
 Unlike in 
Germany, though, where rights are seen as anterior to the state and a precondition of 
democracy, in the U.S. the emergence of these constitutional values has been largely the 
result of the free development of democratic principles in civic society and the parallel 
expansion of the suffrage and democratisation of political institutions.  
The chapter then briefly assesses what I term ‘post-1945 constitutionalism’, 
including the establishment of international human rights instruments and a clear view 
of the centrality of the individual in law. This post-war period was characterised by the 
establishment of constitutional courts in Germany, Italy, and then later in Spain, which 
signified an effort to re-establish constitutionalism in countries where legislatures and 
legal positivism had conspired to undermine human rights. Yet the dialectic of human 
rights at the international level also had consequences in terms of growing 
individualism within liberal democratic states, challenging their ability to maintain 
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societal cohesion and uphold their constitutional values.
83
 The important role of 
constitutionalism in shaping those domestic values is considered now. 
2.1 Constitutionalism 
Martin Loughlin writes that “constitutionalism involves the attempt to subject all 
governmental action within a designated field to the structures, processes, principles, 
and values of a ‘constitution’.”84 According to McIlwain, constitutionalism “in all its 
successive phases” from ancient Greece onwards has “one essential quality: it is a legal 
limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic 
government, the government of will instead of law.”85 According to Walter Murphy, 
“constitutionalism […] enshrines respect for human worth and dignity as its central 
principle. To protect that value, citizens must have a right to political participation, and 
their government must be hedged in by substantive limits on what it can do, even when 
perfectly mirroring the popular will.”86 Parts of McIlwain’s seminal account from the 
late 1930s are tinged with his obvious awareness of the threat that constitutionalism was 
facing from European totalitarianism
87
. The definition advanced by Murphy has 
incorporated the notion of protecting fundamental rights, human worth, and dignity, 
which reflects the new human rights priorities in constitutionalism which arose after 
1945.  
Where constitutionalism ought to come into its own is when the values of the 
constitutional order (i.e. justice, equality, liberty, human dignity) are challenged by 
individuals or groups in society; or, more seriously, when voters elect representatives to 
power who are indifferent to its values or actively hostile to them as the Nazis were to 
those of the Weimar Republic. This view of constitutionalism is that it provides a safety 
mechanism to prevent democracy becoming a conduit for the infringement of rights as 
was the case during the National Socialist period in Germany. In other words, this view 
sees constitutionalism as mainly a limitation on government. While restraint is certainly 
an important aspect of constitutionalism, particularly, as we will shortly see, in the 
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American context, constitutionalism can also have some positive content in terms of 
specifying the substantive ideals of a polity and the overall context within which the 
relationship between citizen and state is shaped. German constitutionalism reflects both 
conceptions of constitutionalism, as a limiting and empowering mechanism. 
Alexander Somek argues that the “reasonable recognition concerning the 
supreme value and authority of human dignity and human rights” which emerges after 
1945―what he calls ‘Constitutionalism 2.0’―and which is embodied in the 
constitutional practice of Germany’s Basic Law, helps us understand constitutionalism 
as a “project of emancipation”.88 The assumption of many after the Second World War 
was that constitutionalism had secured, à la Fukuyama, the permanent ascendancy of 
liberal values with no possibility of a return to the barbarity of the past. But as Somek 
observes, “no emancipation is possible without political action”89.  
The portrait of democracy and the possibility of constitutionalism offered in this 
chapter and in the chapters ahead is a guarded one, reflecting the inherent challenge of 
building institutions which, to paraphrase Friedrich, can preserve human dignity while 
controlling the worst aspects of human nature.
90
 However, the view that democracy 
should be taken seriously in no way suggests that there is any preferable form of 
government on the horizon to representative democracy. Taking democracy seriously 
means recognising its flaws and drawbacks as well as its obvious merits. It means 
recognising that in the U.S. reapportionment cases examined in Chapter 5, it was the 
concerted political action of civil society actors over almost two decades that raised the 
profile of the issue, and managed to get the Supreme Court to accept the justiciability of 
the issue. In Germany, it was political action that propelled the German Green Party 
from a pressure group to a political party represented in the German Parliament in the 
1980s, and eventually into government as junior coalition partners of the Social 
Democrats (SPD), with its leader Joschka Fischer becoming foreign minister and vice-
chancellor of Germany. 
While the experience of the classical world, of Germany in the 1930s, and the 
increasing prevalence of illiberal democracies since the end of the Cold War are 
salutary warnings of where democracy can lead, the correlation between democracy on 
the one hand, and liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law on the other has been 
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more constant in the twentieth century than that between democracy and illiberalism.
91
 
What this correlation does not automatically reveal is whether it is the emphasis on 
rights based constitutionalism, and strong political and legal institutions which leads to 
a vibrant democratic society, or whether democracy is the key to stable 
constitutionalism. What the historical evidence suggests, as Koopmans observes, is that 
democracy and the rule of law go hand in hand, and “where one of the two disappears, 
the other is in danger of being abandoned.”92 The reason, writes Koopmans is probably 
that 
majority rule, in the democratic sense of the word, implies that 
different political opinions can compete for the voters’ favour. 
Every opinion must have a chance to become more generally 
accepted, so that the minority of today can be the majority of 
tomorrow. Freedom of expression and protection of minority 
feelings are part of the prerequisites of democratic government.93 
Not stated until the final sentence are the ends that democratic government seeks. In 
other words, which values or social goods does the polity seek to advance and protect 
(i.e. freedom of expression, the rights of minority groups, equality, liberty, human 
dignity, justice). The values that a polity stands for can be as crucial in determining the 
orientation of a constitutional order, and its relationship to individuals and groups in 
society as the institutional mechanisms which advance those values. Koopmans’ 
statement encapsulates the dilemma of how a liberal constitutional democracy 
establishes the institutional and societal conditions to sustain itself over time, and why 
some fail.  
Within constitutionalism, then, we can say that values can be both the essential 
currency and framework within which the opinions and interests above shift from being 
a minority to a majority view, and back again. In other words, this is about debate, 
contestation and, sometimes, conflict between different interests and groups in society. 
Values inform and orient these debates but are inevitably shaped by them as well. One 
example would be how segregation increasingly became unacceptable in the United 
States during the 1940s and 1950s; another would be how gay marriage gradually came 
to be accepted by a majority of Americans between the early 2000s and today. Overall, 
we can say that constitutionalism provides a mechanism within which these debates 
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and, sometimes, conflicts, on rights and values take place. However, the emphasis in 
German and American constitutionalism over how, and whether, opinions are able to 
form and become ‘the majority of tomorrow’ on a given issue is very different. 
2.2 American and German Constitutionalism 
It was the risk of placing too much faith in human benevolence and in the power 
of intellectual progress and democracy to make human beings more rational and tolerant 
of others in society which motivates constitutionalism. By the early nineteenth century 
the Enlightenment had left much of European intellectual thought with a clear sense of 
modernity. That so many fundamental strands of constitutional liberalism could become 
unravelled in 1930s Germany illustrates the extent to which the idea of any inevitable 
sense of progress may be a chimera without struggle or Somekian political action
94
 to 
secure it.  
Can the liberal democratic state simply be a neutral observer as liberal values 
and opinions compete with illiberal and intolerant ones in Justice Holmes’ ‘marketplace 
of ideas’95? Post 1949 German constitutionalism has emphatically rejected the notion 
that the state can ever be neutral when popular and democratic forces were advocating 
policies hostile to either fundamental rights or the constitutional order itself. Put slightly 
differently, German constitutionalism and its militant democracy is grounded in a total 
rejection of Koopmans’ premise that “every opinion must have a chance to become 
more generally accepted” since the experience of the 1930s demonstrates that some of 
those ‘opinions’ may seek to destroy the values of the constitutional order, and 
democracy itself.
 96
 
Some might argue that a democracy that does not give its citizens a chance to 
destroy it through controversial opinions is not a real democracy. On a purely linguistic 
level, this is correct, but it reduces democratic theory to a zero sum approach more 
suited to international relations. In other words, should democracy be purely about the 
purity and majoritarianism of democratic procedures, regardless of how good or bad the 
outcomes they deliver in terms of governance, policy outcomes, and the longevity of the 
system itself? Or is a political system that aims for a principally democratic system, but 
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which puts in place controls to ensure that those democratic decisions do not contravene 
the fundamental rights of individuals, and the values and laws of the polity as stated in 
its constitution the best way forward? German constitutionalism is far more in tune with 
Koopman’s final sentence that democracy depends on respect for fundamental rights 
including human dignity and the protection of minority groups. Thus, in Germany, only 
through respect for rights―including of freedom of speech and human dignity―could 
the minority of today become the majority of tomorrow. 
 Indeed, since 1951 when the BVerfG began hearing its first cases, the formation 
of democratic opinion has been conditional on it being neither a threat to the country’s 
free democratic basic order (“die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung”), nor the 
fundamental rights guarantees in the Basic Law. This prioritisation of the principles of 
human dignity and the free democratic order in the Basic Law trumps liberty and all 
other rights, whereas in the U.S., liberty would often trump values like human dignity.
97
 
In the U.S., the formation of majority opinion was never so tightly regulated, due in 
large part to the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment, and the important 
American emphasis on voluntary associations and liberty.  
2.2.1 Liberty and Dignity  
The liberty-dignity dichotomy between the U.S. and Germany has been crucial 
in shaping the civic space, in determining how citizens engage in their democracy, and 
in the struggle for rights. To orient the subsequent analysis of how the judicial decisions 
of the American and German courts can be understood within the dichotomy of ‘liberty’ 
and ‘dignity’ constitutionalism, a brief elaboration and definition of these concepts will 
be given. This should also allow for a better understanding of how and why judicial 
interventions in the processes of representative democracy have occurred in each 
country. The emphasis on liberty in American constitutionalism has meant that 
struggles for rights, and the slow emergence of equality and human dignity as 
constitutional values have been driven primarily by social forces, and only 
incrementally have come to be recognised by the federal government and Supreme 
Court. By contrast, the emphasis on human dignity in German constitutionalism is 
grounded in the view of the autonomous individual as part of a community. The 
paradox, then, is that the state has a duty to ensure that the freedom of the individual is 
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achieved, but only through “synthesis with the community”98. The influence of human 
dignity means, as will be shown, that rights in German constitutionalism are a pre-
condition for democracy, not ancillary to it.  
Primarily, the utilisation of liberty and dignity within the thesis is contextual, 
representing the predominant value orientations of each polity, and within which the 
respective courts act and interpret. Broadly speaking, the emphasis on liberty in 
American constitutionalism has shaped the constitutional jurisprudence with respect to 
freedom of speech, and has tended to place an onus on the federal courts to ensure that a 
particular constitutional right has been infringed before acting. The primary concern of 
American constitutionalism has therefore been with “limiting the reach of state 
authority in order to preserve private liberty”99. By contrast the emphasis on dignity in 
German constitutionalism has placed an emphatic duty on the BVerfG to ensure that 
certain rights are realised, particularly in the realm of equality. Thus, as Eberle notes, 
“the absolute commitment to human dignity in Germany” radiates throughout the legal 
order”100. The key difference is that while human dignity was an ideal implicit, but not 
realised at the American founding, and which only became realised belatedly through 
the struggles in a society conditioned by liberty, in Germany, human dignity is the key 
value of the constitutional order which shapes state action and the relationship between 
citizen and state. Rights and democracy can only be exercised in the dignity shaped 
landscape established by the Basic Law and the BVerfG. 
The juxtaposition between the American Constitution’s emphasis on liberty and 
the Basic Law’s greater emphasis on human dignity is not absolute, as will be shown in 
chapters 4 and 5, but it is a good starting point for understanding the role of the U.S. and 
German courts in adjudicating value conflicts in their respective systems. One 
consequence of the liberty-dignity dichotomy is that while American constitutionalism 
has principally involved, what I call, the ‘formalisation’ by the U.S. Supreme Court of 
value changes already taking place in society, Germany’s highly normative 
constitutionalism―as established by the German founders and as mediated by the 
BVerfG―has been more pedagogic in the inculcation of the fundamental values of the 
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Basic Law in German politics and society. Why this difference exists will be expanded 
on at length throughout the thesis, but is partly grounded in the American Constitution’s 
authority only over public law. In other words, liberty was partly created as a negative 
consequence of the Constitution having nothing to say about the private sphere of life. 
This compares to the Basic Law’s comprehensive applicability to all political and legal 
institutions of the state, and the entire legal system encompassing public and private 
law.  
Summarising the principle of liberty in the United States, Eugene Rostow 
famously wrote “the root idea of the Constitution is that man can be free because the 
state is not.”101 America’s ‘liberty’ orientated constitutionalism reflected the initial 
configuration of the relationship between citizen and state; that government was 
restrained so the individual could be at liberty. The establishment of the American 
constitution after the near anarchy experienced under the Articles of Confederation 
presupposed a need to both limit state power, and channel the energy and purposes of 
government in a way that left citizens a wide sphere of liberty where civil society might 
be able to flourish. As Eberle puts it “In American law, the Constitution only applies 
when government acts.”102 It ostensibly has nothing to say about the relationship of 
Americans to one another or to their society. Only if a space was provided for the 
people and for civil society to grow and renew itself, it was thought, would America’s 
constitutional experiment be secure. That meant that Americans were free to decide in 
the course of two centuries of struggle and progress whether other concepts like dignity 
and equality, or slavery for that matter, were important principles.
103
 Eberle notes that 
Americans believe in individual liberty more than any other value. “For Americans, this 
means freedom to do what you choose. From a legal standpoint, such freedom actually 
means freedom from government and official control.”104  
It is this view of liberty which shapes the ongoing discussion in this thesis. 
Liberty in American constitutionalism has meant that the individual was protected from 
government interferences through the clear enumeration of the powers of the latter, and 
through the protections of the Bill of Rights. Thus, the notion of liberty 
constitutionalism in the subsequent analysis is one based on the idea of the freedom of 
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the individual from interference by the state in his or her private life. In Supreme Court 
decisions, the notion of liberty was perhaps best described by Justice Louis Brandeis as 
“the right to be let alone”105. To some, however, implicit in the idea of being left alone 
was “being alone”106. Thus, liberty meant that the individual was essentially isolated in 
the community; once emancipated from the state in this way, the particular challenge for 
American government was how to avoid the atomisation of society, and ensure a 
citizenry that would uphold their government and their liberty.  
Establishing a wall between the public and private spheres may protect liberty, 
but how can that wall then be surmounted to maintain the connection between the 
people and their republic? This was the crucial issue that animated Jefferson’s fears 
about whether Americans could sustain self-government if they only encountered it at 
election times, and will be discussed at length in Chapter 3. The Constitution, so it was 
thought, guaranteed the liberty of the people, and in return, the people would preserve it 
in order to defend their own liberties. Here, there are shades of Gouverneur Morris’ 
admonition that “the French want an American constitution without realising they have 
no Americans to uphold it.” 107 Morris’s words sound rather hollow in the era of Donald 
Trump, while the very idea of ‘renewal’ can no longer be assumed to mean ‘progress’. 
For citizens that value the liberty that American constitutionalism provides, but also 
cherish a sense of belonging to society, there is often an unbridgeable tension where 
“freedom and community can be reconciled only in the nostalgic dream of an idealized 
past.”108  
 The original conception of liberty in American constitutionalism, as Rostow 
conceives it above, caused two problems that are central to our discussion. One, as 
already mentioned, was that the separation of the public and private might cause citizens 
and state to become alienated from one another. The other problem which could result 
from strict non-interference by the state in social life was, as Stephen Holmes notes, 
“private injustice and oppression” and “an outcropping of brutal monopolies”109. The 
evolution of American constitutionalism over more than two centuries of social struggle 
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and injustice has been a gradual coming to terms with the reality that government also 
had a role in preventing private injustice. Here, Sager notes that “the most active and 
secure ingredients of our liberty-bearing constitutional jurisprudence fit […] with the 
broad concerns of equal membership, on the one hand, and fair and open government, 
on the other.”110 At the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal, according 
to Richard Rorty, was a quasi-communitarian rhetoric “in which the government 
ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty”111. As will be shown in 
Chapters 4 and 5, this narrative provided the context for the changing jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court regarding equality, the protection of minorities and electoral 
participation from the late 1930s to the 1960s. However, the traditional resonance of 
liberty remained strong, and meant that when the Supreme Court got involved in 
electoral processes in Baker v Carr and the other reapportionment cases in response to 
the demands of civil society, it was extremely tentative about its intervention and 
proceeded cautiously. It was notable that those opposed to numerically equal 
representation used the liberty argument. Opponents of a 1948 California ballot 
initiative on reapportionment claimed that equal numerical representation would ensure 
the trampling of minority rights by unscrupulous urban majorities.
112
 The battle against 
reapportionment was waged by civil society―as befits the U.S. conception of 
liberty―but it was unable to make progress against state legislatures that refused to 
reapportion. A clear national consensus had emerged against malapportionment after 
over a decade of civil society activism,
113 and the Court’s decisions in the 
reapportionment cases were generally well received across the country.
114
 The role of 
the Supreme Court was, thus, largely one of formalising existing value changes within 
society, which will be examined more closely in Chapter 3.  
The German Constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), could hardly be more 
different. Liberty as understood in the American context has no meaning, because the 
Basic Law in the jurisprudence of the BVerfG views the individual not as an isolated, 
autonomous person but as part of a community.
115
 While freedom in the United States 
comes from the restraint of the state, freedom in the German context can only come 
from a recognition of the dignity of the individual person as part of their community. 
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“Rather than being the key power that needs to be restrained if liberty is to be preserved, 
the state is seen as the vehicle for achieving freedom.”116 
While the constitutional meaning of liberty may be contested, that of dignity is 
even more so. Ronald Dworkin notes that “the idea of dignity has been stained by 
overuse and misuse” and that attempts to define it are invariably challenged owing to 
the fact the dignity is an interpretive conceptive.
117
 It is important to say that the 
principle of human dignity has been cited by the Supreme Court as representing an 
American ideal,
118
 so as a value it is certainly not absent from American 
constitutionalism. However, as I have indicated, human dignity is particularly 
associated with German constitutionalism and means that “each person must always be 
treated as an end in himself or herself”119. The basis of human dignity in Germany’s 
Basic Law was not grounded in any particular religious or philosophical tradition, but 
the jurisprudence of the Court has sometimes adopted “a Kantian view in regarding 
persons as ends and not merely the objects of manipulation […]”120. The BVerfG has 
articulated a view of human dignity which “while protecting an inner core of personal 
freedom, concurrently binds the individual to certain norms governing the whole of 
society.”121  
Human dignity represents the highest value of the Basic Law and is protected 
from constitutional amendment by the Eternity Clause of Article 79(3). Article 1(1) of 
the Basic Law states that “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority.” In the Court’s jurisprudence, the principle of 
dignity applies to the living, the dead, the born and the unborn.
122
 In the Court’s first 
two decades, it understood and presented itself as a fundamental rights tribunal.
123
 This 
emphasis by the Court on human dignity and fundamental rights as a precondition for 
social and political life reinforced the notion that nothing in the German state was 
superior to fundamental rights, not even democracy. Germany’s tolerance of the BVerfG 
as guardian of democracy reflects, writes Collings, “a substantive, value-laden 
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definition of democracy, rather than a flaccid valuation of it.”124 The early tolerance for 
the BVerfG as the guardian of the Basic Law and German democracy also, though, 
reflected an old view that politics was a “dirty business”125, and a much older respect 
for law in Germany rooted in the Rechtsstaat. This will be assessed more fully in 
Chapter 6. 
2.3 Stability and Renewal 
Germany is the ultimate exposition of a state in which constitutionalism has 
played a significant role in aiding the recovery from extreme nationalism, genocide and 
totalitarianism. A further reason for the focus on Germany is the prominent influence of 
post-war German constitutionalism around the world and particularly in the Eastern 
European states which were reconstituted after the end of the Cold War.
126
 The German 
Basic Law remains one of the world’s most influential constitutions based on the 
frequency with which its provisions and institutions have been replicated by newly 
emerging states around the world.
127
 Some of these states which adopted German 
constitutional structures such as Hungary and, more lately, Poland, have taken a 
distinctive turn towards the illiberal and ideological right
128
 in recent years with attacks 
on the independence of their respective constitutional courts intensifying. These 
developments highlight the difficulty of liberal democratic states maintaining their 
liberal values in periods of flux. 
 Maintaining some equilibrium between the forces of stability and renewal is 
crucial to ensure a polity can adjust to a changing social context. During the 
Parliamentary Council which drafted the Basic Law in 1948, some delegates were 
opposed to the idea of electoral thresholds (Sperrklauseln) because they felt they would 
exclude the types of vibrant political forces that a polity needs to renew itself.
129
 The 
emergence of the Greens in democratic politics in the 1980s after they finally managed 
to overcome the 5 percent hurdle, was precisely the type of new political blood that the 
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rather staid and conservative German political system needed according to some jurists 
and politicians.
130
 Although the Greens were only slowly and grudgingly accepted by 
the established parties into the German party system, the BVerfG played a role in this 
process of integration through several court decisions arising out of constitutional 
complaints that the Greens made.
131
 The ability of a constitutional system to integrate 
new political parties within its existing institutions in a stable manner―even ones 
initially viewed with suspicion as the Greens were―is fundamental to the health of a 
polity. If rising political parties are seen to have been unreasonably excluded from 
political institutions (i.e. parliamentary seats, committee positions etc), there is a risk, 
firstly, of increased alienation between voters and their elected representatives, and, 
ultimately, the danger is that voters lose faith in their democratic institutions.  
While this may be true of most democracies, the risk calculation in Germany’s 
case over whether certain parties are acceptable is materially different given its history, 
its constitutional values and the militant democracy. Thus, political ossification must be 
balanced against the existential threat posed to a constitutional order if hostile political 
forces or parties are integrated within its institutions. If such parties enter parliament 
there are two principle risks: one is that they can gain enough leverage to compromise 
the values of the polity; another is they can prevent the parliament from functioning, 
thereby bringing democratic institutions into disrepute. The latter situation can also 
occur not only through the intent of a party to wreck democratic processes, but through 
the entry of many innocuous smaller parties into a parliament, thus precipitating 
legislative gridlock and preventing it from functioning. This is exactly what happened 
during the Weimar Republic, the experience of which is still used as justification for 
maintaining electoral thresholds for elections to the Bundestag. As will be examined in 
Chapter 7, the criterion that a legislature must be able to function is still important. 
However, the Court has seemingly viewed this test as being less important at the EU 
level, which has caused considerable consternation in the federal government 
(Bundesregierung) and among MEPs in Strasbourg.
132
  
One notable feature of the development of an American constitutionalism which 
belatedly came to recognise the dignity of man, the expanding scope of equality and 
individual rights is that its trajectory has exactly paralleled the expansion of the suffrage 
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and the increase democratisation of political institutions
133
, not run counter to it. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has described “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society”.134 Clearly, however, different societies and different 
sub-sections of society as well as the political branches of government may have their 
own ideas about how standards of decency may have evolved.
135
 It is in the different 
interpretations between the judiciary, politics and society that political and 
constitutional tensions―manageable or dangerous―are generated. Certain contexts and 
problems strongly favour judicial scrutiny of political institutions. Chief among these 
are cases where the constitutional system has become ossified, where democratic 
representation is failing and where individual rights are being infringed.
136
  
The connection between democracy and rights is, as I will show, common to 
both Germany and the United States. As the Supreme Court noted in Wesberry v 
Sanders, “other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.”137 Thus, if a group of politicians, a party or a political class are able to 
gain power through malapportioned constituencies, or limits on free speech (or no 
limits
138
), then they would be able to both disenfranchise some citizens and effectively 
strip them of their constitutional rights. While this association has only emerged in fits 
and starts in the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the twentieth century, in 
Germany, the relationship between democracy and rights is inherent in the Basic Law 
and, as will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, has been further developed in the BVerfG’s 
jurisprudence.
139
 Fundamental rights in the Basic Law are seen as anterior to the state 
and as being an absolute precondition for democratic life.
140
  
A fundamental legal differentiation between American and German 
constitutionalism is that while the American Constitution only protects individuals 
against public authority, the German Basic Law has since a famous decision by the 
BVerfG in 1958
141
, also protected the fundamental rights of German citizens against 
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other citizens through the principle of ‘Third Party Effect’. In the U.S. the strictly public 
purpose of constitutional law maintains the separation between the public and private 
spheres that was deemed necessary for liberty to flourish. However, that also meant that 
the constitution was no guarantee against one person abusing the rights of another, 
particularly in terms of race.
142
 Crucially, in terms of the discussion in subsequent 
chapters and, notably, the views of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Justice Stephen 
Breyer, the Constitution opened up the possibility of vastly different value 
interpretations between the Supreme Court and the federal government on the one hand, 
and those of local groups and local majorities on the other.
143
 These value differences 
between local and national majorities explained, at their most extreme, the Civil War; 
however, they also explained segregation and the difference in attitudes to 
malapportionment between urban majorities and rural ones. The former wanted the 
equal representation which they believed the Fourteenth Amendment promised, while 
the latter felt that the very liberty that the Constitution guaranteed would be swept away 
by the numerical superiority of the urban areas under a system of equal numerical 
representation between electoral districts. Ultimately, as will be seen in the next chapter 
and later ones, these differences, firstly, between the values of national and local 
majorities, and, secondly, between the constitutional interpretation of values and the 
interpretation held by members of either a national or local majority, can leave the 
liberal state perilously exposed. 
As will be addressed in Chapter 3, the constitutional wall of separation between 
public and private was central to the fears of Thomas Jefferson about how to sustain a 
citizen democracy. Jefferson’s fears in this regard also parallel Böckenförde’s, and the 
ideas of Tocqueville on civil association. Following the Lüth decision of 1958, the 
BVerfG held that the Basic Law governs the entire legal system including private law. 
Stern summarised the effect of this: 
The constitution takes on central significance for the legal system 
as a whole. State power may only be exercised in conformity with 
the Constitution. The Basic Law, then, lays claim to a 
comprehensive validity, for it directly shapes the political and 
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social life of the community, a feature that is new to German 
constitutionalism.
144
  
Lüth will be assessed in more detail in Chapter 6, but its effect was to define a civic 
republican vision of the individual as part of the community. This vision, which was 
both legal and civic in a broad sense, laid the foundations for German 
constitutionalism’s all embracing influence over German democracy. The post-1945 
human rights consensus was driven especially strongly by the U.S., although its effects 
on U.S. domestic politics or constitutional law were minimal. However, the new 
normative outlook shaped the international and European context within which the 
Basic Law was established. This will now be considered. 
2.4 Post 1945 Constitutionalism 
In this section I will broadly address the international human rights context of 
constitutionalism that emerged after 1945 with particular attention to how the 
promulgation of human rights regimes such as the ECHR and the development of a new 
conception of the individual in law were used as a basis to lock in domestic political and 
legal institutions, especially in Europe. I will then address the establishment of 
dedicated constitutional courts in Europe. Although the United States was one of the 
key actors driving many of these international developments, their impact and influence 
on domestic American constitutionalism are less easy to discern. Nevertheless, they 
were not negligible and this short section highlights some of these international 
influences driving constitutionalism after 1945.  
If one of the fundamental questions for judges engaged in constitutional 
interpretation before 1945 was ‘what sort of polity does the Constitution envisage?’, in 
the decades after 1945 the increasingly normative hue in both German and American 
constitutional jurisprudence seemed to ask instead ‘what sort of polity should the 
Constitution envisage?’ While the reasons for this increased normative influence on 
American and German constitutionalism were, as will be shown in later chapters, of 
primarily domestic origin, the international context cannot be entirely neglected, 
particularly with respect to Germany. Here, the country’s emerging objective value 
order, the creation of its powerful constitutional court, its strong emphasis on human 
rights, and on the centrality of the individual in law, reflected emerging European and 
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international trends in these areas. International factors in the United States were far less 
significant in terms of the specifics of the reapportionment cases assessed in Chapter 5. 
However, the developing domestic understandings of equality and human dignity which 
shaped the Supreme Court’s decisions from the late 1930s to the 1960s were not 
immune to the international context. These will be highlighted in Chapter 4 with respect 
to Harlan Stone’s opinion in Carolene Products, and the decision in Brown v Board of 
Education.
145
  
In the aftermath of World War Two we can discern two separate strands of 
thinking within constitutionalism. One emphasised a focus on judicially enforceable 
constitutional norms such as we see in the ECHR and the German Basic Law which had 
binding legal teeth; the other sought to release law and justice from the prison of legal 
positivism, and place the individual at the centre of all law.
146
 The extent to which legal 
positivism, particularly in Germany, was seen to have facilitated the National Socialist 
assault on justice, drove the creation of powerful constitutional courts in Europe which 
would prioritise values inherent in these documents even over the letter of the text 
itself.
147
 Aside from this emphasis on higher law values, and the decline in the relative 
importance of positive law, Hersch Lauterpacht went one step further. Lauterpacht’s 
insight in 1943 that “the individual human being […] was the fundamental unit of all 
law”148 shaped the perspective of a generation of lawyers and judges on the law. 149  
Alex Stone Sweet notes that “the inclination to construct and then secure 
normative hierarchies is a central focus of European constitutional theory.”150 Germany 
since the establishment of the Basic Law is perhaps the best example of such a 
hierarchy—what the BVerfG refers to as a “value-oriented order that limits public 
authority”.151 This emerging normative orientation of constitutionalism presupposed the 
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idea of an “overriding body of ‘law’”152 containing fundamental rights principles which 
determined how state power would be applied within the constitutional systems of these 
countries. Somek notes that “modern constitutionalism is the project to establish and to 
constrain public power [and] law is the means thereto.”153 Law has had a significant role 
to play in American constitutionalism right back to the founding period.
154
 By virtue of 
its enhanced status after World War Two, law has come to play a more central role in 
governance and the protection of rights. In this respect what was common to almost all 
forms of constitutional review in Europe after 1945 was the detachment of the new 
specialised constitutional courts from the ordinary judiciary so as to “ensure the 
normative superiority of the constitutional law.”155 
Stone Sweet sees constitutionalism as referring to “the commitment, more or 
less operative in any polity, to the idea that the interactions that take place within it are 
to be governed by a set of authoritative rules―the constitutional law.”156 This definition 
is suggestive of the dramatic scope of constitutional law as the highest of legal norms 
after 1945; and, in the use of the word ‘interactions’, Stone Sweet also hints at the 
Aristotelian polis conception where constitutional law also encompasses the relationship 
of the citizens with one another―the issue of third-party effect―according to legally 
enforceable rights norms.
157
 Both of these ideas reflect the path taken by Germany after 
1949. In his use of the word ‘commitment’ Stone Sweet hints at a metamorphosis in 
constitutionalism since 1945, reflecting a clearer conception of what can count as 
permissible action within a state, judgements which come not only from a written text 
but the entire value orientation of a state’s constitutional order. What has developed, at 
least in liberal western democracies since 1945, is an official, judicial, and wider 
cultural recognition that there is, as Judge David Edward suggests, “an overriding and 
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encircling body of law” limiting state power which regulates the context within which 
the struggle takes place.  
The successful post-war development of German constitutionalism was strongly 
influenced by wider European debates of the period. In the Council of Europe, these 
debates were primarily centred on the emerging human rights framework which was to 
become the ECHR as well as on the need to create political stability by learning lessons 
from the immediate past in order to safeguard the future. Post-war human rights regimes 
were concerned as much with dealing with the prospect of a communist future as 
responding to the recent fascist past.
158
 Here, there was a clear understanding of the 
linkage between a country having stable democratic institutions and a non-aggressive 
outlook towards its neighbours.
159
 According to Moravcsik, the motivation of Teitgen, 
the chief French advocate of the ECHR in the assembly saw the Convention’s purpose 
as “assuring the stability of German democracy and thereby the security of France.”160 
Unsurprisingly, the most fervent advocates of the ECHR as a bulwark against future 
tyranny were the representatives from Germany and Italy.
161
 The intention was that 
these external legal institutional structures would reinforce Germany’s domestic 
constitutional institutions in establishing an internal militant democracy. As 
Blankenburg notes, “constitutions gain increased importance in newly established 
democratic regimes where politics and law have to be institutionalised from scratch.”162 
Indeed, the establishment of constitutional courts in such countries is often prioritised 
over the creation of much needed ordinary law courts that can function.
163
 
Stone Sweet links the spread of the Kelsenian constitutional court to Italy and 
Germany after the war to a combination of domestic disenchantment with legislative 
power unique to those countries and an international trend towards the prioritisation of 
individual rights over state power. At the domestic level, the experience of fascism 
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before the war and the American occupation after it, observes Stone Sweet, “conspired 
to fatally undermine the view that parliaments could do no wrong.”164 Legislatures 
which had rubber-stamped National Socialist programmes before the war had illustrated 
the vulnerability of democratic system to abuse if public power was not constrained by 
a higher constitutional law. Thus, the international dimension provided an institutional 
safety blanket of regimes that acted to consolidate domestic attempts to restore 
constitutionalism in Germany and Italy.  
The emphasis of states and the international community on constitutionalism 
and human rights after 1945 ostensibly marked a seismic shift. This shift, prominent in 
the work of the German legal scholar Gustav Radbruch after 1945, signified that neither 
legal positivism nor value neutrality could excuse the abuse of individual rights by the 
state.
165
 Yet liberal values entrenching rights, justice and human dignity within domestic 
constitutional orders will accomplish little if they are not accepted and understood by 
both state and society. This was the glaring weakness of the secular liberal state 
identified by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde in 1964. Böckenförde posed his dilemma in 
the context of Germany’s fragile constitutional order, and as a means of appealing to his 
fellow Catholics to integrate into a federal republic some were suspicious of. However 
it is also highly relevant to all states. As welcome as the international emphasis on 
human rights was, the danger in Böckenförde’s eyes was that its very individualism 
emancipates individuals “not only from religion but also […] from the national idea as a 
homogenizing force.”166 Thus, the post-1945 focus on human rights and on the 
individual reinforced important legal principles, but they also reinforced forces of 
individualism which do not necessarily lend themselves to a dialectic of social cohesion 
and the imperative of states to remain stable and intact. Hence, the Basic Law had to 
emphasise its moral code, its idealism on human rights, but then it had to bring the 
individual back into the fold―without that ‘fold’ being a re-run of the 
Volksgemeinschaftsprinzip. As much, then, as the post-1945 narrative of human rights 
was welcome after what had gone on before, the ‘Locking in’ of democracy and 
constitutionalism through mechanisms such as the ECHR merely reinforced the 
pertinence of Böckenförde’s dilemma of how liberalism could secure itself domestically 
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without negating its purpose. The response of American and German constitutionalism 
to this question was very different.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has primarily examined the domestic influences on American and 
German constitutionalism reflecting the overall focus of the enquiry in the following 
chapters. As noted by Böckenförde, however, the significance of the rise of the 
individual symbolised by human rights covenants posed challenges for the liberal 
secular state in how to maintain societal cohesion and its own constitutional values in an 
era of individualism. 
The far more comprehensive role that the BVerfG has in German politics helps 
explain why for all the importance of the U.S. reapportionment cases at the time, the 
German court has been able to exert a far more positive influence over Germany’s 
democratic institutions and constitutional culture since 1949 than the Supreme Court 
has been able to over American democracy. Whereas (virtually) all opinions and 
interests have the chance to become the majority in the United States, in Germany 
individual rights can be forfeited and political parties can be banned to preserve the state 
if their aims threaten the free democratic basic order.
167
 
In the U.S. and Germany, the particular ‘liberty’ or ‘dignity’ aspects of 
American and German constitutionalism have broadly shaped how the Supreme Court 
and BVerfG have responded to the stability and renewal imperative in their democratic 
political processes. This liberty-dignity difference has also shaped the response of each 
court as to how it deals with voters being excluded from the political process, and 
whether it is able to establish conditions favourable to a vibrant liberal democracy with 
a supportive constitutional culture. Whether the state is more inclined towards liberty or 
dignity has determined the nature of the polis that has been established. This, in turn, 
has determined how interventions in the processes of representative democracy occur, 
and whether values are ‘formalised’ or ‘inculcated’.  
When this dichotomy is applied to the legal case studies examined in Chapter 5 
and 7, what emerges is a U.S. Supreme Court which at rare moments is able to correct 
flaws in the political process, as seen in the reapportionment cases. However, the 
overtly liberty oriented nature of American constitutionalism means that the Court is 
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unable to materially improve the civic space which is essential for a vibrant liberal 
democracy based on equal respect. As will be seen in Chapter 5, this is best illustrated 
by the Court’s inability to tackle the issue of gerrymandering which has had such a 
corrosive effect on the middle ground of American politics. The Supreme Court’s 
domain is primarily a legal one, which has limited the lasting impact of its interventions 
in the political process. By contrast, while the BVerfG’s interventions in specific aspects 
of Germany’s electoral processes such as the legal cases examined in Chapter 7 have 
sometimes been methodologically suspect and counter-productive, its long-term 
influence on rebuilding a democratic constitutional culture in Germany has been 
remarkable. The BVerfG’s domain is a legal, political and civic one, which has been 
instrumental in its ability to restore the liberal values behind the constitution of 1849 
which had been buried for over a century in Germany. As a result, it now becomes 
necessary to examine whether such apparently fragile liberal constitutional values and 
the relationship between citizen and state can be maintained in the absence of 
supportive identity heavy value systems such as religion or nation, or without 
reinforcing civil and associational practices.   
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Chapter 3 - Mediating The Values of The Civic Space 
The best in Germany feel that the integrity of society depends on 
the integrity of its laws. Unhappily here we have also learned that 
the law depends for its integrity on the integrity of society.168 (Gitta 
Sereny, 1967) 
The overwhelming majority of our people in every section of the 
country are united in their respect for observance of the law — 
even in those cases where they may disagree with that law.[…] A 
foundation of our American way of life is our national respect for 
law.
169
 (President Dwight D Eisenhower, 1957) 
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This chapter will assess whether liberal values in the form of equality and 
human dignity―as embodied in German and American constitutionalism―are 
sufficient to sustain liberal constitutional values in the absence of either internal sources 
of identity or homogeneity, or a citizenry that participates in their government. This 
question will be examined with respect to the thoughts and writing of Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde on the survival of the liberal secular state, Hannah Arendt’s interpretation 
of Thomas Jefferson’s fears on the citizen becoming estranged from their government, 
and Alexis de Tocqueville’s arguments on civil association as the basis for maintaining 
representative democracy. Although my primary point of reference will remain 
Germany and the United States, the ideas of Böckenförde on internal bonding forces in 
the liberal state and Arendt’s interpretation of Jefferson on the public private sphere 
have implications beyond just these countries. To begin with, a central issue that 
Böckenförde’s dilemma identifies must first be addressed: whether constitutional values 
alone can maintain the relationship between citizens and their liberal state. 
The chapter will firstly examine how the liberty-dignity dichotomy in American 
and German constitutionalism plays a key role in whether emerging societal values are 
formalised or whether constitutional values are inculcated in society. The chapter then 
considers how the public-private separation that is so essential to liberty also creates a 
possibly fatal weakness at the heart of republican government: how to keep the 
emancipated citizen engaged in upholding their constitutional order. This question will 
be assessed with reference to Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Jefferson’s concerns on 
this subject. Conversely, German constitutionalism and the BVerfG ran a risk from 
another perspective: that in inculcating a normative value orientation on the rest of the 
constitutional order including its political institutions, citizens would see democracy as 
an empty vessel, and would disengage from politics and political activity. Citizens 
might then find solace in other forms of identity, social cohesion and value systems that 
had more resonance in their lives, including religion or nationalism. This does not mean 
that religion or attachment to country will be antithetical to liberal constitutional values; 
sometimes they may reinforce them, which was Böckenförde’s hope in 1964.170 As 
during the Weimar Republic, it is where ‘traditional’ values and the interpretations of a 
national majority or significant minority of the population run counter to the values of 
the constitutional order on an issue of significance to both that the liberal state is at risk. 
A liberal democratic state which is largely homogeneous where there is less 
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differentiation between national and local majority sentiments may have fewer political 
divisions than in the United States. But where its population turns against the values of 
the constitutional order, then the state is in far more serious trouble. Ultimately, German 
and American constitutionalism both have the potential to have a negative impact on 
liberty: Germany from doing too much and smothering out democratic activity; the U.S. 
from doing too little and letting republican government die out through ennui and anti-
democratic practices like malapportionment or gerrymandering that entrench 
oligarchical interests. 
The fundamental rights provisions at the start of the Basic Law set out a clear 
value framework which is further buttressed through the eternity clause of Article 79 
which prevents changes to those values or to Germany’s democratic and federal 
structure. Principles such as human dignity and the free democratic basic order are 
eternal according to this logic. Provisions without any scope for constitutional 
amendment would have doubtless horrified Jefferson by striking at his belief in the 
possibility of constitutional renewal and a tabula rasa moment.
171
 Although Jefferson 
never used the word ‘renewal’ in describing his ‘sovereignty of the living generation’ 
idea of constitutions which lapse every 19 years,
172
 a reasonable interpretation would 
seem to be that he wanted to ensure continued popular ‘buy-in’ for the constitution, and 
a continuing bond between the citizens and their republic to avoid ossification. This last 
point―that republican government would fail because Americans would become aloof 
from the need to participate in government―will be assessed later in this chapter 
through Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Jefferson’s concerns.  
Part of the reason that Jefferson’s maddening and whimsical inconsistencies 
endure is because constitutions seemingly strike at the heart of a fundamental human 
impulse: the ability to correct mistakes and to alter governing arrangements in response 
to changing circumstances. This, however, was precisely what Chief Justice John 
Marshall argued that “a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come” should be 
capable of doing: “being adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”173 It was the 
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mutability of constitutional form over time in response to societal developments and 
events that provided for this, Marshall said. Thus, Marshall’s conception of an evolving 
constitutional understanding may provide a happy medium between Jefferson throwing 
the baby out with the bath water and Germany’s post-war aversion to throwing anything 
out. However, this requires an appreciation of the dynamic role of values in shaping the 
formation of opinions which can become more widespread and even, as Koopmans 
noted, become tomorrow’s majority.174 How American and German constitutionalism 
shape this process of value formalisation and inculcation is considered now. 
3.1 Inculcation or Formalisation 
Sheldon Wolin asked of the American Constitution whether the “we” in its 
preamble was not so much the creator of it, but its “creature”.175 While the answer in 
America’s case may be ‘somewhere in between’, the creature view is much easier to 
discern in the case of Germany after 1949. As much as the Basic Law resurrected 
elements of the Weimar constitution and the country’s genuinely liberal constitution of 
1849, it also owed something to Jefferson’s tabula rasa view of societal rebirth. If 
American constitutionalism in the twentieth century has rested predominantly on a 
formalisation of value changes already occurring in society, German constitutionalism’s 
normative bent since 1949 has relied unmistakably on the inculcation of values from 
political and judicial elites downwards. Put slightly differently, America created a 
constitution which matched its political culture while in Germany over the last sixty 
years a political culture has gradually developed which matches its constitution. This 
raises a number of questions about how the German and American constitutional 
experiments came to create functioning liberal democracies through very different 
approaches. The process of conditioning Germany’s post-war constitutional culture was 
driven by a multiplicity of factors including the normative aims of Germany’s framers, 
then by the political leadership of Konrad Adenauer, and ultimately through the 
judgments of the BVerfG. The presence of the Court in public life and a growing 
awareness on the part of German citizens of its role as guardian of the Basic Law 
contributed to the civic education of Germans regarding the values of their 
constitutional order.
176
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What remained in doubt as we shall see in Section 3.3 is whether the values of 
constitutionalism were sufficient in themselves to uphold the liberal democratic state, 
absent some other source of social cohesion which could bind citizens to their states as 
well as to one another. Drawing together Böckenförde’s ideas with Hannah Arendt’s 
analysis of Thomas Jefferson’s thought in Section 3.4, the means of preserving 
representative democracy and liberal constitutionalism would seem to be: 1) 
Participation of the citizens in the affairs of government, or the presence of government 
in the lives of the people, as Jefferson saw it; 2) a strong respect and affinity among 
citizens for the liberal democratic values of their constitutional order in their own right; 
3) in addition to 2, a reliance on other sources of social cohesion including god, country 
or some other form of identification. The constitutional cases looked at in the U.S. and 
Germany both illustrate the involvement of civil society groups and citizens in 
attempting to ensure their voting rights, and constitutions, were upheld. The political 
campaign against malapportionment in the U.S., which initially went nowhere due to 
the intransigence and vested interests of lawmakers who refused to reapportion 
themselves out of a job, eventually became a legal struggle in the federal courts. In 
Germany it was the constitutional complaint mechanism which provided the means for 
citizens and political parties in the two European Parliament cases to petition the 
BVerfG. 
Speaking in 1985, Justice Brennan noted that the act of interpretation is 
“undertaken with full consciousness that it is, in a very real sense, the community’s 
interpretation that is sought.”177 Depending on the particular case or controversy before 
the Court, Brennan is correct that a majority of the society may clearly favour the 
decision that the Court eventually reaches. Brown v Board of Education, Baker v Carr 
and the case which recognised gay marriage
178
 are all cases where there was either a 
clear or emerging national consensus, even a bare, one in favour of the decisions that 
the Court reached. However, as will be outlined in Chapter 4, the idea and implications 
of a clear national consensus can be more problematic in a continental sized country 
such as the U.S. where local majorities in different regions or in non-urban areas may 
have a very different view from the national majority. The ‘which majority?’ question 
matters a great deal where competing value systems and competing interpretations may 
be antithetical to each other.  
                                                          
177
 Brennan Jr, p. 25. 
178
 Obergefell v Hodges 14-556 (2015).  
74 
 
Seeking the community’s interpretation may be all well and good if its values 
respect liberalism and human dignity. However, if its values are akin to Germany’s in 
the late 1930s, or Alabama’s in the 1950s, then this is ostensibly where and when 
constitutionalism matters the most. In other words, constitutionalism comes into its own 
when the decision of a court or indeed the political branches is not one that a majority of 
the population would likely have come to. Yet such decisions are likely to be the ones 
which are most essential and difficult for a court to make. Alexander Hamilton put the 
point best in Federalist 78 when he noted that  
It would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to 
do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where 
legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of 
the community.
179
 
Justice Robert Jackson’s majority opinion in West Virginia v Barnette180 is 
perhaps the most cogent definition of constitutionalism enunciated by a U.S. court in the 
twentieth century. The First Amendment case, which Friedman regards as “one of the 
most notable pro-liberties decisions of the era”, prompted the New York Times to write 
in response that “when the court rises to its full height it proves its claim to be regarded 
as one of the great prides of American democracy”.181 Jackson’s 6-3 majority opinion, 
which ruled that schoolchildren could not be compelled to salute the flag or be expelled 
from public schools for not doing so, came at a time when the United States was 
fighting totalitarianism abroad, and required precisely the sort of fortitude that Hamilton 
referred to. 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections..
182 
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Jackson’s opinion is an important benchmark for it represents an example of what I 
describe below as heightened constitutionalism. In other words, this is a decision which 
is correct precisely because it would not be, in Justice Brennan’s words, the 
“community’s interpretation”. Barnette speaks to one of the fundamental principles at 
the heart of constitutionalism, the placing of certain controversies beyond the power of 
democratic change. Barnette is a powerful statement of constitutionalism precisely 
because it is the Court saying to the state and ‘the major voice of the community’ during 
a time of war that free speech requires that no citizen can be forced to salute the flag.  
However, the Court’s authority to resist the will of the community in this sense 
nevertheless requires that the community and the other branches of government accept 
the importance of the constitutional principles at issue―be it freedom of speech, the 
rule of law or human dignity―as fundamentally important, even if they might disagree 
with how the Court has applied these principles in a given case; and even if the 
government and community disagree with the relative importance of the principles, that 
they recognise the authority of the courts to make the call. One example of this is the 
enforcement of the Supreme Court decision in Brown, which was vigorously supported 
by President Eisenhower during the Little Rock controversy.
183
 
As highlighted in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 with respect to the arguments of 
Böckenförde about “internal bonding forces”184 being necessary to preserve the liberal 
democratic state, and Jefferson’s concerns about the public private sphere, there has to 
be an awareness that the values of constitutionalism, as enforced in the Supreme Court 
decision in Barnette or other cases, may often be antithetical to those forces of social 
cohesion, be they religion or nation. Inevitably, politicians rarely take kindly to their 
key policies being subject to legal scrutiny, and the predictable cry goes up about 
unelected judges overriding policies which a party or politician was elected to 
implement. Nevertheless, citizens rarely enjoy having their political or civil rights 
curtailed either. A better understanding among citizens and officials that “part of 
constitutionalism is the rule of law, and part of the rule of law is allowing courts to 
decide issues”185 would minimise such disputes. This requires, as Wolfgang Friedmann 
notes, “the purposeful collaboration and the constant interplay between legislators, 
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administrators and courts in the articulation and implementation of social change.”186 In 
times of normal political and social consensus the interplay between society, the 
political branches, and the judiciary will be rather predictable with the values of each 
tending to reaffirm or only slightly alter the predominant normative orientations of the 
other groups. It is during times of crisis or extreme social and political flux that the 
formalisation of values versus inculcation of values dichotomy becomes more pertinent 
and crucial for the survival of a polity. In other words, the state, through the courts and 
the political branches, must decide whether the ideas of new and burgeoning social 
forces are ones that it is willing and able to incorporate into the permitted spectrum of 
constitutional values in the polity.  
When values are formalised, as when the Supreme Court voted to desegregate 
schools in Brown v Board of Education, the Court is acting as a guide of sorts. In 
Brown, the Court saw the direction of travel of the national majority or near majority of 
the population and formalised that emerging national consensus, even while repudiating 
the local consensus in Kansas and Arkansas that permitted segregation.
187
 Thus, while 
the Brown decision formalised and reinforced the value change in the national majority 
regarding civil rights and the unacceptability of segregation, it also served a pedagogic 
function in seeking to inculcate the new norm in the whole of society, but especially 
those parts that were resistant to it. When the Supreme Court prevents the majority of 
the community, the political branches, or a group in society from carrying out a policy 
or some desired civic practice―as it did in the free speech case Barnette by banning the 
requirement that all children must salute the flag―the Court’s decision served to 
reinforce and inculcate the principle of free speech against the state’s desire to inculcate 
the value of nation during a time of war. Because of the size of the United States and the 
difference between national and local majority sentiment, Brown represented something 
of an anomaly in the way that it both formalised a value change among a national 
majority or (near) national majority, while it also sought to inculcate the decision 
among those groups that would be resistant to it.
188
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While the formalisation of value changes already in progress in society is more 
common to American constitutionalism, the inculcation of values also occurs in cases 
involving what I term heightened constitutionalism. Such cases include decisions such 
as Barnette where the Supreme Court blocks or compels an action of another branch of 
government which would generally be supported by a majority of the people. The 
essence of value inculcation, then, is that it involves a court enunciating and applying 
norms as law which a clear majority of the population and their elected representatives 
may disagree with. Value inculcation is moot if a majority of the population has already 
accepted the idea, to use Brown again, that ‘separate but equal’ schooling was morally 
unacceptable; the question is then just one of formalising the general mood in the 
national community. However, this value inculcation in the local majority which rejects 
the norm will likely be seen by that local majority as undemocratic. Although the 
decision in Barnette can be seen in terms of inculcation of an important right of freedom 
of expression against a community, those in Brown and Baker more closely fit the 
Tocquevillean idea that Court actually was speaking for an emerging or distinct 
majority, albeit a national one. 
Germany in the early 1950s, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7, represented a 
much clearer example of heightened constitutionalism as it was a society that was 
certainly not in tune with the liberal democratic values of its new constitutional order. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s role was therefore significantly one of entrenching the 
norms of the Basic Law into all of the political and legal institutions of the 
constitutional order. Then, following a 1958 decision
189
, the entire German legal system 
including private law became subject to the Basic Law.
190
 Inculcating the Basic Law’s 
values in society was a much longer term process involving the BVerfG, different state 
institutions and, from the mid-1960s onwards, became conjoined with the wider 
Holocaust consciousness that developed in Germany. In fact, for the first decade of the 
Federal Republic there were probably few values in German society that the BVerfG 
would have been inclined to formalise.
191
 The most direct pedagogic effect that the 
Court has had on German society has been through the constitutional complaint 
mechanism, examined in Chapter 7. More than 130,000 citizens have petitioned the 
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Court since 1951, which has been credited with developing a broad democratic 
understanding among the German people
192
. However, as will be assessed in Chapter 7, 
the emergence of the Green Party in the 1980s represented a dramatic change in the 
political scene, one that the BVerfG was generally more accepting of than the 
established political parties.  
3.2 Whose Values?  
 The American and German acts of constitution forming each represented an 
attempt to create a new state and a new constitutional identity from a tabula rasa 
moment. These parallels, though, do not disguise the significant differences between 
these acts of constitution making. Justice Oliver Holmes observed in his famous dissent 
in Lochner v New York that a constitution is “made for people of fundamentally 
different views.”193 Although undoubtedly true of the United States it seems less true of 
Germany, for reasons I will explain presently. Holmes might well have said ‘peoples’ 
for in the American colonies, while there was certainly a common culture, Americans 
had distinct state, regional and local identities. Sharp differences existed within states 
and between the propertied and moneyed elites of the northern states and the farm and 
plantation owners of the south. Thus, even by the time of the Civil War, almost 75 years 
after the Constitution was established, Robert E Lee and Jefferson Davis still considered 
themselves citizens of their states first, of the South second and of the United States 
last.
194
 
 Patrick Henry’s indignation during the Virginia Ratifying Convention at the 
words in the Constitution’s preamble illustrated the fragmented reality of the American 
colonies.
195
 The United States as a nation did not exist and would not be forged without 
the struggle and shedding of blood that Justice Holmes referred to.
196
 It is often only 
when various groups and interests clash over their differing conceptions of the 
constitutional narrative that the Supreme Court’s interpretations became orientation 
points for the developing nation. Sometimes, however, the divisions in constitutional 
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meaning between the social practices that are permitted in the civic space and what the 
state is prepared to accept as law become too wide. In the United States, the Civil War 
was the end result. As Robert Dahl observed  
Given the extreme polarisation in interests, values, and ways of 
life between the citizens of the slave states and those of the free 
states, I cannot imagine any democratic constitution under which 
the two sections could have continued to coexist peacefully in one 
country.
197
 
After the defeat of the South and the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the 
law of the United States and the constitutional interpretation of the North regarding the 
abhorrence of slavery won out. But the Union won by force; as Böckenförde would put 
it, it had to sacrifice its liberalness and resort to war to restore a constitutional 
interpretation that would have to be recognised as law in the South. However, 
recognition of law did not mean that the South had accepted the values and meaning 
embodied in that law.   
 Under normal circumstances in a country as large as the U.S., differences in 
constitutional meaning between the interpretation of a national majority and that of local 
majorities need not result in bloodshed. Justice Stephen Breyer noted recently that the 
Constitution  
leaves vast space in between the boundaries, for people themselves 
through the ballot box to decide what cities, towns, states, what 
kind of a nation they want. That is what [it] foresees.
198
  
The Court’s role, Breyer added, is more akin to “the boundary commission” of the 
Constitution, policing only those difficult questions on the edges of the document which 
people can and will differ on. This view of a constitution establishing a civic space 
where political and social life can occur―and the role of any court in policing that 
space―is very important and will be returned to in this chapter and later ones.  
The President of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Andreas Voßkuhle, said in a 
2013 interview that the role of a court―particularly in the German sense―is defining 
parameters within which politics can unfold.
199
 Breyer’s and Voßkuhle’s remarks may 
sound alike, but they are essentially describing two different universes, one broadly 
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conditioned by liberty and one by dignity. More significantly, Breyer is describing, 
however decorously, a civic space where individuals volunteer, engage in their 
communities, and live their lives within those spaces. Voßkuhle, though, is describing a 
purely political space where representative democracy can be allowed to play out; but 
only if it respects the higher law norms and fundamental rights of the Constitution. This 
difference sets up the fundamental problem which will be engaged with in this and later 
chapters, and which Jefferson, Tocqueville, Arendt and Böckenförde have wrestled 
with: the balance between the state giving citizens the discretion to live their lives free 
from its interference, while depending on those same citizens to preserve the state, and 
those very freedoms that the state’s existence guarantees.  
If the U.S. Constitution was a framework for argument
200
 among people of 
different views, Germany’s Basic Law (‘Grundgesetz’) was an unambiguous normative 
attempt to create a liberal democratic constitutional order based on fundamental rights 
that the state would be duty bound to protect. Although more homogenous than 
eighteenth century America, Germany, also contained people of different views, some 
of whom were on the march in opposition to the new FRG and its values.
201
 But 
whereas the U.S. Constitution had to be ambiguous enough to draw together those 
different societal threads within a workable framework of governance, the Basic Law 
was a clear normative constitution which did not seek to reconcile the values of 
disparate parts of society, but to inculcate its fundamental values in society. While the 
liberal values of the Basic Law represented some of the fruits of the country’s two 
previous liberal constitutions—the Frankfurt Constitution of 1849, which survived less 
than a day, and the Weimar Constitution of 1919 which lasted fourteen years—they 
were not rooted deeply in German society.
202
  
The development of the Basic Law’s objective value order by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and its implications for stability and renewal will be assessed 
in Chapter 6. It is also important to recognise that Germany’s post-war constitutional 
institutions were widely seen as just one part of the equation. Finding a value system or 
sense of identification that would resonate with the Germany people in 1949 and 
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reinforce rather than undermine the values of the Basic Law was every bit as much of a 
challenge. One widely discussed idea in Germany for decades has been constitutional 
patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus), which has been developed in the very different 
work of Jürgen Habermas and Dolf Sternberger
203
. For Sternberger, who had 
experienced the fall of Weimar, the Verfassungspatriotismus was one of ‘militancy’ and 
making the state and its institutions strong enough against its enemies, while for 
Habermas it was about ‘memory’ and recognising that after the Holocaust the only 
possible national identity for Germans was one based on a shared public adherence to 
democratic rights and values. Both of these ideas―of militant democracy and resistant 
institutions, and public adherence to democratic values―are embodied in important 
ways within the Basic Law.  
Germany’s founding fathers, like America’s, recognised the tentative nature of 
their creation. Given the fate of the country’s previous attempts at constitution making, 
the new constitutional document was deliberately not called a constitution 
(‘Verfassung’), but the Basic Law or (‘Grundgesetz’204). This paradoxically had the 
effect of lowering expectations even as the lofty principles in the Basic Law’s opening 
articles, and its resistant constitutional structure, sought to ensure that it did not meet the 
same fate as Weimar. In a country which, despite the Nazi period, still had a profound 
respect for the law
205
 and the notion of the Rechtsstaat, characterising the Basic Law as 
‘fundamental law’ was perhaps wise. Moreover, the designation Grundgesetz indicated 
that the Basic Law was intended to be a temporary and transitional document, which 
according to the terms of its preamble would apply during a “transitional period” 
(‘Übergangszeit’) until the “entire German people” could “in free self-determination, 
complete the unity and freedom of Germany”.206 The opportunity to create a new 
Constitution for a re-unified Germany came in 1991, but it was not one that most 
Germans, at least in West Germany, had any wish to take advantage of.  
3.3 Böckenförde and the Survival of the Liberal State 
There is generally little that unites the outlooks, philosophical or otherwise, of 
Jürgen Habermas and Carl Schmitt. Both, however, saw that in its first decade the 
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Bundesverfassungsgericht had become too powerful.
207
 For Schmitt, the Court’s 
existence fractured the state’s ability to decide, while for Habermas its central role in 
politics impaired the ability of the people to deliberate.
208
 As Collings puts it, “Policy 
came from Bonn; values from Karlsruhe
209
; but what came from the people?”210 This, of 
course, was the problem. By the late 1950s, the Federal Republic had gained majority 
acceptance in Germany, aided in large part by spectacular economic growth and a sense 
of stability.
211
 However, the uninvited guest at the German dinner party remained the 
Nazi period and the willingness of so many Germans to support Hitler, actively or 
tacitly
212
. While the Basic Law derived its authority and legitimacy from the people
213
, 
incorporating their agency into the new body politic was effectively done, writes 
Möllers, by migrating the constitutional populism of the Reich President under the 
Weimar Republic to the BVerfG under the Basic Law.
214
 Meanwhile, the ability of 
Germany to maintain a liberal democracy and a sense of societal cohesion and identity 
purely on the basis of economic growth―and, implicitly, the liberal values being 
enunciated by the BVerfG,―was questioned from the left and right.  
These questions revealed doubts as to whether the values of Germany’s 
Karlsruhe inspired constitutionalism―human dignity and democracy itself―were 
enough to keep liberal democracy alive in a country where democratic institutions had 
fared so dismally. Schmitt referred to the Court’s value order as a ‘tyranny of values’ 
and railed against it.
215
 For Schmitt (a Catholic), all significant political concepts were 
traceable to Christian theology or religious tradition, compared to which the insipid but 
still menacing Karlsruhe inspired objective value order was a poor substitute.
216
 
Schmitt’s view was broadly shared by Adenauer’s Christian Democrats that “without 
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the moral nourishment or value-orientations provided by Christianity, liberal democracy 
would suffer a normative deficit and might not long survive.”217  
This emphasis on religion was on one level a concerted strategy on the part of 
Christian Democrats to exculpate themselves from the secular materialism of the Third 
Reich, and to blame the secular left (i.e. the Social Democrats) for facilitating the Nazis. 
On any objective level this was absurd as the Social Democrats had generally been 
among the most vociferous opponents of the Nazis. Despite the political motives and 
advantage the CDU gained by presenting itself as an alternative to National Socialist 
secularism, an identity crisis was undoubtedly brewing in the FRG, one which became 
an open wound after the 1960s with the public debate over how Germany came to terms 
with it Nazi past (“Die Vergangenheitsbewältigung”). Consequently, neither 
nationalism nor even a milder traditional patriotism were seen as viable sources of 
either constitutional values or societal cohesion in post-war Germany.  
It was ironic, then, that it was the value-assertive doctrine of the priests of the 
BVerfG which has become such an unmistakable part of Germany’s post-1949 
constitutional topography. In this respect, the Court’s role has been nothing less than 
defining the very telos of the Basic Law. This was not the BVerfG telling Germans what 
to believe. Rather, the impact of the BVerfG’s influence was seen, firstly, through its 
inculcation of the Basic Law’s emerging values and processes in political institutions, 
and, secondly, through a growing awareness on the part of ordinary 
Germans―particularly as a result of the constitutional complaint mechanism―that the 
Court was there to protect their fundamental and democratic rights. Writing in 1971, 
Wilhelm Geck argued that “the jurisprudence of the [Bundesverfassungsgericht] has, as 
we all know, fostered the development of true democratic understanding in the Federal 
Republic.”218 As we shall see in Chapter 7, the Court’s role in shaping Germans’ 
expectations and understandings of democracy has been repeatedly manifested through 
the constitutional complaints of citizens and political parties; this has been especially 
the case over the restrictions imposed by the statutory 5 percent hurdle for electoral 
success. 
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A further irony is that it was Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, a political theorist
219
 
and protégée of Schmitt, who became one of the Court’s most influential justices during 
the 1980s and 1990s. In 1964, Böckenförde gave a lecture, at the heart of which was the 
question of which values can bind and hold a state and society together in a secular age, 
and in the absence of the old certainty of religion or the homogeneity provided by 
nation.
220
 “Can the state be built on a ‘natural ethics’,” he asked, and, “how far can 
nations united in states live by the guaranteed provision of individual liberty alone, 
without a unifying bond antecedent to that liberty?”221 In the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Nazi secular state and in the first decades of the federal republic these questions 
were seen as existentially significant. After all, nothing in Germany’s three previous 
constitutions of 1849, 1871 and 1919 had done anything to entrench liberal values in 
German society and its state institutions. From the vantage point of the FRG’s first few 
decades, there was no axiomatic or logical reason why it should be ‘fourth time lucky’.   
When Böckenförde originally posed these questions in the 1960s, Western 
liberal democratic societies were again in a growing state of flux due to social changes 
and movements demanding civil rights and greater equality. These factors were also 
relevant in Germany, where student protests and the imminent change from the CDU 
government―which had led the country since the establishment of the FRG―to Willy 
Brandt’s Social Democrats, were cause for alarm in some quarters. Böckenförde feared 
that the reliance of the FRG since its establishment on the “moral values” of the Basic 
Law as a basis of shared convictions was replete with dangers, potentially opening the 
door “to subjectivism and positivism in current assessments of values that, each laying 
claim to objective validity, tend to destroy rather than foster liberty.”222 In times of 
changing values and a possibly dissolving social contract, can a normative constitution 
alone hold a society together? Böckenförde’s question is as pertinent to the context of 
Germany’s current debate over migration and the rise of right-wing populism across the 
West as it was to the social and political flux of the 1960s.   
Böckenförde’s argument lies at the heart of the stability versus renewal 
dichotomy assessed thus far. Can the liberal democratic state successfully preserve its 
own existence on the basis of its constitutional values without indoctrinating those 
values in society, and thus, according to Böckenförde, sacrificing its fundamental liberal 
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character? Böckenförde’s ultimate point, building on Schmitt’s critique of values and 
around twenty years before he joined the Court, was both a question and a warning. I 
cite it at length because of its relevance to my central argument.  
The question of bonding forces [in society] is posed afresh and 
reduced to its actual core: the liberal, secularised state is 
nourished by presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee
223
. 
That is the great gamble it has made for liberty’s sake. On the one 
hand, it can only survive as a liberal state if the liberty it allows its 
citizens regulates itself from within on the basis of the moral 
substance of the individual and the homogeneity of society. On the 
other hand, it cannot attempt to guarantee those inner regulatory 
forces by its own efforts―that is to say, with the instruments of 
legal coercion and authoritative command―without abandoning 
its liberalness.
224
 
Böckenförde then takes aim at the extent to which, in inculcating its value system, the 
state acting through the BVerfG had, at once, sacrificed some of the liberalness of the 
Federal Republic in the interests of its preservation, and eroded the wall between the 
public and private spheres essential to liberty.   
The prescribed state ideology, the revival of the Aristotelian polis 
tradition, and the proclamation of an ‘objective system of values’ 
all do away with the very split out of which public liberty is 
constituted. There is no way back across the threshold of 1789 that 
does not destroy the state as the order of liberty.
225
 
The ‘split’ of course, was that between state and society, between the public and the 
private, which the French Revolution and, indeed, the American Revolution, had 
ushered in. Despite being a student of Schmitt, Böckenförde is a Social Democrat by 
party affiliation. His ‘dilemma’ posed in 1964 and his later complaints about 
ossification among the established parties while he was on the Court can be seen not as 
an attack on the liberal values of the Basic Law, but as a warning that the inculcation of 
values, even liberal ones, can easily end up negating liberalism itself.  
It is also undoubtedly the case that over forty years after Böckenförde penned 
his dilemma, that the values of the Basic Law have become a reliable moral anchor and 
identification point for German society as a whole. This may not be fully fledged 
Habermasian constitutional patriotism but it is not far off. This context of modern 
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liberal Germany is the basis for the analysis of the European Parliament electoral 
threshold cases in Chapter 7. These cases effectively question whether threats to 
stability are still sufficient to justify restricting the popular sovereignty of certain 
German voters. However, a larger question posed by the cases is whether Germany’s 
liberal democracy is strong enough to sustain a normal polity again. 
3.4 Arendt, Jefferson and Tocqueville on ‘Neighbourliness’ 
The American framers tried to prevent either legislative or executive tyranny 
emerging, firstly, by dividing and limiting power and, secondly, by placing faith in the 
people to uphold the Constitution because it protected their own liberties. Democracy in 
America was, says Wolin, less a paean to democracy than a warning about the dangers 
of what Tocqueville called “democratic despotism”.226 Americans had developed a 
political society in which the state was practically invisible.
227
 Though invisible at the 
local level, the state became increasingly complex as the nineteenth century wore on in 
response, firstly, to the Civil War, and then the co-development of America’s industrial 
society and the movement of people from the countryside to the growing cities. The fear 
that the state would become invisible in the lives of the people was one that motivated 
Jefferson. Attempting to reconcile Jefferson’s notoriously inconsistent thoughts can be 
problematic, but one can see perhaps that his ‘sovereignty of the living generation’ 
theory was due to a fear of an ossification or disintegration in the civic space, due to 
individuals voting, but not participating in their republic.  
According to Hannah Arendt, Jefferson’s fear was that the Constitution had 
divided the public and private spheres in such a way that all power had been given to 
the citizens “without giving them the opportunity of being republicans and of acting as 
citizens.”228 Jefferson’s realisation, says Arendt, was that “unless the country was a 
living presence in the midst of its citizens” rather than materialising only every two 
years in the form of elections, then the necessary bonds to maintain representative 
government would be insufficient.
229
 Arendt’s insight into Jefferson’s thought is, in the 
post-Trump and post-Brexit world, an important one. Jefferson, she said, had  
a foreboding of how dangerous it might be to allow the people a 
share in public power without providing them at the same time 
with more public space than the ballot box and with more 
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opportunity to make their voices heard in public than election 
day.
230
  
Jefferson’s concern about how to sustain representative government and the crucial 
bond between citizen and state endures.  
 For Jefferson the optimal way for the citizens to maintain republican 
government was for the citizen to play an active role in the state, or for the state to be a 
living presence in the life of the citizen. If maintaining the precious bond between 
citizen and state was challenging enough in 1826 when Jefferson died, it became even 
more so with the development of complex modern industrial states in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries where the opportunity of citizens to participate in their 
government at any time other than at elections was becoming more challenging.  
It is certainly true that in the United States, as Tocqueville observed, the 
prevalence of voluntary and religious associations cemented civic loyalties, even though 
such bonds were at the local rather than national level. For Tocqueville, religion in 
America was “the first of their political institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for 
freedom, it facilitates the use of it.”231 Liberty for Americans in Tocqueville’s era was 
first and foremost about religious freedom, which was seen as indistinguishable from 
their status as citizens. The linkage between freedom and religion predated the First 
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and religion, with one important document 
being Jefferson’s ‘Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom’232. While the migration of 
large numbers of people to the cities weakened many of those civic and religious 
bonds―and provided the fodder for electoral malapportionment as the maintenance of 
naked political power trumped civic engagement―American religion continued to 
provide an additional source of civic identity well into the second half of the twentieth 
century.
233
  
Tocqueville equally saw that the place where republican government ends and 
despotism begins is when all relationships and associations between people have broken 
down except with their immediate families. In such a society, individuals would be 
“necessarily endeavouring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut 
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their lives. Each of them, living apart is a stranger to the fate of the rest.” Above such 
isolated individuals there stands  
an immense and tutelary power which takes upon itself alone to 
secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate.[…]  For 
their happiness such a government willingly labours, but it chooses 
to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness.
234  
Had Tocqueville anticipated the medium, reality TV progammes like The Apprentice 
would doubtless have been near the top of his definition of ‘paltry pleasures’ and 
‘gratifications’. He may not, though, have anticipated that things could deteriorate to 
such an extent that the host of such a show could become the ‘tutelary power’. 
In terms of constitutionalism, malapportionment was the result of a failure of 
state legislatures to keep faith with their own constitutional requirements. The Supreme 
Court’s solution to malapportionment involved an invocation and reminder of the values 
generated by the struggles for equality in American society: the Civil War, the end of 
slavery, Reconstruction, the gradual story of emancipation, and the progressively 
expanding suffrage for African Americans, non-property owning whites, and women.
235
 
Yet this only told part of the story of emancipation and growing equality―that in the 
private sphere―which Böckenförde and Arendt’s insight on Jefferson, remind us of. 
The Supreme Court’s narrative was about the right to vote, and it was important. But it 
was, necessarily, as any court decision dealing with a specific case or controversy must 
be, limited. It was the product of the division between the public and private spheres 
which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. Therefore, it could concern itself 
only with the right to vote every two or four years; it could not deal with either the 
participation of citizens in their government, or the question of how a society can 
cohere, absent common values or a common god.   
The root causes of malapportionment were, in terms which are all too familiar to 
us in the post-Brexit and post-Trump context, rapid social change, mass immigration, 
the growing influence of cities, and a fear in rural areas that the values of god, country, 
neighbour, community, and civil loyalty―which had held society together up to that 
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point―were fracturing.236 The response of the rural areas in states was to try and hold 
onto power illegitimately by not reapportioning. The eventual and important 
constitutional solution the Supreme Court provided was a reminder of American 
progress and the steadily improving state of equality and the human condition. The 
Court’s decisions in the reapportionment cases spoke to the realisation of the county’s 
original principles of equality, and paralleled the liberal values we see as coming out of 
the post-1945 period. However, the decisions did not address the question of citizens 
being involved in the civic space through participation, in Arendt’s words as citizens, 
merely as voters. According to Jeremy Waldron, Arendt de-emphasised the negative 
liberty aspect of the American Constitution which provided the individual with security 
against the state, instead focussing on the freedom derived from participation in public 
affairs.
237
 
What the reapportionment decisions did not and could not address was how to 
reconcile the disparate values in the civic space. The values of urban and rural voters, 
and their interpretations of the Constitution, were simply too far apart for 
constitutionalism or law to provide a shared vocabulary in the civic space (of the type 
identified by Orwell
238
 in Chapter 1). The danger was that, absent this shared 
vocabulary and social glue, the values of human dignity and equality as lynchpins of 
liberal democratic government would be left perilously exposed if they were accepted 
by only half of a society. The danger of equality without religious belief, said 
Tocqueville, is it tends to “isolate [men] from one another, to concentrate every man’s 
attention on himself, and it lays open the soul to an inordinate love of material 
gratification.”239  
One can have social cohesion in a state without it being a being a liberal 
democracy. In the absence of religion, the Volksgemeinschaftsprinzip in Germany or 
‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ could probably create a degree of social cohesion. 
But it would mean a great deal of control of the public sphere over the private sphere so 
liberal values would be snuffed out. The emergence of secular liberal democracy out of 
the French Revolution split the public and private spheres asunder. Thus was a tenuous 
bond established between citizen and state. Once the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
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had “stood the individual on his own two feet and handed him his liberty,” the problem 
for government became “how to integrate the emancipated individual into the state.”240 
Individuals increasingly concerned themselves with emancipation in the private sphere 
and their only activity in the public sphere, if at all, was voting at election times every 
few years. The fundamental values of equality and human dignity in constitutionalism 
since 1945 are essentially private values in the sense that the state has a duty to provide 
a sphere for the citizen to live their life where they have equality and human dignity, 
and, as Hobbes reminds us, security. Within this constitutional constellation the 
citizen’s sole role is, as Arendt suggests, that they vote every two, four or five years. As 
Jefferson suggests, that constitutes a fragile basis for maintaining representative 
government in the sense of a republic. 
 This was the crux of Böckenförde’s lecture in 1964, and while it was an 
especially pertinent warning to Germany, it is equally prescient with respect to the 
United States and indeed most modern societies. The “split” between the public and 
private that Böckenförde refers to when he says “there is no way back across the 
threshold of 1789 that does not destroy the state as the order of liberty”241 is exactly the 
same division between the public and private that Arendt describes Jefferson as fearful 
of. That division creates a zone of liberty for the citizens, but the preservation of that 
zone relies on the collective agency of the citizens to maintain their constitutional order. 
Böckenförde’s key concern was how, in the absence of religion, the vast majority of 
individuals can maintain the necessary bonds of social cohesion to preserve the peace of 
their society, and ultimately their liberal democratic polity. In a clear sense then, 
Böckenförde and Jefferson are attempting to address the same problem of how to 
sustain representative government, albeit from different perspectives; Böckenförde, in 
terms of whether the liberal state―and, implicitly, its constitutional values―can be 
sustained without internal bonding forces; Jefferson, through the participation of the 
citizen in government, or the presence of government in the life of the citizen. For 
Germany after 1949, the constitutional order and its political system had liberal values, 
but they were not deeply rooted in society. However, there was a growing amount of 
social cohesion, but it was based on economic growth and a basic but rather 
unenthusiastic acceptance of the federal republic at least for the first couple of decades. 
This is the context which prompts Böckenförde’s concern about how one maintains the 
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social cohesion in a secular age in order to maintain the liberal democratic constitutional 
order itself.  
One sui generis explanation for what eventually provided Germany with the 
values of social cohesion to reinforce the values of liberal constitutionalism being 
disseminated by the Bundesverfassungsgericht was the growing Holocaust 
consciousness in Germany, and the acrimonious debate over coming to terms with the 
Nazi past (die Vergangenheitsbewältigung). That it was acrimonious does not sound 
like a recipe for social cohesion, and it was not at first as younger Germans asked 
difficult questions about what their parents and grandparents had done during the Nazi 
period. In the longer term, younger Germans who came of age after the 1960s and who 
had been inculcated in the history of the Nazi period and the Holocaust were better able 
to understand how the liberal democratic values of the Basic Law were a response to the 
Holocaust. Böckenförde could not have realised it in 1964, but the decades long debate 
and angst caused by the debate over the Nazi period that was about to be unleashed, and 
that many Germans at the time, as Gitta Sereny noted, would rather have left buried,
242
 
would in time provide a strong foundation for Germany’s liberal democracy.  
The initial fragility of Germany’s liberal democracy after 1949 was mainly due 
to the absence of a deep constitutional and political culture which might have allowed 
democratic values to take root. What initially proved fundamental to the recovery of 
German constitutionalism in 1949 was Germany’s respect for the law, which will be 
assessed in Chapter 6. The longer-term question regarding the success of the Basic Law 
was whether the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s objective value order that so offended 
Schmitt, and its ‘image of man’ conception of the German polis, could succeed in 
binding Germans to their liberal democratic constitution in the absence of god, nation, 
or other salutary associational pursuits.    
The ‘image of man’ is a choice of words which the BVerfG has repeatedly 
invoked as representing the central idea of the relationship between the individual and 
community lying at the heart of the Basic Law.
243
 According to this logic, rights could 
only be realised in a civic space which recognised the relationships between individuals. 
Pure equality on the basis of individuality rather than community would be dangerous 
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because once “deprived of the internal bonding forces” upon which it relies, the secular 
liberal state, says Böckenförde, is forced down the social utopian path of attempting to 
do ever more for its citizens and even fulfil their “eudaemonistic expectations”.244  
The dichotomy between constitutional values and the bonds of social cohesion 
highlighted by Böckenförde’s dilemma is one that will be returned to. Given 
Böckenförde’s theoretical and historical concerns in 1964 on how Germany’s liberal 
constitutional democracy could maintain its bonds with the German people, it is perhaps 
no surprise that as a justice on the Bundesverfassungsgericht from 1983 to 1996 he 
emerged as a defender of emerging smaller parties like the Greens, while criticising the 
established parties for their “oligarchical”245 tendency. As important as stability is and 
was in the German context, Böckenförde recognised when he was on the court that 
constitutional representative democracy had to remain representative in order to 
maintain its connection with the citizens. This question is assessed in greater depth in 
Chapters 6 and 7 regarding German constitutionalism and the European Parliament 
electoral threshold cases.  
3.5 Conclusion 
For a concerned German social democrat like Böckenförde, the fear in 1964 
would have been that Germany’s increasingly strong liberal constitutionalism, as 
embodied in its powerful new constitutional court, had only been superficially accepted 
by Germans as a result of international institutions and the country’s economic miracle. 
As will be addressed in Chapters 6 and 7, Germany and its people ultimately answered 
Böckenförde’s concerns about whether the country could sustain liberal democracy, 
although I think the reasons had as much to do with the country’s willingness to 
confront its traumatic past, as either internal bonding forces such as religion, or the 
objective value order of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. What remained unanswered was 
a broader question Böckenförde posed that applied to all liberal secular states wanting 
to maintain social cohesion and their constitutional institutions: “On what will that state 
base itself in time of crisis?”246 As will be addressed in later chapters, this question is of 
ongoing relevance. 
Böckenförde’s argument was that the liberal secular state rested on values which 
it could not guarantee. The state’s options were to use coercion to sustain those values, 
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but sacrifice its liberalness, or that it rely on other internal bonding forces such as 
religion or nation.
247
 Böckenförde stated recently that his lecture in 1964 was an appeal 
to his fellow Catholics to see the liberal secular state not as a threat to their religion but 
as an important means of guaranteeing the liberty which was essential to religious 
belief.
248
 By integrating into the Federal Republic, noted Böckenförde, Catholics would 
further strengthen the state through the addition of their “ethical imprint”.249 
Thus, whether religion supports democracy―by, as Tocqueville saw it, teaching 
Americans “the art of being free”250―or the other way around, we can at least see a 
relationship where they are mutually supportive without having to decide which comes 
first. I think Böckenförde’s dilemma can best be seen today as emphasising the 
practical, ethical, dialectical, and associational tools which religion, and other forms of 
social bonding or civic associational activity provide as a means of supporting liberal 
democracy, its institutions and its values.  
The key concern which we return to in the remaining chapters is whether the 
constitutional values which the respective courts have enunciated in their 
reapportionment and electoral threshold decisions are ones which can maintain the 
relationship between the state and citizens, absent other sources of social cohesion such 
as nation or religion? The context within which this question is asked is the liberty and 
dignity oriented paradigms of constitutionalism outlined thus far. What I called 
‘heightened’ constitutionalism in the flag salute case251 was an example of the Court 
defying the will of an unambiguous local and national majority during a time of war. 
Barnette was heard around five years after Carolene Products
252, and―with its 
protection of a religious minority, Jehovah’s Witnesses, entirely ticks the boxes of 
footnote four, and fits the expanding scope of equality assessed in the next chapter. 
Having examined how values are mediated in the civic space, we turn now to the 
question of how the Supreme Court has interpreted values institutionally.  
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Chapter 4 - People of Different Views 
A legal interpretation cannot be valid if no one is prepared to live 
by it.
253
 (Robert Cover) 
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they 
have called into life a being the development of which could not 
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. 
It was enough for them to realise or to hope that they had created 
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors 
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case 
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, 
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
254
 
(Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr)  
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The previous chapter examined alternative sources of values, identity and 
association in the civic space which undermine or reinforce the constitutional values of 
the liberal state. This chapter switches to assess the legal / institutional space within 
which constitutional values emerge and are interpreted by the U.S. federal courts. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the crisis in American representative democracy 
prior to the mid-1960s due to the widespread practice of malapportionment. This 
involved the effective exclusion of non-rural voters from the political process by local 
‘state’ majorities through the debasement of their votes. This chapter examines the 
development of American constitutionalism and the evolving understanding of equality 
and rights in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as well as the theoretical, historical 
and jurisprudential roots which shaped the relationship between the Supreme Court, the 
federal government, and national and local majorities. 
Prior to and after the Civil War, it did not particularly matter if local majorities 
subscribed to different constitutional interpretations and values in their lives and social 
practices provided that the interpretation did not clash with the law of the state on a vital 
issue for the federal government. To paraphrase Justice Holmes and Justice Breyer, the 
Constitution was intended to allow for this flexibility in meaning among people of 
different views. The Civil War effectively broke the Constitution by sacrificing its 
liberalness, real or pretended, in order to save the state itself.
255
 Segregation and civil 
rights were, likewise, two issues which stretched constitutional meaning to breaking 
point and beyond.  
The important distinction here is between the civic space of constitutional 
meaning and interpretation examined in the previous chapter and the legal / institutional 
space of interpretation examined in the chapter ahead. What the victory of North over 
South could not do was make the values of equality and emancipation more important 
to the citizens in the South than their own bonds of homogeneity which rejected 
Lincoln’s emancipatory vision. The Supreme Court and the federal government could 
impose force and federal law on the states in the legal / institutional space, but the 
constitutional values embodied in those laws were rejected in the lives and social 
practices of those local majorities. As seen in the last chapter in the ideas of 
Böckenförde, where differences exist between the authoritative values of the state which 
sustain constitutional meaning and, thus, law, and the values or internal bonding forces 
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which hold individuals, groups and majorities together, then the survival of the state can 
be at risk.  
While Alexander Bickel looked at the Supreme Court in terms of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, this chapter assesses the Court’s interpretive role and 
emerging doctrine of equality through the evolving prism of constitutionalism itself. 
One of the problems with the countermajoritarian difficulty is that it does not specify 
‘which majority’ is the relevant one. As addressed in the previous chapter, the 
differences between national and local majority sentiment started the Civil War, and are 
deeply implicated in the malapportionment problem which will be examined in Chapter 
5. The question of majoritarianism, however, is a useful springboard to assess the 
Court’s role in supporting emerging national majority sentiment, its relationship with 
the federal government, and its emerging role after 1937 as a defender of minority 
rights. The Court’s institutional role in steering American constitutionalism towards a 
more emancipatory vision of equality and human dignity was, more often than not, done 
by overruling state laws or practices and was often supported by the federal 
government, as Whittington argues.
256
 The picture of constitutionalism which emerges 
has been mostly been driven by political action, and legislative and constitutional 
initiatives in response to social struggles and conflicts, and through judicial 
interpretations. As Walter Murphy notes  
The adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
passage of legislation authorising the federal courts to interpret 
these provisions, and judicial interpretations of them, and the Bill 
of Rights, have solidified constitutionalism as part of the larger 
political system, though one should not underestimate legislative 
and executive action, or the synergistic effects of political 
institutions and culture.257 
This passage by Murphy bridges the content of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 and more 
broadly reflects the dichotomy between the legal / institutional space―characterised by 
legislative and judicial initiatives solidifying constitutionalism―and the civic 
space―where cultural and traditional values can support or undermine constitutional 
values.  
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In the chapter ahead, I will begin by briefly highlighting the 
‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ before then addressing the more central question to the 
analysis in the American chapters of ‘which majority is relevant?’ The chapter then 
addresses the concerns of Madison and Jefferson over the dangers of majority tyranny at 
the local level as exemplified by the state legislatures, and their gradual recognition that 
the federal courts provide a means of reining in the states, albeit in the legal / 
institutional space. Section 4.3 considers the development of the modern court, its 
essentially majoritarian character and how administrative and personnel changes laid the 
groundwork for the emergence of a constitutionalism which would prioritise minority 
rights and the access of voters to democratic processes. The chapter then proceeds to the 
Holmesian idea that a constitution is “for people of different views” which conceptually 
bridges the concerns of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. This chapter addresses the key tension 
inherent in America’s liberty orientated constitutionalism between a constitution 
designed to liberate its citizens from the clutches of government, but is cohesive enough 
to hold a people together, a constitution general enough to allow people to live their 
lives without restraint, but which must nevertheless resolve legal disputes. The chapter 
then considers the gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, and the 
recognition of many lawyers that the state governments were the quintessential threat to 
individual rights. To close, I consider the extent to which Carolene Products footnote 
four was a catalyst for the growing focus on equality and human dignity after 1945. In 
conclusion, I consider whether the emerging individual rights discourse that emerged 
after footnote four marked the beginnings of a geographic schism between national and 
local majorities, and between urban and rural areas in the United States, based on their 
predominant value orientations. 
4.1 Which Majority?  
As stated in Chapter 1, the main concern of constitutionalism has been 
mitigating threats to the state from too much participation or too little participation in 
the democratic process. The stability-renewal dichotomy at the heart of the investigation 
also frames some of the questions in this chapter and the next. These examine how 
developments in American constitutionalism since the founding period help explain the 
Court’s intervention in the malapportionment issue and its eventual one person one vote 
decisions. The one person one vote decision cannot simply be seen through the prism of 
an expanding franchise but as part of a developing understanding of how equality and 
human dignity have come to reflect the Court’s idea of the values of a maturing 
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society.
258
 As Justice William Douglas reiterated in Gray v Sanders, “the right to have 
one’s vote counted has the same dignity as the right to put a ballot in a box.”259  
As with the actions of the BVerfG in Chapter 7 which sought to remedy 
ossification in the German political system, the irony here is that it was the Supreme 
Court rather than elected politicians breathing life into the principle of political equality, 
which the Court argued demanded equal representation for equal numbers of people. 
One aspect of this constitutional evolution was the Court’s own interpretive journey of 
renewal. After the Court’s intensely countermajoritarian ‘Lochner period’(c.1890-
1937)
260
, where it interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting economic 
interests and private property rather than individual rights,
261
 it dramatically changed 
course in the late 1930s. This resulted in a belated acceptance of progressive legislation, 
a truce with Franklin Roosevelt over the New Deal legislation, and the famous footnote 
four in United States v Carolene Products
262
. Carolene, which will be assessed in 
Section 4.6, effectively signalled that the Court would only consider checking laws 
which contravened federally protected rights or which targeted the participation of 
minorities in the political process.  
 For Friedman, the puzzle with the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ is that it 
encompasses very different examples of Supreme Court decision-making across 
decades, even when it was clear that decisions such as Brown v Board of Education in 
1954 and the reapportionment decisions of the 1960s carried broad popular support 
either at the national or local level, and sometimes both. Friedman differentiates 
between two different types of criticism that the Court faced: 
Even popular dissenters from Court decisions did not claim that 
the Court was interfering with popular will, as much as that the 
Court was rushing ahead of legislative (and perhaps) popular 
decision-making. The claims, though easily confused, are 
different. The countermajoritarian criticism applies to courts 
striking down laws that had been enacted by popular legislative 
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bodies, at least theoretically with broad popular support. This was 
precisely the case during the Progressive Era, with relatively fresh 
legislation in constant jeopardy.
263
 During the Warren era, 
however, the Court’s decisions typically did not invalidate newly 
enacted legislation. Rather, the Court moved to address social 
problems that were already of concern to the public.
264
 
What the counter-majoritarian difficulty does not address, then, is which majority is the 
relevant one and, as seen in Chapter 3, whose values are relevant? Majority opinions 
vary from state to state and region to region, and a Supreme Court decision that might 
be enthusiastically received in northern states might be vilified in the South. This 
difference in majority opinion views between regions was highlighted by Friedman who 
asked: “Is the ruling ‘countermajoritarian’ because it thwarts a majority in the state, or 
majoritarian as reflecting a national consensus?
265
  
This regional differentiation exactly reflected attitudes to the Court’s unanimous 
decision in Brown v Board of Education in 1954.
266
 As Friedman notes, national public 
opinion was “strongly supportive” of the decision in Brown, while the outraged 
Southerners who attacked the decision did not do so on countermajoritarian grounds.
267
 
Instead, the arguments those in the South used attacking the Brown decision were 
primarily “grounded in respect for minority viewpoints and states’ rights”.268 This 
picture was also reflected in the very different value systems that were clashing in the 
reapportionment cases. 
The emphasis of the aggrieved Southerners on the idea that their minority rights 
were being violated as seen in the Brown decision exactly mirrored the response of rural 
areas across the country to reapportionment proposals going back to the 1940s.
269
 For 
our present purposes, this question of national versus local majorities is important for 
highlighting the potential for state fragmentation from the essential ‘value’ differences 
between a national and local majority on an issue of vital importance for the state. What 
this division between local and national majorities indicates―apart from the adjective 
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‘countermajoritarian’ only being statistically accurate around 50 percent of the time at 
best―was that an essential value or identity difference existed between constitutional 
values as interpreted by the Supreme Court and accepted by a national majority, on the 
one hand, and the values and interpretations of different communities who disagree with 
the Supreme Court’s and national majority’s interpretation, on the other.    
To understand how this value and identity schism between nation and local 
majorities became so central to the development of American constitutionalism it is first 
necessary to understand the fears of Madison and Jefferson over the dangers of local 
majority tyranny. It was the views of Madison and Jefferson on the dangers of 
legislative tyranny and the necessity of a judicial check on the states that ensured that 
the Supreme Court would have a role in supporting federal power and formalising the 
emerging values of the national majority.  
4.2 A Legal Check on Local Majorities 
For many of the founders the necessity of a new republican government of the 
United States was precisely because the popularly elected state legislatures had been 
guilty of pandering to mob tendencies and passing retroactive laws which often stripped 
property-holders of rights. Summarising the “calamitous” effects of the “mutable 
policy” of state legislatures, Madison wrote in Federalist 62 that  
it poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to 
the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the 
laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent 
that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised 
before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes 
that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it 
will be tomorrow.
270
 
From the outset, and even before the addition of the Bill of Rights, through their 
emphasis on representative democracy over direct democracy with only the House of 
Representatives directly elected, the framers seemed to have expressed their concerns 
over the dangers of popular majorities. In an era when the franchise was very limited, 
Madison’s main concern was less people’s ability to participate in the democratic 
process and more the protection of private rights from what he viewed as the principal 
threat–the state legislatures.271 Preserving rights for the minority was best achieved, 
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argued Madison, both through a balance between social forces in the much larger 
society created by Union, and also through an additional check at the federal level, 
which ultimately became the courts. The first part of Madison’s equation worked, writes 
John Hart Ely, till about the fiftieth anniversary of the republic, when it became clear 
that the greater plurality of interests in a larger republic was no impediment to the 
oppression of one group by another.
272
 Madison and the other framers failed to foresee 
the crystallising effect that parties would have on previously disaggregated interests 
within the political system.  
The challenge for Madison and the other founders, as Bellah noted was the 
particular problem of developing “public virtues in democratic citizens.”273 The 
Constitution was designed to bring this about through the instrumentality of checks and 
balances to offset “the centrifugal and anarchic tendency of competitive individual and 
local self-interest,” and so foster what Madison called the “permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.”274Although this vindicated their belief in the federal courts 
as a secondary check on state laws seeking to oppress the minority, the expansion of the 
franchise and the growing significance of democracy within the republican system 
provided states—through their control over the machinery of state and federal 
elections—with additional means to oppress minority groups. This flaw in republican 
theory lay at the heart of the malapportionment problem, but it is one which 
constitutionalism provided a ‘legal’ solution for in the form of the federal courts. 
A number of concerns drove Jefferson and Madison to see the judicial branch as 
an essential check on the states. Those reasons allow us to see that the founders saw the 
judicial branch as an important check on iniquitous state laws and the judiciary as the 
defenders of rights. The clear preference of the framers, firstly, for constitutionalism and 
secondly, judicial checks on state laws, runs counter to claims that the framers had 
intended that constitutional limits would be enforced through politics rather than law.
275
 
In fact, the evidence seems to be that the framers saw politics and law as both very 
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important. As Madison put it, “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”276 A 
further dimension of the countermajoritarian critique has it that Madison believed that 
interests in society would be able to balance one another at the national level, thus 
minimising tyrannical influences.
277
 Broadly this is correct, at least in the pre-Trumpian 
era. However, malapportionment was a classic local problem of precisely the type 
Madison had identified as exemplifying the iniquity of state politics.  
Madison had seen first-hand the effects of invidious state laws under the Articles 
of Confederation where populist majorities ran roughshod over the rights of the 
minority. By 1787, even initially ardent republicans had become disenchanted by what 
they viewed as the near tragic experience under popularly responsive state 
governments.
278
 In October 1788 Madison told Jefferson that he had come to believe 
that 
the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not 
from acts of government contrary to the sense of its constituents, 
but from acts in which government is the mere instrument of the 
major number of its constituents.
279
 
This role of the people in bringing about constitutional change from the 
founding period onwards through ordinary politics has been the subject of much 
scholarly attention.
280
 However, the specific nature of the people’s involvement, the 
forms it is manifested in and what it achieves is often harder to pin down. Kramer is 
right to say that popular pressure from the people was indispensable in bringing “an 
unruly authority to heel”.281 However, his claim that the founders had a uniform 
position in expecting that constitutional limits would be enforced through politics and 
by the people rather than in the courts seems contradicted by Madison and Jefferson 
(below).
282
 As the exchange between them below makes clear, they came to recognise 
that the courts would sometimes be an indispensable check on tyrannical government 
when all other avenues failed.  
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Given twentieth century Bickelian debates on the countermajoritarian difficulty, 
it is easy to overlook the clear view during the American founding period that there 
needed to be a countermajoritarian institution as a check on odious state laws and to 
enforce rights provisions.
283
 Fundamental to the very idea of a written constitution and 
Bill of Rights was the non-mutability of certain principles. Jefferson was a key 
advocate
284
 for the adoption of the Bill of Rights, even while recognizing and approving 
of the key check it would give to the judiciary.
285
 In March 1789, at the time when 
Congress was convening for the first time, he wrote to Madison: 
In the arguments in favour of a declaration of rights, you omit one 
which has great weight with me; the legal check which it puts into 
the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered 
independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits great 
confidence. 
286
 
Still, for Madison, judicial review was a poor substitute for stopping poor 
legislation from being enacted in the first place. Originally he had sought to achieve the 
dominance of the centre over the states by establishing a veto power (or ‘negative’) 
which the federal government would have over all state laws. However, this proposal 
was defeated at the convention. The Bill of Rights now assumed much greater 
importance. Addressing Congress in June 1789 to introduce the proposal for a 
declaration of rights Madison said 
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals 
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark 
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; 
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of 
rights.
287
 
These relatively early views of Madison gradually embracing the principle of judicially 
enforced rights, with the judiciary functioning as a bulwark against extra-legal 
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accumulations of power, illustrate that the founders believed that neither a balance 
between social forces nor the enforcement of constitutional limits through politics 
would be sufficient to protect rights and hold those in power to account.
288
  
Despite eulogising the proposed Constitution in his Federalist essays to ensure 
ratification, the eventual outcome of shared and divided sovereignty between the federal 
government and the individual stares was one that profoundly dismayed Madison. He 
saw that the outcome at Philadelphia could be a recipe for conflict because of its 
generality and the way that the Constitution blurred the lines of sovereignty between the 
national and state governments and indirectly gave the states a key role in the federation 
through their power to appoint senators. Ultimately, Madison believed that the 
periphery had too much power over the centre and that the federal republic of the 
United States would dance to a tune set by the states. At this stage, Madison believed 
the generality of the Constitution could be a cause for problems. Later he came to see 
the ambiguity in the document was its great advantage. One reason that 
constitutionalism functions as a framework for constitutional renewal, and perhaps 
debate
289
, is the general nature of the compact agreed to originally.
 
It provides vast 
space for citizens to live their lives, as Justice Stephen Breyer noted.
290
 However, as we 
shall see, this generality causes problems of its own. It is the implications of the 
relationship between the Court, the federal government and the people for the 
development of American constitutionalism that will be explored further in the next 
section.  
4.3 The Supreme Court and Majoritarian Politics 
In the key reapportionment case, Baker v Carr, Justice Tom Clark noted that the 
role of the Supreme Court as a defender of federal rights was anticipated as early as 
1787. 
As John Rutledge (later Chief Justice) said 175 years ago in the 
course of the Constitutional Convention, a chief function of the 
Court is to secure national rights.
291
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However, for much of its history, even when it had the Fourteenth Amendment at its 
disposal, the Court chose to protect economic interests and private property rights rather 
than individual rights. In the section ahead I will address the Court’s position within the 
national majoritarian system, and how some administrative changes in its docket in the 
mid-1920s gave it a unique vantage point from which to endorse changing policies such 
as the New Deal and, later, to anticipate and formalise emerging norms in society.  
The immediate catalyst for footnote four of Carolene Products and the Court’s 
change of emphasis was the appointment of two justices which put the normally 
dissenting Harlan Stone into the unusual position of being in the majority. This 
personnel shift was a return to business as usual in the sense that after an unusually long 
wait of four years to nominate his first justice, Roosevelt’s New Deal policy agenda 
would no longer be at odds with the Court’s decisions. As Robert Dahl noted in the 
1950s, such personnel shifts and the obvious political orientation of most justices meant 
that “the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the 
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”292 The 
Court could on rare occasions block the application of a policy by up to 25 years. 
However, such outlier cases could not disguise the reality that “Congress and the 
president do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile court on major policy issues”.293  
The often close relationship between the federal courts and the federal 
government has been prominent in the work of Dahl and others.
294
 In his 1957 study of 
the Court’s role as a policy-making institution, what was significant for Dahl was not 
that courts made policy, but the extent to which policy decisions were made “by going 
outside established ‘legal’ criteria found in precedent, statute, and constitution.”295 
Central to his enquiry was understanding the Court’s role in either blocking the will of 
the ruling majority or lending legitimacy to it.
296
 The Court is not merely an agent of the 
governing alliance, wrote Dahl:  
It is an essential part of the political leadership and possesses some 
bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the 
unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the 
                                                          
292
 Robert A Dahl, 'Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker', J. 
Pub. L., 6, (1957), 285. 
293
 Ibid. p. 288. 
294
 See for example ibid; Whittington, 'Political Supports'. 
295
 Dahl, 'Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker'. pp.279-
280. 
296
 See for example Cover, 'The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative'.  
107 
 
Constitution. This legitimacy the Court jeopardizes if it flagrantly 
opposes the major policies of the dominant alliance.
297
 
As the sentiment of the dominant national alliance shifted in response to political 
activity in society, so too did that of the Court.  
From 1938 onwards the Court enunciated a changed conception of rights that 
placed more emphasis on the protection of federally protected rights, the rights of 
minorities, particularly their right to participate in the political process. During the 
Progressive era from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1930s, the Court dragged 
its feet while the democratic political institutions of the federal government and the 
states were passing legislation to ameliorate the conditions of workers and the urban 
poor. By the late 1930s it had begun to accept the changing political context, after 
which the gap between the Court’s and the federal government’s interpretation of the 
Constitution narrowed considerably. Two parallel trends emerge. As seen in Chapter 3, 
on the one hand, the Court’s decisions have over time come to endorse, or ‘formalise’, 
values emerging from ongoing struggles within civil society. On the other hand, the 
Court became an agent of federal power almost by default. It was less a pro-active 
decision by any particular court or justices than it represented a correlation between the 
Court’s commitment to uphold an emerging equality based conception of constitutional 
rights―which national majorities and the federal government had come to support 
first―and the greater propensity of the states to violate those rights.  
Following the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925
298
, the range and number of 
cases falling within the Court’s obligatory appellate jurisdiction was dramatically 
reduced, giving the justices complete discretion to hear cases, most of which would 
henceforth come by way of petitions for certiorari

.
299
 This ostensibly simple 
administrative change had a profound impact on how the Court perceived its emerging 
role. It was now no longer responsible for correcting ‘errors’ in the decisions of the 
lower federal courts. The Court’s “primary responsibility now was to focus on those 
cases which presented issues of general importance ─ those which ‘transcended’ the 
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interests of the parties to the case.”300 According to Grossman and Epp, this enhanced 
control over the cases that it heard resulted in a “much broadened judicial vision” and a 
radically changed agenda “responsive to emerging theories of ‘rights consciousness’ 
and expectations of legal redress.”301  
The Court’s new control over its docket combined with its vantage point in the 
American system of government put it in a strong position to formalise emerging 
norms, and to recognise the expanded scope of norms, which is evident in the handling 
of the reapportionment cases in Chapter 5. Neither the Court’s decision in Carolene nor 
its later decisions in Brown v Board of Education or the reapportionment cases were 
ones where it was imposing its will on a reluctant population as the countermajoritarian 
difficulty would imply. Indeed, the complaint could be made that given the Court’s role, 
as Dahl saw it, as part of the ruling coalition, that it has sometimes been overly 
conscious of what national majority sentiment would tolerate. The sense that the Court 
does not stick its neck out before there is already a groundswell of national opinion on a 
given issue fits the Tocquevillean conception of opinion formation in the United 
States.
302
 As Klarman puts it: 
The Court identifies and protects minority rights only when a 
majority or near majority of the community has come to 
deem those rights worth of protection.
.303
 
The role of the Supreme Court is thus very much that of a passive arbiter that 
does not create values but which must sometimes decide between conflicting 
constitutional values arising from already significant social issues.
304
 To this extent, it 
has been said that the Court has “seldom lagged far behind or forged far ahead of 
America.”305 This certainly represents a reasonable assessment of the Warren Court, 
which sometimes got ahead of the political branches on issues like desegregation and 
reapportionment, but was largely in step with the emerging value orientations of civil 
society on those issues.  
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One example is the Court’s evolving interpretation of equality and human 
dignity. For example, Maxine Goodman notes that in Brown v Board of Education the 
Court cited the Swedish sociologist Gunner Myrdal
306
, who had defined the American 
Creed as including dignity as an essential ideal.
307
 The Court used Myrdal’s work as 
authority for the idea that segregation negatively impacts African-American school 
children. Perhaps just as significantly, in Trop v Dulles the Court recognised that any 
conception of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 
must recognise an evolving conception of human decency.
308
 The irony of the Court 
citing a Swedish study to illustrate that dignity was an essential American ideal does not 
diminish the important role of the Court in ‘solidifying constitutionalism’ and its values, 
to paraphrase Murphy
309
.  
Though the Court’s role as a legal check on dangerous local majority sentiment 
became increasingly important as its authority and prestige grew, its writ was still 
primarily felt in the legal / institutional space. It could support and encourage political 
action in the civic space where the underlying values were aligned with its priorities and 
national ones. As indicated in previous chapters, however, the Court’s ability to shape 
the value orientations of the civic space in former slave states, or those of certain other 
local majorities remained limited.  
4.4 A Janus Faced Constitution 
In the United States, the Böckenförde dilemma also has relevance. Here it was 
solved partly through the emerging national ideology, and partly through the plethora of 
voluntary associations which through the nineteenth century allowed community, civic, 
and religious loyalties to sustain themselves in parallel but not in opposition to 
American identity. The very liberty guaranteed by the Constitution also sustained these 
voluntary associations. However, the strength of these local bonds has weakened over 
time, particularly as church attendance has declined.   
Jefferson’s belief in constitutional renewal left a powerful resonance in 
American political thought. It is of a country which commits itself to a set of precepts 
on parchment, but which has had to constantly fight and struggle over the meaning and 
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implications of those ideas. This point is put most strikingly by Walton Hamilton who 
writes 
The Bible of verbal inspiration begat the constitution of 
unquestioned authority. […] As the Bible wanted exegesis, the 
constitution demanded exposition. Its catholic clauses yielded to 
deduction precepts suitable to the cause and the occasion; it 
became the great storehouse of verbal conflict, and rival truths 
were derived by the same inexorable logic from the same infallible 
source. The Civil War was waged for a Union which it had 
created; the object of secession was to secure rights guaranteed by 
the constitution.
310 
At the basis of interpretation, then, is not merely the possibility, but the probability, of 
conflict over meaning and values.
311
 Given such a range of diametrically opposing 
interpretations in American history from one relatively short text, one can perhaps 
forgive the Supreme Court for not always getting it right. Constitutionalism therefore 
requires not only the enunciation of certain values such as equality and human dignity, 
but also a reinterpretation of the scope, potential and applicability of those values over 
time. That progress is also dependent on the stability of a country’s constitutional and 
institutional culture.  
One paradox with the malapportionment cases examined in the next chapter was 
that the crisis for representative democracy did not arise because state legislators were 
acting in conformity with constitutionalism, but because they were manifestly acting in 
opposition to it. By ignoring the equal protection principle of the federal constitution 
and contravening the terms of their own state constitutions requiring decennial 
reapportionment, the majorities in all but a handful of state legislatures had been elected 
by only a minority of the state’s population.312 While this could easily be dismissed as 
purely a desire to hang onto political power―and it was certainly 
that―malapportionment also reflected deeper value schisms. Each malapportioned state 
was itself split into different value systems. In northern states, the divide was principally 
between urban and rural, and between the wealthy white business class and urban poor. 
In the South, segregation added a particular hue to these competing values systems. The 
urban / rural split was replicated across the country: between poorer urban and blue 
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collar workers demanding better conditions, and those in rural areas seeing threats to 
their liberties and rights from numerically equal districting.
313
 Of course, the 
constitutional rights and liberties which wealthy white rural populations invoked as a 
reason for not reapportioning were found in the same constitutions whose decennial 
reapportionment requirements they were ignoring.  
Only a system of government based on general principles could bridge the 
divide between the groups assembled at Philadelphia in 1787. Such principles had to be 
flexible enough to mean one thing to defenders of states’ rights and something quite 
different to those favouring energetic national government. Justice Holmes’ dissent in 
Lochner that a constitution “is made for people of fundamentally different views”314 
was a message to his colleagues on the majority that attempts to straightjacket the 
country into a plutocratic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment ignored what 
constitutions are about. A constitution can be seen as much as a tool for mediating 
disagreement politically as a final and definitive instrument of governance. This is 
partly why claims about identifying original intent are problematic if a constitution is a 
compromise between different groups or interests within thirteen sovereign states. Yet 
as a legal tool, the constitution has to represent the final word of authority, even if it 
cannot be the final word in interpretation or meaning. Since a constitution acts as both 
the source of ultimate authority and is also a general instrument of law and governance, 
this means that its authority may greatly exceed its capacity to provide definitive 
answers. In other words, constitutions have authority precisely because they are general 
enough to unite an otherwise disaggregated people around a set of political and societal 
principles.  
Justice Robert Jackson argued that the judicial burden involves “translating the 
majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal 
government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with 
the problems of the twentieth century.”315 Brenner’s point that “only a fragmentary 
constitution is unstrained, only it can permit a constitutional consensus over the long 
run”316 is relevant here. Such a constitution permits the courts to interpret flexibly to 
meet the changing needs of a society and reconcile conflicts which could not have been 
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foreseen by the constitutional enactors.
 317
 This flexibility was just as well with slavery 
being the elephant in the room for the first eight decades of America’s existence.  
Without that generality (and flexibility) in the constitutional text―which still, 
astonishingly, has the force to unite Americans of such disparate political persuasions as 
can be found in red states and blue states―it seems unlikely that the U.S. would have 
even made it intact to fight the Civil War, let alone survived it. In the post-Civil War 
period, constitutional amendments and Reconstruction ostensibly entrenched the logic 
and value of equality in the constitutional text. However, this was a victory in the legal / 
institutional space; it was not a decisive victory in the ‘local’ civic space in the former 
slave states. The emancipated African Americans living in the former slave states were 
still not accepted as citizens in those places, because the value system in the South 
rejected the constitutional values which triumphed at the end of the Civil War.  
The Supreme Court’s part in incorporating the protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against the states would be crushingly slow for the emancipation of 
African Americans and other minority groups, as the Court turned towards the 
protection of economic rights. This reflects and reinforces the point made in Chapter 1 
that the development of American democracy and the expanding suffrage have 
paralleled, and also driven, the expansion of rights.
318
 This is perhaps what Robert 
Bellah meant when he called slavery “the second time of trial”.319 Slavery was, said 
Bellah “the most salient aspect of the more general problem of the full 
institutionalisation of democracy within our country.”320 How and why the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and democracy itself, eventually made headway is 
the question we now turn to.  
4.5 Incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
By the 1920s the U.S. was still grappling with the thorny question of how, and to what 
extent, the Bill of Rights of 1791 would be incorporated within the scope of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868). Incorporation 
represented a significant evolution in American constitutional jurisprudence towards the 
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idea that the Bill of Rights protected individuals as much against abuses of power by 
their own states as by the federal government.
321
 
The Fourteenth Amendment is by some margin the Constitution’s most litigated 
provision. Although passed in 1868 as the United States pushed ahead with 
Reconstruction, its impact did not really begin to be felt until the 1920s―and only then 
just barely―when the Supreme Court began to hold that its Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses applied to the states.
322
 The evolution of American constitutionalism 
from a charter of enumerated powers designed to limit government to a value centric 
orientation focussed on protecting individual rights parallels the incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights against the states. Whittington observes that the states have occupied far 
more of the Supreme Court’s constitutional attention than has the federal government, 
and the states have been the main target of the power of judicial review.
323
 This is both 
because of the Court’s role as an agent of national policy since the first decades of the 
republic
324
 and the frequent violations of federally protected rights by the states. It is 
this second point I wish to concentrate on.  
The Bill of Rights was ostensibly thought to be a defence of the people against 
federal power. By the twentieth century it was becoming abundantly clear that they 
needed to be protected from their own states.
325
 The Fourteenth Amendment contains 
within it the simple idea that neither federal nor state laws may negate or diminish the 
constitutional rights of citizens of the United States. The amendment contains five 
sections but it is Section 1 which provides some of the Constitution’s most significant 
constitutional rights guarantees, which also makes it the section about which the vast 
majority of Supreme Court cases are fought over.
326
 Still, even as the power of the 
federal government increased after the Civil War, the innately conservative federal 
judiciary did not rush to incorporate the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments against the states. By the beginning of the New Deal period (c.1933) there 
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were as yet few cases dealing with civil liberties, and the constitutional concept of 
equality in the Equal Protection Clause was generally underdeveloped and “offered little 
protection against discrimination”.327 In Justice Holmes’s view, the Clause was the “last 
resort of bad constitutional arguments”.328 Even after over 160 years of interpreting the 
Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s had only been dealing 
with the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states for a few decades.
329
  
By the 1960s, the expansion of the suffrage to women was no more than two 
generations old, but the fulfilment of its extension to African Americans promised in the 
post-Civil War amendments was woefully incomplete. After Brown v Board of 
Education, many lawyers felt that the emancipatory promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was finally being fulfilled almost ninety years after its adoption. In 
decisions such as Brown, and other cases
330
 in the 1950s and 60s that flowed from it, the 
Supreme Court found itself engaged in what might be called the second great period of 
reconstruction.
331
 Lending credence to the idea of the judiciary as a bulwark against 
ossification, Martin Shapiro observes that “[the Court] rather than the congress or 
presidency has been the principal agent of domestic reform in post-World War II 
American politics.”332 One explanation for this was the recognition by many American 
politicians, lawyers and judges that while slavery had been abolished after the Civil 
War, many of the states were still a regressive and anti-liberal force within the country. 
To such lawyers, state governments were “the quintessential threat to individual and 
minority rights”, while federal officials, particularly federal courts, were the special 
guardians of the rights promised in the Fourteenth Amendment.
333
 The idea that the 
biggest threat to liberty and the Union came from the states rather than the federal 
government was by no means novel. In 1913, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr 
observed: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost 
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union 
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would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the 
laws of the several States.
334
 
Holmes was, in fact, merely restating what had been a perennial fear of the 
founders, particularly Jefferson and Madison that the threat to minority interests came 
from the states and not the incipient federal government. One ironic caveat was that due 
to the widespread practice of reapportionment, one minority that the states were sublime 
at protecting was the white rural minority.  
The Reconstruction Period after the Civil War created a constitutional and 
societal architecture which was closer to the twentieth century than to the eighteenth 
century. However, it took almost a century for some of the promises of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments to be realised. The catalyst for this much delayed 
recognition of basic rights was not the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, 
but the social and economic crisis of the Great Depression, and a quiet revolution in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Out of the defeat of Roosevelt’s court packing plan and 
the Court’s belated approval of the hitherto blocked legislation came a new 
jurisprudence which would take the constitutionality of economic statutes almost as 
axiomatic, while declaring that legislation which curtails the processes that protect 
minorities and political participation would be subject to stricter judicial scrutiny. 
4.6 Footnote Four and the Rise of the Individual 
4.6.1 Case overview – United States v Carolene Products 
United States v Carolene Products was a generally mundane case relating 
to the shipping of milk products across state lines. However, it contains what is 
regarded as the most famous footnote in Supreme Court history. A 1923 act had 
banned the interstate shipment of ‘filled’ milk products (with skimmed milk and 
vegetable oil added). A manufacturer indicted for shipping filled milk challenged 
the statute. At issue was whether the statute violated the Commerce Power 
granted to Congress and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since 
the late nineteenth century such cases had normally been decided in favour of 
the business interest concerned, with the offending statute being struck down. 
Carolene marked a turning point, signifying a shift on the Court from its decades 
old defence of business interests dating from the Lochner era which had blocked 
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progressive legislation. Footnote four, written by, the then, Associate Justice 
Harlan Stone, signalled that the Court would presume the constitutionality of 
economic legislation, but would undertake more searching judicial scrutiny with 
legislation that was prohibited by the Bill of Rights, which affected access to 
political processes, or which targeted minorities.  
*** 
During the period when the intellectual debate about the nature of judicial 
review began to gain ground in the 1950s, the U.S. and its allies had just successfully 
fought fascism in Europe. Many liberal academics who agreed with the leftward policy 
shift on the Supreme Court following the multiple appointments made by Roosevelt felt 
a particular intellectual need to find a justification for judicial review given their 
opposition to it during the Progressive Era. There was moreover an intellectual need “to 
imagine a counter-majoritarian Court, even if one did not exist.” Beyond the academy, 
“for a public that had seen the ugly face of totalitarianism” there was, notes Friedman, 
“broad support for an institution in a democracy dedicated to protecting minority 
rights.”335  
By the end of World War Two, humanity had “learned some indelible lessons 
about the need to find effective constraints for governmental abuse of power.”336 
Despite the risks of government by judges, writes Durham, the post-World War Two era 
“witnessed a pronounced convergence towards reliance on ‘the least dangerous 
branch’337 to control such abuses through judicial review.”338 Although America had no 
Holocaust, it had, observes Durham, “a history of racism that courts began to dismantle 
at the beginning of the 1950s.”339 The roots of that process to dismantle racism can be 
traced to footnote four. Robert Cover refers to the footnote as “the text” for the 
generation of Brown v Board of Education and the civil rights movement.
340
 The greater 
willingness of the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of representative democracy 
and the individual in the 1960s has its origins in the New Deal period. Roosevelt 
strongly promoted the idea of a second Bill of Rights that would include a duty to 
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provide for ‘welfare rights’.341 The reapportionment decisions, which were concerned 
with restoring the integrity of democratic representation, can be seen through the prism 
of footnote four’s statement of the conditions under which the Court would undertake 
judicial review and intervene in democratic processes.
342
 
The emphasis on group affiliations had remained dominant in the U.S. since the 
Civil war. This suited the idea of a country where majority rule prevailed, but it seemed 
ill-suited to changes in society wrought by industrialisation and the migration of huge 
numbers to the cities. Bobbitt notes that changes were also afoot within American law 
that would move its orientation away from the interests of groups to a greater focus on 
the individual.
343
 This transition had more significant implications though since the 
greater focus on the individual implied a weakening of the communal bonds, 
associational activities, and political activity of the civic space through which rights had 
previously been realised. By the 1930s, economic crisis meant that the old order would 
no longer hold. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programme sought to provide for a new 
and invigorated relationship between the federal government and ‘the people’, but it 
was one that the Supreme Court was initially resistant to.  
David Strauss argues that footnote four was “the Court's first—and maybe 
only—attempt to say, systematically, when the courts should declare laws 
unconstitutional.”344 Although footnote four signalled a retreat from judicial review of 
economic regulations and suggested a general inclination towards judicial inertia, it also 
gave notice that the Court would take a keener interest in cases where federal rights, 
rights of political participation, or the rights of certain minorities were under threat. 
Carolene served to enshrine the incorporation process within a formula, which while 
not universally admired, provided some evidence of a logical framework for the use of 
judicial review rather than the arbitrariness of discretion. Carolene can be seen as a 
clear statement of judicial deference to majority rule, but it was one which came with a 
significant caveat: the circumstances under which the Court would act to protect 
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individual rights against the will of the majority were made clearer than they had ever 
been before, or perhaps, since.
345
  
However, this change in the Court’s jurisprudence and the influence of footnote 
four on subsequent decisions of the Stone, Vinson, and Warren Courts cannot be 
divorced from the changing political context of the time. In 1937-38, that context was 
“the New Deal at home and totalitarianism abroad”.346The Court was, thus, announcing 
its intention to withdraw almost totally from its decades-long oversight of economic 
regulations which had culminated in the confrontation with Franklin Roosevelt. Yet this 
withdrawal did not mean that “in the age of Hitler, majoritarianism itself would not 
require more in the way of justification than its professedly democratic nature”347. 
Assessing the degree to which global events, particularly in Europe, were influencing 
the thinking of the justices and the direction of the Court is particularly difficult. 
However, the day after the decision in Carolene Products, Stone wrote in a letter to 
Judge Irving Lehman: 
I have been deeply concerned about the increasing racial and 
religious intolerance which seems to bedevil the world, and which 
I greatly fear may be augmented in this country. For that reason I 
was greatly disturbed by the attacks on the Court and the 
Constitution last year, for one consequence of the program of 
‘judicial reform’ might well result in breaking down the guaranties 
of individual liberty. 
348
 
Stone’s connection between fascism in Europe and Roosevelt’s court packing plan 
highlight his concerns over how easily state power can overcome legal restrictions on 
government and erode civil liberties.  
Stone signalled in footnote four that civil liberties would still be subject to 
judicial protection when specific wires were tripped. These tripwires—one for each 
paragraph—can be summarised as ‘federal rights’, ‘political participation’, and 
‘representation’. Secondly, it established a principle of closer judicial scrutiny for the 
protection of the rights of “discrete and insular minorities”.349 Third, it articulated a 
principle which linked the proper functioning of political processes with a system that 
protected minority rights. Provided the political processes are working normally and are 
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not excluding any groups then the courts will not normally intervene. Particularly 
relevant to the reapportionment decisions is the second paragraph of footnote four since 
it links the legitimacy of democratic processes with the ability of citizens to participate 
fully in the political processes without hindrance from their elected representatives.  
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected 
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected 
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation.
350
 
Footnote four created a legitimacy test for legislative action against which civil liberties 
claims could be measured. Taking each paragraph in turn, legislative actions attracting 
judicial scrutiny might be 1) ones prohibited by the Bill of Rights as incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment; 2) ones which disadvantage citizens generally by restricting 
their participation to the political process, or which sabotage the process by prioritising 
the interests of certain groups or legislators themselves; and 3) ones which discriminate 
against specific minorities, thereby damaging the political processes which protect them 
and the quality of their representation within those processes. Cover writes that the 
scope for extending judicial review is determined not by “the special value of certain 
rights” but by “their vulnerability to perversions by the majoritarian process.”351  
The paradox in the reapportionment cases was that while they were ostensibly a 
problem of illegitimate minority rule as a result of decades old malapportionment, they 
were fundamentally about the denial of individual rights to the majority of the 
population located in urban and suburban areas. So while ‘the minority’ was in charge 
of state legislatures, many of the groups which constituted the numerical majority were 
the very minorities that footnote four alluded to: African Americans, Catholics, Jews, 
immigrants, and other minority groups.  
Due to changes in personnel on the Court in the 1940s a period of intense 
judicial deference to federal and state legislatures began, but there were exceptions such 
as West Virginia v Barnette which illustrated the influence of Carolene.
352
 Eventually, 
the deference to majorities went too far, with a divided court led by Justice Felix 
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Frankfurter upholding many McCarthyite anti-civil liberties laws in the 1950s.
353
 
However, three appointments to the Court in the 1950s by Dwight Eisenhower―Earl 
Warren, William Brennan and Potter Stewart―laid the basis for Baker v Carr and the 
other reapportionment decisions. 
4.7 Conclusion 
A renewal oriented development in constitutional values can be seen in the 
evolving understanding of equality and human dignity represented by the incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights against the states, the expanding franchise, and the important 
consequences of the Court’s changed jurisprudence after its decision in Carolene 
Products. Characterising the Court’s shift from its pre-New Deal jurisprudence to its 
post-footnote four orientation, Lietzmann argues that after it lost the economic fight 
with Franklin Roosevelt over the New Deal, the Supreme Court “withdrew to the 
sidelines of political morality”.354 In other words, as represented in Carolene Products 
footnote four.  
I would rather characterise this, though, as an emerging national liberal morality, 
based on the constitutional development of equality highlighted above. It was, though, 
one that drew particular political sustenance from urban, suburban and northern parts of 
the U.S., rather than either rural areas, the American heartland, or the South. The second 
paragraph of footnote four, which provided a judicial standard for stricter scrutiny of 
cases involving the functioning of the political process and its ability to provide relief 
from undesirable legislation, anticipated precisely the sort of problem presented by the 
reapportionment cases. James Madison believed that the multiplicity of interests in a 
continent sized republic would make it more difficult for tyrannical factions to form as 
they could at the local level. Although Madison was partially correct, as we shall see in 
Chapter 5, the intractable difficulty with malapportionment was that electoral districting 
at the state and federal level was still run by the states and the state legislatures refused 
to reapportion. Civil society groups such as the League of Women Voters were hugely 
important in highlighting the issue of malapportionment with the public, but their efforts 
to shame legislators into reapportioning and so solve the issue politically ran into 
legislative roadblocks. Resolving the problem would eventually require the intervention 
of the federal courts. The reapportionment decisions were ones which brought the 
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constitutional order back into alignment with majority sentiment and, as Barry 
Friedman argues, anticipated changes in public opinion.
355
 The reapportionment cases 
were different and more significant in the legal / institutional space because they altered 
the political system through which policies are made.  
What were the factors that brought the Court to pronounce on the proper form of 
representative government in the United States, and what longer term developments in 
American constitutionalism led to this significant political transformation? This 
question will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 - A Changing Concept of Equality 
In the last analysis there is something compelling about an 
institution that can say with authority that the south may not 
preserve slavery any longer, that one man’s vote is not to be worth 
seventeen times that of another, that the police too must obey the 
law, that the poor and ignorant are entitled to the same legal 
protection as the rich and educated, that one man may not tell 
another man what he may not read or what he must pray.
356
 
(Martin Shapiro) 
Our constitutional system amply provides for the protection of 
minorities by means other than giving them majority control of 
state legislatures. (Chief Justice Earl Warren) 
357
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Held: The right of suffrage is denied by debasement or dilution of a 
citizen’s vote in a state or federal election. […] The seats in both houses 
of a bicameral legislature must under the Equal Protection Clause be 
apportioned substantially on a population basis.
358 (Majority Opinion, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren) 
With these words, the Supreme Court launched a constitutional and political revolution 
in the United States. The widespread practice of malapportionment in almost
359
 every 
state in the Union effectively represented a decades old counter-majoritarian power grab 
at the heart of American constitutional government by pro-segregationists in the South, 
and wealthy rural and business interests across the country. The abuse of civil and 
democratic rights in state legislatures which had endured intermittently since America’s 
founding provided the political imperative and moral impetus for the stronger judicial 
defence of representative democracy which was seen in the reapportionment cases. 
However, in the United States this scrutiny took the form of intense corrective 
intervention over a period of three years rather than the more permanent role of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany.  
As seen in previous chapters the division between the civic space and legal / 
institutional space was a significant factor in how the reapportionment cases reached the 
Court and were eventually dealt with. Civil society actors played an important role in 
bringing the problem of malapportionment to the public’s attention. The 
reapportionment cases brought into sharp relief the issues addressed in previous 
chapters, particular the growing schism between constitutional values as enunciated by 
the Supreme Court which matched national majority sentiment, and the competing 
value systems and interpretations of local majorities who were refusing to reapportion. 
What the reapportionment cases examined in this chapter illustrate is that even in the 
absence of an agreement on values, or even if the dogged and persistent activity of civil 
society actors does not succeed in persuading legislators to reapportion, there must as a 
last resort be an institution with the authority to compel them to do so.  
Malapportionment illustrated the extent to which the preservation of human 
dignity relies on functional representative democracy, and ultimately relies, as the 
Supreme Court cases showed, on constitutionalism itself. By leaping into the 
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“mathematical quagmire” of reapportionment which Justice Felix Frankfurter’s dissent 
in Baker v Carr
360
 warned about, the Court found itself eventually having to decide 
upon the fundamental principle of American representative government in the United 
States; one which was based on the clear idea of majority rule, or one which took 
geographic, historical or community factors into account. In its decision, firstly, to enter 
the reapportionment fray and then, secondly, to enunciate a constitutional principle for 
the standard of representative government, the Court located the equality principle for 
one person one vote ostensibly through reference to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the one person one vote decision was ultimately 
explained through the Court taking an expansive narrative view of the country’s 
constitutional development, which recognised the changed conception of equality as a 
result of social struggles, the expanding franchise and successive constitutional 
amendments. Since the Constitution did not specify a form of republican government, 
the idea that it had to be based on equal representation was certainly not self-evident. As 
Bruce Terris, an assistant to the Solicitor General noted, this development towards a one 
person one vote standard was inevitable seen in the light of the steadily expanding 
franchise.
361
  
Baker highlighted not just the general question of the permissibility of judicial 
review in a democratic society as more mundane cases have. It also raised questions of 
fundamental constitutional importance such as the nature of republican government, the 
separation of powers, and the tension between state sovereignty and the rights of United 
States citizens, all of which were understood and deliberated upon by the justices in 
Baker. The reapportionment cases illustrate the stability versus renewal paradigm of 
constitutionalism addressed in previous chapters in the form of a complex political and 
legal dilemma. Due to the somewhat limited parameters of this project my focus will be 
on the development in the Court’s reasoning from its initial ruling in Baker v Carr 
which avoided pronouncing on principle to the later rulings which declared equality to 
be the standard of representation in the United States. 
In what follows I will firstly explain how malapportionment entrenched political 
ossification and minority rule in most of the state legislatures in the Union, before 
addressing the Supreme Court’s dilemma over whether to wade into Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s “political thicket”, as civil society and (some) political actors were urging 
                                                          
360
 Baker v Carr. 
361
 See infra note 447. 
126 
 
the justices to. As addressed in Chapter 3, what we can observe in the reapportionment 
cases is the Court responding to the demands of civil society by formalising an 
understanding of equality―one person one vote―that polling after the decisions 
showed a large majority of Americans approved of.
362
 The evidence from the 
reapportionment cases indicates a Supreme Court formalising value changes that are 
already occurring in civil society. The chapter then proceeds to assess the Supreme 
Court’s shift from a standard of republican government that merely avoids arbitrariness 
in Baker v Carr to its eventual destination of ‘one person one vote’ in Reynolds v Sims. 
This shift can be understood through the overall paradigm of renewal, reflecting a 
changing conception of political equality and individual dignity within American 
society as a result of struggles between civil society actors, entrenched local majority 
interests, and national political institutions. Overall, this evolution in jurisprudence seen 
in the reapportionment opinions of Justice Douglas in Gray v Sanders and Chief Justice 
Warren in Reynold v Sims reflected, and indeed paralleled, fundamental struggles 
between different interests, regions, and groups in American history, and the 
progressive social, economic and political developments which arose as a result.
363
 
Although this shift towards human dignity and political equality mirrored some 
constitutional developments in Europe as a result of the increased focus on human rights 
after World War Two, it was predominantly based on the uniquely American factors of 
the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights and Carolene Products footnote four addressed in 
the last chapter.
364
 To conclude, the chapter assesses the success and permanence of the 
Supreme Court’s restoration of majority rule and individual rights in the 
reapportionment cases, amid the continued problem of gerrymandering.  
The reapportionment decisions had a dramatic political effect at the time forcing 
almost every state legislature to reapportion. However, the decisions did not affect the 
underlying values differences between the urban and rural areas, and so can perhaps 
only be described as a partial success. Some of the gains of the reapportionment 
decisions were lost within twenty years due to the upsurge in gerrymandering, which 
was now the only legal form of malapportionment now that its ‘numerical’ sibling had 
been outlawed. Overall, the reapportionment decisions reveal the limitations of the 
Supreme Court in being able to influence the overall quality of the civic space and the 
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processes of American representative democracy as the Bundesverfassungsgericht is 
able to do in the German system. The decisions stand as a remarkable testament to the 
progressive role that courts can have in a country committed to the idea of government 
under law. Yet they also illustrate that such progress may be limited if it is not 
embraced in the civic space as well.  
5.1 Overview 
5.1.1 Case overview Baker v Carr and Reynolds v Sims 
Baker v Carr365 arose from a federal court action filed against the State of 
Tennessee by a number of officials from across the state on behalf of qualified 
voters in under-represented areas. Charles W Baker was one of a large number 
of people who joined the suit, but who otherwise played virtually no part in the 
proceedings. The attorneys for Baker et al sued Joe Carr, the secretary of state, 
whose role involved overseeing the State’s election processes. The case against 
Tennessee hinged on the refusal of legislatures since the turn of the century to 
meet their constitutional duty to reapportion. The attorneys sought to show that 
this failure to reapportion constituted a violation of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the maldistribution of 
state revenues arising out of the malapportionment demonstrated a pattern of 
discrimination against urban voters. The case was dismissed by the three judge 
district federal court, who noted that the state legislature was “guilty of a clear 
violation of the state constitution”, but that on the basis of the precedent set by 
Colegrove v Green366―in which Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority 
opinion― the remedy did not lie with the courts. The case was then appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court.367 
Reynolds v Sims368 was one of dozens of lawsuits initiated after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baker that malapportionment was a justiciable 
issue. Owen Sims, a voter in Alabama was selected as the lead plaintiff in a suit 
requesting that the federal district court declare all legislative districts in 
Alabama null and void, and order that the primary and general elections for 1962 
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be fought on an ‘at-large’ basis.369 On July 21 1962, the three judge district court 
unanimously declared Alabama’s system of apportionment a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court increased the 
representation of underrepresented urban counties, changing Jefferson 
Country’s delegation from seven to seventeen and Mobile County’s from three 
to eight.370 The hope of the district court was that this change would break the 
strangle-hold of the rural legislators on the legislature allowing a more 
comprehensive reapportionment plan to take shape. Bernard Reynolds, a 
probate judge in Dallas County, an overwhelmingly white rural county that 
feared being lumped into a district with Lowndes County and its overwhelming 
African American majority filed an appeal against the district court’s ruling with 
the U.S. Supreme Court, with the case being heard as Reynolds v Sims.371 The 
eventual 8-1 decision in Reynolds declared one person one vote to be the 
required standard of apportionment in the United States, based on the principle 
of numerically equal districts.   
*** 
Asked after his retirement what the most significant cases had been during his 
fifteen years on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren identified the legislative 
reapportionment cases, Baker v Carr, Reynolds v Sims, and a number of parallel 
cases.
372
 Given that the Warren Court had also decided such high profile cases as Brown 
v Board of Education, New York Times v Sullivan, Gideon v Wainwright, and Miranda v 
Arizona, the choice of the reapportionment cases surprised many. For Warren, though, 
the reapportionment cases mattered because they were the key to the realisation of a 
truly democratic nation.
373
  
The decision in Baker was controversial in the academy and divisive within the 
Court, although it met with broad public approval across the United States. The inability 
of the justices to reach a decision in Baker at the end of the 1961 term following oral 
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arguments in April 1961 led to it being carried over to the following term, with a second 
series of oral arguments in October 1961. Over seven hours of oral arguments took 
place in Baker, a highly unusual occurrence.
374
 Baker v Carr
375
 was constitutionally 
significant for many reasons, not least because of the acrimonious nature of the debate 
between some of the justices over the standard of republican government, differences 
which ultimately destroyed the health of Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Charles E. 
Whittaker, forcing them off the Court.
376
  
Two years after Baker, the Court made its famous ‘one person one vote’ decision 
in Reynolds v Sims. It is a testament to how far the Court travelled in two years that in 
Reynolds v Sims it eventually embraced the population based apportionment for both 
houses of a bicameral legislature that Solicitor General
377
 Archibald Cox argued was 
unnecessary in Baker. The Supreme Court’s odyssey from holding in Baker v Carr378 
that the question of reapportionment was merely ‘justiciable’ to its decision in Reynolds 
v Sims
379
 that “The Equal Protection Clause requires substantially equal legislative 
representation for all citizens in a State regardless of where they reside” was completed 
in two years rather than the two to three decades Cox originally anticipated.
380
 
5.1.2 Political and Civil Rights Context  
New life was breathed into the civil rights movement in the post-war period, 
helped in part by the conviction that African Americans who had fought for the United 
States overseas must be protected at home. As John F Kennedy put it “when Americans 
are sent to Vietnam or West Berlin, we do not ask for whites only.”381 The Cold War 
context was a particular problem for the U.S. with the Soviet Union making capital out 
of the treatment of African Americans as early as 1949.
382
 However, progress in the area 
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of equality for African Americans had been slow, with decisions such a Brown v Board 
of Education and Gomillion v Lightfoot being rare examples of improvement in a 
country where McCarthyism tore down many constitutional protections for the 
individual. 
When President Lyndon Johnson introduced the Voting Rights Act in a speech 
before Congress in March 1965, his opening words reflected the fundamental linkage 
between equal voting rights and the future of American self-government: “I speak 
tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy.” Malapportionment and 
the denial of voting rights were separate but symbiotic issues, neither of which could be 
completely resolved while the other persisted. Rectifying the malapportionment issue 
would have somewhat rebalanced power towards urban areas in the South and across 
the country, but as long as voting rights were being denied to African Americans then 
the victory would be incomplete. The passing of the voting rights legislation without the 
Supreme Court’s action to end malapportionment would have effectively made the 
Voting Rights Act meaningless since, even if urban-dwelling African Americans had 
the vote, it would make little difference if it was still worth only about ten percent that 
of a rural white voter.  
To American liberals the rulings of the Warren Court are viewed as a halcyon 
moment in American history when the traditionally conservative judiciary acted to 
remedy racial, social, political, and constitutional injustices, some of which were as old 
as America itself. To American conservatives, it was a period of judicial activism when 
the Court strayed far outside its brief in imposing its own prescription for social and 
political change. What the latter view neglects is the rapidly changing civil rights 
context within which the Court was operating. Even during the Eisenhower 
Administration civil rights were on the agenda. By the 1960s under Kennedy, and even 
more so under Johnson, civil rights was joined on the White House’s legislative agenda 
by voting rights, the Great Society, education and Medicare. This was the true 
revolution in the 1960s, and it was being orchestrated in precisely the place seismic 
political progress ought to occur – democratic institutions. The Warren Court’s 
decisions on reapportionment, as on school segregation, were on many levels, then, not 
usurping legislative and political prerogatives but anticipating them. 
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5.2 American Constitutionalism and Malapportionment 
The Supreme Court’s emergence as a defender of rights in American 
constitutionalism can be traced to footnote four of Carolene Products in 1938.
383
 
However, this progress did not become evident until the 1950s at the earliest. Although 
this progress has been far from linear, and the Court’s role often far from exemplary, 
one notable trend has been the steady expansion of the groups in American society to 
whom equality applies. However, as seen in the previous chapter, the struggles which 
have characterised the development of constitutionalism have not only come about as a 
result of a clash in interpretations between different groups in society, but also because 
of the competing value systems and internal bonding forces that Böckenförde noted.  
No standard of republican government was explicitly defined in the 
Constitution. However, this ought not to have been a problem had state legislatures 
complied with the terms of their own constitutions for decennial reapportionment. Their 
failure to do so for sixty years in some cases constituted political ossification, not 
constitutional ossification. The reapportionment cases were therefore a political 
problem requiring a constitutional solution that only the Supreme Court was capable of 
providing. In resolving the cases and the broader malapportionment problem, the 
Supreme Court made reference to both the progressive understanding of political 
equality that had emerged in the United States with the expansion of the right to 
suffrage, and invoked texts and moments from the Declaration of Independence 
onwards.
384
 By requiring that the state legislatures show fidelity to state and federal 
constitutional mechanisms for recalibrating the political system in the face of social 
changes―the decennial reapportionment requirement―the Court solved the problem of 
political ossification that was blighting the democratic process. The reapportionment 
cases illustrate how the Court could, when pressed into action, stimulate democratic 
renewal when political processes stopped functioning or were usurped by special 
interests and oligarchical tendencies. However, as will be shown, long term positive 
effects from tackling malapportionment were compromised by the inability to deal with 
gerrymandering. 
At the heart of the reapportionment issue were a number of deep underlying 
social and political changes. These changes include the emerging conflict between the 
interests of wealthy white rural areas, on one side, and, on the other, poorer urban areas 
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with faster growing populations of immigrants, African Americans and blue collar 
workers.
385
 Collectively, the reapportionment decisions can be seen as enunciating a 
conception of political equality based on an ever widening arc of social and political 
relationships.
386
  
Germans had learnt the hard way from the National Socialist period what could 
be done when an elected government began to dismantle democracy and rights 
protections from within on the basis of unscrupulous legislative methods. In the United 
States, it took the McCarthyite assault on individual rights in the 1950s to make many 
Americans conscious of the dangers that can emerge from legislatures, as indeed 
Jefferson had warned of.
387
 Baker v Carr
388
 and the subsequent reapportionment cases 
which enshrined the principle of ‘one person one vote’ still resonate today because the 
scourge of malapportionment disproportionately impacted on poorer and less powerful 
urban voters, many of whom were African-Americans. J Douglas Smith writes that “In 
the American South […] malapportionment served as a cornerstone of white supremacy 
ensuring the overrepresentation of the most ardent segregationists and thus further 
delaying the realisation of civil and voting rights for African Americans.”389  
Many state legislatures had so corrupted the principle of republican government 
through their practice of malapportionment that by the time of Baker v Carr in 1962 
there were no political avenues open to urban dwelling citizens in Tennessee or other 
states to seek redress for their underrepresentation in the state legislature. Only the 
federal courts provided an avenue for relief. Baker represented a paradox because the 
widespread practice of malapportionment, which was found in almost every state of the 
Union, was in fact a problem of minority rule by mainly rural voters who were over-
represented in the legislatures. Malapportionment represented not so much the tyranny 
of the majority that the founders warned of, but rather the tyranny of a minority 
controlling a legislative majority. However, the urban majority was comprised of 
various minority groups, while the rural minority was predominantly white. This 
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demographic aspect highlighted how malapportionment directly attacked the political 
processes marked out for special judicial protection in paragraph two of Carolene 
Products footnote four.  
By the early twentieth century, social change, immigration to the United States, 
and mass migration from rural areas to the cities had—in terms that are all too familiar 
given contemporary debates on Syrian refugees and Mexican migrants—turned wealthy 
white rural majorities into minorities in almost every state. The gross iniquity of 
malapportionment in Tennessee and almost all other states in the Union was manifested 
in voting districts with population variances of sometimes hundreds of thousands of 
people which, as the Supreme Court noted, meant rural citizens’ votes were worth many 
times that of urban citizens. Such disparities meant that majority control of both houses 
of state legislatures could be achieved by legislators representing less than 40 percent of 
the population and, in some of the worst cases, less than 25 percent of the population.
390
 
The smallest district in Tennessee’s lower house in 1962 had 3,454 inhabitants, while 
the largest district had 79,301.
391
 The reapportionment cases were fundamentally about 
the quality and quantity of representation, and the power balance between on one side, 
wealthy white rural voters and business interests, and on the other, the interests and 
rights of blue collar workers, immigrants African Americans, Catholics, and Jews who 
were in faster growing urban areas.  
Although the worst excesses of malapportionment were in state legislatures, 
Congressional districts were also affected because the states were primarily
*
 responsible 
for federal redistricting. 35 percent of congressional districts were said to be 
malapportioned by 1960.
392
 Congressional districts in Michigan drawn by the 
Republican controlled legislature ranged in population from 117,431 to 802,994.
393
 
Malapportionment of congressional districts thus compounded the under-representation 
of urban residents in state legislatures. In the House of Representatives, 8 of the 20 
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powerful committee chairs came from overrepresented districts, highlighting the 
pervasive effect of malapportionment on politics at the state and national level.  
In a 1960s America where the questions of civil rights and political equality 
were becoming incendiary issues, malapportionment seemingly constituted a further 
injustice preventing the adequate representation of certain groups in American society if 
they happened to live in urban rather than rural areas. As problematic as the effects of 
malapportionment were on state and national politics, its effects on the civil, social, and 
economic rights of citizens were even more serious. How malapportionment enshrined 
minority rule while also denying individuals the rights that affected every aspect of their 
lives is the question we turn to now. 
5.3 The Tyranny of the Local Minority 
As seen in the previous chapter, James Madison recognised that tyranny was 
most likely at the local level but he also feared that eighteenth century 
malapportionment would contaminate representation at the federal level unless 
Congress had the power to override state control of federal elections.
394
 
Malapportionment was also present in the state legislatures of the eighteenth century. 
Jefferson deplored the situation in Virginia where the tidewater counties continued to 
insist on the older territorial principle of two representatives per county to offset the 
growing influence of western counties in the state assembly.
395
 During the 
Constitutional Convention, Madison presciently feared that the states would 
contaminate representation at the federal level.  
The inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of 
particular States, would produce a like inequality in their 
representation in the Natl. Legislature, as it was presumable that 
the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it 
to themselves in the latter.
396
 
Madison argued in Federalist 51 that a natural balance between the large number of 
interests in a continental sized republic would render “an unjust combination of a 
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majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable”397. Madison’s faith in a 
balance between social forces to prevent tyranny across the country as a whole was 
partially correct. However, politics remained local and the same veniality Madison 
identified in state legislatures in the eighteenth century frustrated political attempts to 
solve the malapportionment issue in the twentieth century.
398
  
With the vote of a rural inhabitant of Tennessee worth up to twenty times that of 
an urban dweller in some cases, the result was that in state and federal elections 
legislators would be elected who would represent the interests and rights of a minority 
of (mainly) white voters and not the majority who dwelt in the cities.
399
 
Malapportionment showed that when representative democracy did not represent certain 
groups they were more likely to have their individual rights infringed as well. One 
example was how malapportionment exacerbated the effects of segregation and allowed 
state legislatures to resist the Court’s integration ruling in Brown v Board of Education. 
In 1956, when the Virginia legislature voted to close public schools rather than 
integrate, the seventeen senators who opposed the measure represented more Virginians 
than the twenty-one state senators who voted in favour of the action.
400
  
Malapportionment was therefore not merely a problem for democratic 
legitimacy. It affected citizens’ individual, economic, civil, and social rights. Minority 
control of legislatures across the United States impacted on the ability of civil society 
groups and others seeking progressive reform to improve working conditions, increase 
funding for health and education programmes, and advance civil rights protections.
401
 
As Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion in Baker put it, “if present 
representation has a policy at all, it is to maintain the status quo of invidious 
discrimination at any cost.”402 Urban areas with larger populations suffered from 
chronic underfunding of community infrastructure and educational provision. City and 
municipal officials across Tennessee joined the court action in Baker including 
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Nashville mayor, Ben West, whose office provided crucial statistical evidence of the 
discriminatory effects of malapportionment.
403
 
The involvement of civil society actors such as the League of Women Voters 
(LWV), state municipal officials, and the executive branches of the federal government 
in highlighting the iniquity of malapportionment gave the issue a profile which proved 
indispensable to its eventual resolution. This public awareness proved important in 
initiating the litigation in Baker and in bringing on board the amicus curae
404
 support 
from both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations for the Supreme Court 
challenge. Equally clear, however, was that years of concerted civil society action 
against malapportionment had failed to shame legislators into reapportioning or secure 
change through political channels. In 1962, only five states – Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin – apportioned “so that majorities in 
both chambers of the legislature represented at least 40 percent of the population.” 405 
Individual voters and even active groups such as the LWV lacked the means to resist 
when the political institutions of the state have been captured by legislators who had 
manifestly subverted law, their state constitutions, and the U.S. Constitution to secure 
their office. The reapportionment cases represent the paradigmatic examples of political 
issues that could not have been solved without judicial intervention since it was too 
much to expect legislators to willingly vote themselves out of office and a job. 
Appearing before the Court during oral arguments in Baker
406
, Archibald 
Cox
407
, the U.S. Solicitor General, highlighted this tension between legislative 
usurpation and the faltering resistance of the citizens, which he argued can only succeed 
through the courts. 
We've often been reminded and quite right that the ultimate 
safeguard of constitutional rights is a vigilant electorate. But where 
the wrong goes to the existence or distribution of the franchise, 
then the electorate can do nothing to protect itself. No matter how 
vigilant the majority of the people of Tennessee are, there is 
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nothing that they can do under these circumstances to assert their 
constitutional rights. […] The short of this case is as Judge Miller 
pointed out in his opinion convening the three-judge court that 
either there is a remedy in the federal court or there is no remedy 
at all.
408
  
Cox was essentially making the point about malapportionment addressed by John Locke 
in his Two Treatises of Government.
409
 As will be seen in the next section, the 
arguments presented before the Court in Baker and the other reapportionment cases 
represented a tension within the constitution—whether the federal courts could compel 
the state legislatures to reapportion—and the demands of citizens to have their 
constitutional rights upheld.   
5.4 A Crying Necessity 
Theoretically at least, respect for the principle of separation of powers requires that the 
courts only rule on cases which are ‘justiciable’410 in order to preserve the distinctions 
between the ‘political’ and ‘judicial’ functions.411 The idea behind this demarcation is 
simply but importantly to preserve the principle of representative government which is 
clearly established by the Constitution. That the threat to representative government was 
originating from citizens’ legislative representatives was an irony lost on none of those 
involved in the battle against malapportionment.  
As noted in the previous section, Baker v Carr arose partly as a consequence of 
long-term concerns among civil society groups in the U.S. over malapportionment by 
state legislatures. Groups like the LWV and other civil society groups were acutely 
aware of the constitutional requirements of their own states and wanted their state 
representatives to uphold the oaths they had taken.
412
 Individuals and municipal officials 
repeatedly sought relief through political channels but were thwarted by what Smith 
called “a conspiracy of inaction.”413 The case standing in the way of federal support to 
end the iniquity of malapportionment was Colegrove v Green in which Justice Felix 
Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion calling for judicial abstention and arguing that 
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the courts should not wade into “the political thicket.”414 Almost sixteen years later and 
Frankfurter was still adamantly opposed to the Court getting involved in 
reapportionment. However, six new justices had joined the Court in the intervening 
years and malapportionment by the states was on the agenda of the executive branch.   
The publication of the Kestnbaum Report in 1955 on the relationship between 
the federal government and the states had highlighted the issue of malapportionment.
415
 
Senator John F. Kennedy referred to the issue of malapportionment as “The Shame of 
the States” in an article he wrote for New York Times Magazine in 1958.416 Support for 
those fighting malapportionment in the states also extended to the federal government. 
J. Lee Rankin, the Solicitor General in the Eisenhower Administration saw 
malapportionment as an invidious practice which required judicial relief. During the 
transition period to the incoming Kennedy Administration Rankin arranged for the 
Justice Department to file an amicus brief in support of the Tennessee appellants, of 
whom Baker was the first named on the appeal.
417
 Such amicus support from the 
executive branch of the federal government for an appellant is quite unusual,
418
 and 
possibly convinced two of the justices, Potter Stewart and Tom Clark, that only the 
federal courts could resolve malapportionment.
419
 Perhaps more interestingly, the 
amicus support highlighted how malapportionment had created an unspoken alliance 
between the federal government and civil society against the states.  
The reapportionment cases showed how existing American values, particularly 
equality, were recapitulated in the context of a period where the demand for civil rights 
for all Americans had never been stronger and where, for once, civil society and the 
federal government were equally active in driving the rights agenda.
420
 
Constitutionalism requires a higher principle—political processes which are logical and 
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not arbitrary, and a set of statutory and policy outcomes that do not infringe either the 
citizen’s constitutional rights or more fundamental ones.421 Equality was such a higher 
principle and its providence in American political history is beyond reproach, but it did 
not fundamentally figure in Baker as a justification for the decision; it would have to 
wait till Reynolds v Sims. Rather, the main question at issue was justiciability and 
whether malapportionment was a ripe topic for judicial oversight.  
To some, the involvement of a court in managing the processes of representative 
democracy raised the spectre of the counter-majoritarian difficulty which was discussed 
in the previous chapter. With the reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court acted to 
support majority rule and the demands of civil society by ensuring that representative 
government functioned properly. That was not to say—and this was the key point that 
arises in the reapportionment cases—that properly functioning representative 
government need necessarily mean perfect equality in terms of one person one vote; 
certainly the American framers never viewed republican government in such generous 
democratic terms. Some required only that a government not be a monarchy to meet the 
republican test. 
422
  
One irony was that nor did Solicitor General Archibald Cox who appeared in 
Baker as amicus curae to support the appellants’ case against the State of Tennessee. 
During oral arguments, Cox went out of his way to emphasise that population equality 
was not required by the Fourteenth Amendment: “I am not […] intending to suggest that 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the apportionment of Representatives in both 
houses of the Legislature, in the ratio to the population. It's quite plain [to me] that that 
is not the Fourteenth Amendment requirement.”423 Cox was being deliberately cautious 
in not seeking a more sweeping ruling from the justices in Baker as he felt that might 
jeopardise his fundamental goal that the Court reverse the precedent in Colegrove v 
Green and declare reapportionment a justiciable issue. Despite arguing for the Court to 
wade into the political thicket in Baker, Cox’s position was, like his former law 
professor, Felix Frankfurter, cautious about how judicial power ought to be used. As 
much as Cox wanted the Court to step into the reapportionment issue, which he saw as 
the only way of resolving it, his caution about the Court wading into enunciating a 
mathematical standard too fast likely bolstered the credibility of his argument among the 
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justices whose votes were needed to overturn Colegrove. During the re-argument of 
Baker, Cox observed: 
This Court doesn't carry the whole burden of Government and for 
it to rush in to try and right political wrongs instead of leaving 
them to the other branches—the political branches of the 
Government—could impair its usefulness in our constitutional 
system. But I suggest to you that judicial inaction through 
excessive caution or through a fancied impotence in the face of 
crying necessity and very serious wrong may also do damage to 
our constitutional system.
424
 
Wrapping up his remarks, Cox then shrewdly reminded the justices of Robert Jackson’s 
thoughts on the relationship between the Court and democracy prior to him being 
appointed to the Court in 1941. Then Attorney General, Jackson wrote in The Struggle 
for Judicial Supremacy
425
: 
W]hen the channels of opinion and of peaceful persuasion are 
corrupted or clogged, these political correctives can no longer be 
relied on, and the democratic system is threatened at its most vital 
point. In that event, the Court, by intervening, restores the 
processes of democratic government; it does not disrupt them.[…] 
[A] court which is governed by a sense of self-restraint does not 
thereby become paralyzed. It simply conserves its strength to 
strike more telling blows in the cause of a working democracy. 
Jackson’s view here echoes Madison’s speech in Congress introducing the Bill of 
Rights where he referred to the judiciary as “an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the legislative or executive.”426 However, it also represents the 
essence of footnote four of Carolene Products.  
The majority opinion in Baker rejected the idea that granting relief was a 
violation of separation of powers boundaries, arguing that the individual states were not 
protected by the political question doctrine, and that the only relevant issue was “the 
consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution”. Without deciding on the 
merits of the claim, the majority opinion of Justice William Brennan held that “the 
complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal protection presented a justiciable 
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constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a 
decision.”427  
Although the eventual result in Baker was 6-2, it had been a fairly evenly divided 
Court for much of the deliberations. Cox did not want to risk the decision going in 
Tennessee’s favour by asking the justices to decide on the principle at issue in the case 
(i.e. whether the malapportionment constituted a Fourteenth Amendment violation), let 
alone ask them to come up with a solution to the question of what the standard of 
representative government should be. Cox was simply trying to avoid the case getting 
thrown out, which likely would have killed all attempts to tackle malapportionment for a 
generation. While Cox argued that the case looked like a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation, he did not want to push the justices to making that call, because if they had 
been forced to decide Baker on the merits of the case rather than merely the justiciability 
question, they would then have had to supply a remedy for which there probably was 
insufficient votes.
428
 Indeed, had the Court felt compelled to decide on the principle at 
issue, it would also have had to decide whether a principle—such as equality—would 
have to apply to both houses of a bicameral legislature.  
Justice Tom Clark was also concerned about stepping into Frankfurter’s 
“political thicket”429 and began to write an opinion rejecting the complaint of Baker and 
the other Tennessee voters who were seeking relief. After trying to muster arguments 
against granting relief to the Tennessee voters, Clark changed his mind, accepting Cox’s 
argument that the situation would never resolve itself without the intervention of the 
federal courts.
430
 Once he recognised this, Clark was keen for the Court to leap in and 
decide the case on its merits, by stating that the Tennessee malapportionment was a 
clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
431
 Clark went on to say in his 
concurrence opinion that the apportionment picture in Tennessee was “a topsy-turvical 
of gigantic proportions” and “a crazy quilt without rational basis”.432 Once the Court 
had ruled that reapportionment was justiciable in Baker, the question before the justices 
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in future cases was whether they ought to simply restore a modicum of rationality to the 
process or would have to come up with a constitutional standard of representation.  
5.5 Struggle and Progress 
The development in the Court’s reasoning from Baker v Carr to the later 
reapportionment cases Gray v Sanders and Reynolds v Sims presents us with two starkly 
different visions of representative government. In Baker, although the more 
conservative 6-2 majority opinion did not decide on the principle at issue in the case, 
the holding that it was a justiciable matter opened a floodgate of litigation
433
 against the 
malapportioning states. Just over one year later in Gray v Sanders, Justice Douglas’s 
majority opinion first enunciated the ‘one person-one vote principle’, and then in 
Reynolds v Sims, Chief Justice Warren officially declared that one person one vote 
would be the new standard for both houses of a bicameral legislature. Although, it 
would not, of course, apply to the U.S. Senate. 
Contextualising this move from a system of apportionment that merely has to 
avoid being arbitrary and capricious to ‘one person one vote’ is explained through the 
shift in constitutionalism from a charter of fixed rules intended to, as Kay puts it, “fence 
out certain subjects from […] public regulation”434 to a system of values which 
recognises the gradual realisation of equality and human dignity in American history, 
and their extension to ever more citizens. This fits the historical understanding of 
constitutionalism identified by Stanley Katz as a process of struggle.
435
 The move to 
one person one vote can be seen in this light as reflecting a number of parallel 
transitions and struggles. The first was the shift within law identified by Bobbitt from an 
emphasis on groups (including racial and ethnic groups, unions, political parties, 
sectarian organisations, the underprivileged, and marginalised) to a greater focus on 
individuals, which was manifested in the ‘rights revolution’ “wherein the interests of 
groups against the state were vindicated through individual lawsuits.”436 The second, as 
seen in Chapter 4, was a parallel shift in the position of the Supreme Court in 1938 from 
its decades-old defence of economic rights to an equality-centric orientation which 
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would instead give greater protection in law to individuals and minority groups.
437
 
Thus, Goodman argues that since the mid-1940s the Supreme Court has treated human 
dignity as a constitutional value.
438
  
Of course, the breakdown of these group identifications and associational bonds 
to the broader focus on the individual represented precisely the problem that 
Böckenförde was concerned about, where the state no longer had the necessary glue to 
hold itself together and maintain its relationship with its citizens. Patriotic sentiment in 
American life could not disguise the deep divisions and conflict that American history 
had revealed. Many of these divisions were based on a strong differentiation in values 
between urban and rural, and north and south. These shifts towards individual equality 
also indicated that the civic space where interests were previously mediated had 
collapsed. This change from individuals as communal beings to isolated ones meant that 
rights could only be realised through law rather than from cooperation and contestation 
in the civic space.  
Politically, Baker v Carr and the other malapportionment cases were certainly 
about the problem of disproportionate power being wielded in the interests of ever 
smaller groups of people. Yet the dire implications of this imbalance for the rights of 
those citizens without power in terms of education, schooling, and other areas of state 
activity illustrated that the principle fundamentally at stake was human dignity. As Ely 
notes, the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment along with the extension 
of the franchise to wider groups and constituencies reflects a developing commitment to 
“equality in the distribution of various goods”.439 “Valuing a vote thus granted at a 
fraction of the votes of others obviously undercut the commitment this constitutional 
development reflects.”440  
In his dissent in Baker, Justice Frankfurter wrote that the Court’s decision that 
state legislative apportionment was a justiciable matter amounted to “a massive 
repudiation of the experience of our whole past in asserting destructively novel judicial 
power.”441 Frankfurter’s use of the words ‘whole past’ contained in it the passion with 
which he viewed the issues at stake in the case. Baker effectively reversed the majority 
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holding of Colegrove v Green
442
 (which he wrote) that legislative apportionment 
represented a “political question” that was non-justiciable. In denying the wisdom of the 
Court intervening in the reapportionment question, Frankfurter’s technical argument 
was that nowhere in the Constitution was equal representation between districts 
assumed to be the basis of republican government.  
Frankfurter’s advice that Tennessee voters use the political channels to resolve 
malapportionment seemed equally out of touch with the reality, both of what America 
had become, and the practical possibility of getting a large number of rural legislators to 
reapportion themselves out of a job. His dogged embrace of the past in the face of the 
manifest injustice of malapportionment in the present suggest someone struggling to 
recognise the merit of his mentor Holmes’s view443 that the Constitution needs 
interpreting “in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was 
said a hundred years ago”. While Frankfurter was passionate about judicial restraint, 
that philosophy led him, I think, down the intellectual cul-de-sac of the political 
question doctrine, which ultimately produced inconsistencies in his own thinking about 
when the Court should intervene in the political system to defend individual rights.
444
 
As stated in the introduction, this development illustrates the innate tension 
between stability and renewal in constitutionalism, and shows how the development in 
the Court’s thinking reflected a longer term expansion in the number of individuals and 
groups to whom the terms ‘equality’ and ‘dignity’ could be applied, along with the 
particular areas of individual activity liable for protection. A stability argument might 
say that the Court had to end the clearly unconstitutional and egregious legislative 
apportionment schemes which, if left unchecked, could have been a cause of political 
unrest.
445
 A renewal argument might say that stability could not be an end in itself, and 
that American history had seen an incremental but progressive improvement in equality 
between individuals and groups, which was essential for the achievement of human 
dignity. Hence, the Court should be guided by the understanding of equality in the early 
1960s, not 1868, or even 1776. While popular majorities can sometimes lead to the 
promulgation of laws that can be a threat to equality and human dignity, it is also clear, 
                                                          
442
 Colegrove. 
443
 State of Missouri v Holland, pp. 433-34. 
444
 The key inconsistency being his defence of judicial intervention in politics in Gomillion v Lightfoot. 
Frankfurter was prepared to tackle racially motivated malapportionment, but not in Colegrove or Baker to 
tackle malapportionment against all groups in society.   
445
 Former solicitor general, Theodore Olson, makes a similar point. See infra note 483.  
145 
 
as Murphy observes, that “allowing all adults to participate in governing the community 
is a mark of respect for human dignity”446. There was, therefore a fundamental 
inconsistency between Frankfurter’s dogged embrace of a philosophy of judicial 
deference to the will of democratic majorities and his opposition to the Court entering 
“the political thicket” to restore majority rule.  
With six post-Baker cases scheduled for oral arguments in November 1963 
including the Alabama case, Reynolds v Sims, Bruce Terris an assistant to Archibald 
Cox, sent the Solicitor General a memo addressing the question of what position the 
Justice Department should take on the standard of apportionment. The question that the 
Supreme Court had ducked in Baker was what the standard of apportionment should be. 
Would the vast majority of states with bicameral legislatures be able to reapportion one 
house on factors other than population? This was the question preoccupying both the 
justices on the Court and also officials in the Justice Department who had seen how 
impactful their amicus brief in Baker had been. Given the wave of law suits initiated in 
the wake of Baker, the question of apportionment standards could not be kicked down 
the road indefinitely. Crucially, Terris noted that historical precedents for a 
reapportionment standard based on factors other than population were no longer tenable 
in the light of changing social circumstances and the evolving understanding of 
equality. “The meaning of equal protection is necessarily a changing concept,” Terris 
noted.
447
 Citing the assimilation of African Americans and women into the American 
body politic, and the Seventeenth Amendment of 1913 providing for the direct election 
of senators, Terris added that  
the history of this country shows increasing awareness of the 
requirement that all citizens be permitted to participate equally in 
our government.[…] The Equal Protection Clause today requires 
that both houses of the state legislature be apportioned on the basis 
of population.”448 
Far more than Cox, who remained cautious in asking the Court to put its reputation on 
line—and possibly create a constitutional crisis449—by committing to a standard of 
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equality, Terris presciently saw that a majority of justices were moving towards a 
conception of equality based on one person one vote. By contrast, Cox’s gradualist 
approach anticipated that the country might be ready for total population equality 
between electoral districts in perhaps twenty or thirty years.
450
 The narrative of struggle 
followed by progressive historic development that Terris outlines, anticipates almost 
exactly Earl Warren’s Reynolds opinion which notes the “continuing expansion of the 
scope of the right of suffrage”451. More broadly, though, Terris’s advice reflects the 
shifting jurisprudence of the Supreme Court towards a more equal conception of 
representative democracy based on the idea that each person’s vote must be weighted the 
same. Once the Court had decided that the existing system was wrong ‘one person one 
vote’ had to be the end destination. 
If the Court had not announced a one person one vote standard and had instead 
left it as ‘not capricious or arbitrary’, then it would likely have ended up sitting in 
judgement on every apportionment plan for the fifty states ─ every bit the mathematical 
quagmire Felix Frankfurter had warned about.
452
 Arbitrariness might lie in the eye of 
the beholder and “a map that one judge might think was pure hodgepodge might to 
another judge reflect permissible balance of historical boundaries and multifactored 
modern realities.”453 When the Court announced one person one vote, more than forty 
state legislatures were apportioned on a basis that did not meet the new standard.
454
 This 
was certainly an indication of the bureaucratic level of judicial scrutiny that most of 
these states would have had to face with a less equitable system and a more 
administratively burdensome standard than one person one vote.  
The value/renewal answer was that it was right for the times. The principle of 
equality in the Equal Protection Clause was the cause of the original complaint in 
Baker. Equality had been one of America’s defining values since 1776. The precedent 
that separate is not unequal which had stood since Plessy v Ferguson was quashed in the 
Brown decision, and along with Gray, Reynolds and the other cases underlined the idea 
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that equality, and ultimately, human dignity, had become, at least during the Warren 
Court, fundamental principles of American constitutional government.  
Anticipating Akhil Amar’s identification of the equality principle as part of his 
unwritten constitution, Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Gray v Sanders observed 
that  
The conception of political equality from the Declaration of 
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one 
thing─one person, one vote.455  
There was no indication in the Constitution or from the founders that one person 
one vote was the proper standard of representation for republican government. What 
was beyond doubt, however, was that the framers had clearly “acknowledged popular 
consent as the indispensable basis for setting up that process of government in the first 
place.”456 The consent of the governed was the fundamental basis of legitimacy for the 
entire revolutionary endeavour.
457
 One founding document which did point the way was 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which established the principle of equality in 
legislative apportionment for future states beyond the Appalachian Mountains.
458
 While 
the Ordinance meant an equality for some white men only, it nevertheless guaranteed “a 
proportionate representation of the people in the legislature”.459 As with the Declaration 
of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, the Gettysburg Address and Brown v Board 
of Education, so Baker v Carr and Reynolds v Sims symbolised the progressive 
expansion of the individuals and groups to whom equal protection applied. According to 
Eberle, only around the time of Brown did the Court “make equality a premier 
organising principle of American society”.460 
As I suggested at the outset, equality or equal protection means little without 
some sense of who these principles apply to and who is equal with whom. 
Constitutionalism therefore requires not just equality but a framework for reimagining 
its scope and potential. One person one vote represented a progress centric view of 
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American constitutionalism which saw the malapportionment problem in the context of 
the country’s emerging constitutional narrative. 
5.6 Restoring Majority Rule and Individual Rights 
Baker and the reapportionment cases highlight the extent to which the counter-
majoritarian critique was based on several rather dubious assumptions. One was the idea 
that there was even agreement on what the standard of representative government ought 
to be. Another was the idea that the representatives and officials being overruled by the 
courts were actually enacting the policies of the majority, rather than representing the 
interests of a rural minority which was the reality prior to the apportionment decisions. 
The ‘counter-majoritarian’ label was merely a more virtuous sounding label for the idea 
that judges shouldn’t meddle in politics, as Frankfurter instinctively felt. Such a 
lethargic view of the Court’s role would probably have surprised John Rutledge, who as 
we saw, argued at the Constitutional Convention that one of the Court’s chief functions 
was to secure national rights.
461
 Presumably he might well have included in this 
‘political rights’ which had been denied to citizens by the malfeasance of their elected 
politicians. 
When the political processes had ossified as much as they had in the United 
States prior to the reapportionment decisions, the potential for crises to develop is just 
as likely as when change occurs too suddenly. The reapportionment decisions ended the 
usurpation of the political process by rural minorities and brought about the majority 
rule that malapportionment had blocked. The decisions in the reapportionment cases 
illustrate the development towards a conception of constitutionalism centred on the 
values of human dignity and democracy. As Justice William Brennan put it, 
“interpretation must account for the transformative purpose of the text” and that purpose 
was “a sublime oration on the dignity of man”.462 However, the reapportionment cases 
also highlight Bruce Ackerman’s point that preserving America’s constitutional 
tradition means “unconventional innovation and democratic renewal”463. Although there 
was criticism of the decision in Baker, and the later one person one vote stipulation in 
Reynolds from politicians across the South and in the academy, the degree of 
compliance with it was significant. By the summer of 1966 forty-six of the fifty states 
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had “substantially complied with the Supreme Court’s mandate”464 and over half of the 
new intake to the House of Representatives in 1968 were from newly drawn 
congressional districts
465
. The principle of equal representation may well press a button 
in the American psyche which goes back to the revolutionary cry of ‘no taxation 
without representation’. Indeed, as Ely puts it, “the equal weighting of everyone’s vote 
turned out to be a notion with which most people could sympathise.”466  
“Every government degenerates,” wrote Jefferson in 1781, “when trusted to the 
rulers of the people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe 
depositories.”467 Jefferson’s instinctive faith in the people was vindicated by the civil 
society actors that fought malapportionment during the 1950s and 1960s, even though 
those groups were fighting the wealthy rural interests from which Jefferson himself 
came. The involvement of newspapers and civil society actors like the League of 
Women Voters over a prolonged period sustained a vital public dialogue about 
malapportionment which put the issue on the agenda of parts of the federal 
government.
468
 However, their considerable efforts had met only resistance from state 
legislatures. When civil society turns to the courts to correct structural defects, 
inequalities and corruption in political institutions―which devalue citizens’ votes by up 
to 20 to 1― it could be said that the standard countermajoritarian paradigm of judges 
overruling democratically elected officials needs revising. Indeed, the reaction among 
the public and the media to the Court’s reapportionment decisions was almost uniformly 
positive.
469
 Opinion polling by Gallup indicated that the public approved of the 
reapportionment rulings by a margin of two to one.
470
 Public reaction to the decision in 
the United States suggested that the Court had anticipated the public mood and was met 
with “broad approval by the American public”471. Friedman notes that “the very 
popularity of the reapportionment decisions belied any perception that legislative bodies 
were reflecting popular will, and that the courts were not.”472 
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Criticisms of the decision such as that of U.S. Senator Everett Dirksen— that 
“the will of six men on the Supreme Court” was contrary to the will of the people—were 
rare, because in Friedman’s words “probably they were not true”.473 Explaining why, 
Friedman adds 
The judiciary apparently was the only place to go when 
malapportionment had locked out the will of the people, who could 
not get politicians, anxious to retain their employment, to solve the 
problem themselves.
474
 
Even an initial critic of the decision such as Louis Jaffe conceded that  
At least some of us who shook our heads over Baker v Carr are 
prepared to admit that it has not been futile, that it has not 
impaired, indeed that it has enhanced, the prestige of the Court. It 
has been a peculiarly popular opinion.
475
 
Overall, it is hard to disagree with Robert McCloskey’s view that the Court “happened 
to hit upon what students of public opinion might call a latent consensus.”476 
The reapportionment cases and the decisions also highlight deep tension 
between national and local majorities that have been discussed in previous chapters. 
However, they also demonstrate the counter-intuitive relationship between majority rule 
and individual rights. The reapportionment cases restored majority rule in the United 
States in the interests of democracy. Yet that ruling was based on the principle that 
every individual’s vote must count the same as every other person’s. Ostensibly the 
court proclaimed the value oriented principle of equal representation; yet the decisions 
in the reapportionment cases were also fundamentally a corrective intended to instil the 
principles of equality into the participatory processes of representative government. In 
this respect the reapportionment decisions also reflected the principles of footnote four. 
As Dixon eloquently put it in a passage that was included in Justice Ginsburg’s 
‘Madison Lecture’: 
The ultimate rationale to be given for Baker v Carr and its 
numerous progeny is that when political avenues for redressing 
political problems become dead-end streets, some judicial 
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intervention in the politics of the people may be essential in order 
to have any effective politics.
477 (emphasis in original).  
It is perhaps unsurprising that Justice Ginsburg, whose dissent in the affirmative action 
case Fisher v University of Texas at Austin
478
 was based on footnote four
479
, would also 
see the decisions in Baker and Reynolds through the participatory prism of Harlan 
Stone’s opinion.  
Running counter to some conventional understandings of constitutionalism that 
what is good for democracy is bad for rights, in the reapportionment cases the Court 
instead saw a more symmetrical relationship, where the rights of all citizens were more 
likely to be undermined when representative democracy was malfunctioning and 
treating citizens unequally. The reapportionment cases illustrate that the standard 
assumption that constitutionalism and democracy are mutually antithetical does not 
reflect the more complex interdependence that exists between them. Democracy has 
tended to empower rights in America, but local variations in value differences meant 
that in certain places they were antithetical to one another. Thus, Carolene Products 
footnote four speaks directly to the dangers of political ossification and the 
circumstances under which the courts had a role to play in protecting individual rights 
when normal political channels had become dysfunctional. Constitutionalism, through 
its manifestation in judicial power, can have a restorative effect on democracy rather 
than debilitating it.
480
 This was also reflected in Justice Jackson’s remarks, cited by 
Archibald Cox during oral arguments in Baker. Ending that political ossification might, 
according to Bickel, have been achieved simply through the Court’s ruling in Baker if it 
prompted state legislatures to finally take action.
481
 That was not sufficient, however, 
for an American constitutionalism where every person’s opinion has to be able to form 
a majority.  
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5.7 Conclusion  
One lesson from the malapportionment cases is that when representative rights 
are restricted then democracy becomes an empty vessel. The reapportionment cases are 
useful because they highlight how the Supreme Court’s writ is all powerful in the legal / 
institutional space and in those limited areas of communal activity that federal law and 
the Constitution gives it jurisdiction in. While the decisions in Baker v Carr and the 
other reapportionment cases corrected a deep problem with voter exclusion and restored 
the representative nature of U.S. representative democracy
482
, they did not reconcile the 
fundamental value differences between rural and urban inhabitants that caused 
malapportionment. The Court’s decision extended to the political sphere where it was 
obeyed as state legislatures across the country complied with it. However, its capacity to 
improve the quality of the civic space―where the relationship between citizen and state 
matters the most―was limited.  
The schism between America’s broadly idealistic constitutional values and its 
often unscrupulous political values is clearly manifested in the reapportionment cases. 
The Supreme Court’s intervention in the reapportionment of electoral districts had a 
seismic effect on politics. Theodore Olson, U.S. Solicitor General from 2001-2004, 
recently commented on the positive legacy of Baker and the other reapportionment 
decisions. “It is hard to imagine what this country would be like, or what political crises 
we may have had because of the continued exasperation of that system of smaller 
numbers of people having greater concentrations of power.”483  
Among the writing of the founders, particularly Hamilton and Madison, it is 
hard to discern any desire for a concept of republican government based on numerical 
equality. Yet in the United States after Carolene Products and Brown v Board of 
Education, and after the beginning of the civil rights era, it seemed unthinkable for 
representation to be based on anything other than political equality, as Justice Douglas 
noted in Gray. Grossly unequal representation is now recognised as being 
unconstitutional. The recent case of Evenwel v Abbott in which the Court unanimously 
upheld the principle of ‘one person one vote’ (and not ‘one voter one vote’) against a 
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challenge from a Texas voter illustrates how efforts by some vested interests to skew 
the principles and structure of representative government against those with less wealth 
and influence have not abated. Gross inequalities in political representation as existed in 
the United States before the reapportionment decisions are particularly dangerous in a 
democracy, potentially leading to a crisis of confidence with wider political institutions, 
with all the concomitant risks to political stability that implies.  
Today, gerrymandering has replaced unequal numerical representation of voters 
as the primary instrument of malapportionment. In the 2012 mid-term elections, 
Democrats received 1.5 million more votes than Republicans nationally, but gained only 
8 house seats, leaving the GOP’s house majority of 33 seats intact.484 The effects of 
gerrymandering are pervasive since, by drawing boundaries favourable to one party, the 
centre ground of American politics has collapsed. Solving gerrymandering would 
require the Supreme Court to leap into the political thicket once again, but without the 
aid of either a fundamental constitutional value such as equality or a principle such as 
one person one vote which most voters can appreciate the rationality of. A solution 
would more likely require a process driven approach, perhaps adopting the logic behind 
reapportionment laws passed by Congress in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries requiring “compact districts of contiguous territory”485. Perhaps the best 
solution to gerrymandering might be to take the responsibility for electoral districting 
out of the hands of state legislatures and political machines altogether as six states have 
done with the creation of non-partisan commissions.
486
 Without such action, 
Republicans will continue to do well in state and House elections, while the Democrats 
will be more competitive in the Senate and presidential elections – where apportionment 
is irrelevant.  
The role of the Court in upholding the Constitution has, as seen in this chapter 
and the last, generally made it a useful proxy of federal power. This, I have argued, has 
been less about the Court pro-actively acting to advance federal goals and more about a 
correlation of interests and values, and a higher propensity for malfeasance on the part 
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of the state legislatures, making judicial intervention more likely. The Court’s 5-4 
decision in 2013 to invalidate key parts of the 1965 Voting Rights Act represents both a 
seismic departure from this support for federal action, and a repudiation of the 
principles contained in Carolene Products footnote four. The majority opinion in Shelby 
noted that “the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize 
voting in the covered jurisdictions.”487  
Unlike the decisions of the German Constitutional Court to strike down 
thresholds for electoral success because they prevented all Germans from exercising 
their vote and participating in a representative democracy, the Supreme Court in Shelby 
defended the interests of the States in striking down parts of the VRA designed to 
protect the right of individuals to participate in the democratic process. Apart from 
invalidating Congress’s decision in 2006 to re-authorise the VRA for an additional 25 
years
488
, the Court reversed the progressive development towards equality and human 
dignity that marked the century between the end of the Civil War and the passing of the 
VRA in 1965. More significantly, the Court broke the link between human dignity and 
the right of all individuals to participate in the political process which characterised the 
reapportionment decisions and the VRA itself.  
As argued in Chapter 3, America’s liberty oriented constitutionalism has tended 
to work to formalise existing value changes as a result of political activity in civil 
society. This was the case with Brown v Board of Education, the reapportionment cases, 
and the 2015 ruling on gay marriage. None of these cases are ones where the Court 
acted counter to existing majority sentiment in the United States.
489
 Rather, it declared, 
to paraphrase Justice William Brennan, what it considered to be “the community’s 
interpretation”490. One might say, then, that the Court’s role merely reflects and 
confirms Tocqueville’s observation about social change in America, that once the 
majority has decided to embrace a new social principle, be it desegregation or gay 
marriage, the minority tends to fall in and accept that new value.
491
 The Court can play a 
role then in helping society make the transition from minority to majority acceptance of 
the new value. In the American reapportionment cases we can discern an account of 
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constitutionalism which shows that social forces were hugely important in driving some 
political action. However, the self-interest of legislators in keeping their jobs meant that 
the federal courts were the only possible source of relief. 
Given its undisputed powers in the Basic Law, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
would not have had to justify its role in restoring majority rule the way the Supreme 
Court had to. The post-war recovery of Germany is widely seen as a political and 
economic miracle. Yet it was a miracle which was neither pre-ordained nor particularly 
likely given the assault on constitutional democracy by the Nazis and the distinct lack of 
affection among Germans for the new constitutional order in the early years of the 
Federal Republic. Few would have predicted in the early 1950s that the institution of the 
German state which would do most to underpin the country’s nascent democracy over 
the next seven decades would be the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
Given Germany’s traumatic past, German constitutionalism has been more 
inclined towards ‘less’ participation than more. In the early 1950s what was perhaps 
most needed in Germany was political stability and a renewed faith in law. The 
development in German constitutionalism through which the BVerfG restored that faith 
was controversial for it created exactly the kind of Aristotelian polis that Böckenförde 
was concerned about. This value order broke down the barrier between public and 
private law, and declared that individuals were not isolated human beings but realised 
their dignity and freedom in relation to their role in the community. Democracy in the 
German context did not, therefore, arise out of liberty as in the American view, but 
arose out of fundamental rights including human dignity, which it is the state’s duty to 
protect. The Court’s role in stabilising German democracy and restoring its trust in law 
will now be assessed.  
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Chapter 6 - The Democracy Training Programme 
We got democracy from you, as a gift I would say, in the forties 
and fifties. But I’m not sure if these democratic attitudes are very 
well established in my country. We Germans always have to 
practice democracy—we’re still on the training programme. (Dirk 
Kurbjuweit)
492
 
Neither democratic or constitutionalist theory requires that a polity 
quietly submit to assassination. (Walter Murphy)
493
 
Constitutions enjoy stability not only when any possible destroyers 
are at a distance, but sometimes just because they are close by; for 
through fear of them men keep a firm hold on their own 
constitution.
494
 (Aristotle) 
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In the previous two chapters the Supreme Court’s developing jurisprudence 
recognised, often belatedly and tentatively, the changing concept of equality within U.S. 
society. Only after 1938 with Carolene Products footnote four and the later 
emancipatory decisions of the Warren Court, did its ‘formalising’ decisions catch up 
with, and occasionally overtake, the pace of societal change. By contrast, the role of the 
Federal Constitutional Court or Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in shaping the 
development of fundamental constitutional values and moving away from the legal 
positivism of the Weimar Republic has been anything but tentative. The emergence of 
the Basic Law’s ‘objective value order’ as enunciated by the BVerfG can be seen as an 
attempt both to create a basis for stability by entrenching the fundamental values of 
human dignity and the free democratic basic order at the centre of the constitutional 
order, while also allowing a space for societal renewal and for liberal democratic values 
to take root in Germany. As I will address in Section 6.4, this balance between stability 
and renewal has tilted over time from the former’s emphasis on the ‘militant 
democracy’ to, beginning in the 1970s, the greater emphasis of the latter on democratic 
renewal and a rejection of any sense of a “timeless validity”495 in constitutional 
interpretation.  
Of particular interest is how the country’s constitutional recovery was placed 
almost entirely in the hands of a small group of constitutional court justices in the small 
German city of Karlsruhe. Their mandate empowered them to restrict democracy in 
order to preserve it against the uniquely anti-democratic conditions which it faced at its 
inception. When the Court began hearing cases in 1951, Nazi sympathisers were again 
on the political march
 
and in state elections that year far right parties won between 7 and 
11 percent of the vote.
496
 Even as the German Parliament, the Bundestag was appointing 
the first justices to the BVerfG, Konrad Adenauer’s new government considered asking 
it to ban the largest far right party, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP).
497
 German 
constitutionalism as it emerged from the decisions of the BVerfG has increasingly 
exerted huge influence over the interpretation of constitutional values and the power 
balance between legal and political institutions. This influence ensured that the role of 
the BVerfG in the development of German constitutionalism after 1949 would be one of 
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entrenching the values of democracy and human dignity within the constitutional order, 
while providing a stable basis for those values to take root in German society.  
 This chapter will assess the theoretical, historical and jurisprudential context 
within which German constitutionalism has mediated the competing imperatives of 
stability and renewal. Chapter 7 will assess how in practice the BVerfG has intervened in 
Germany’s political processes and why, to some, it has become the guardian of German 
democracy. I will begin by firstly addressing the constitutional challenges faced by the 
Federal Republic of Germany
498
 (hereafter Germany or FRG) after 1949 and the 
perceived need to create a more resistant constitutional culture than was the Weimar 
Republic. The theoretical and jurisprudential underpinnings for German 
constitutionalism will be considered in this chapter with reference to the higher law 
basis of the Basic Law as a charter of justice which rejected legal positivism and which 
was encapsulated in the natural law thinking of Gustav Radbruch. This created a 
constitutional tableau in which the Court began to be seen as “a necessary 
precondition―and not as an institutional threat―to democracy”499. I will then assess the 
BVerfG’s objective value order which created the idea of the ‘image of man’ in the Basic 
Law where the dignity of the individual was bound to their role in the community. Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde’s critique of this Aristotelian polis view which was examined in 
Chapter 3 raised the question of whether the Court’s objective value order was sufficient 
to maintain liberal democracy without some other ‘internal bonding force’. In Section 
6.7, I will assess the crucial role of law as just such a value which both underwrote the 
BVerfG’s authority and provided Germany with a necessary breathing space for liberal 
constitutional values to develop. 
6.1 Creating a Constitutional Culture 
Jeremy Waldron’s observation that “it is not conceptually impossible for a 
democracy to vote itself out of existence”500 seems almost ahistorical given the 
experience of the Weimar Republic. Germany during the 1920s and 1930s remains the 
classic example of what can go wrong in a democratic system when there are 
insufficient constitutional safeguards in place. Germany was a constitutional state in the 
1920s, and the tradition of the Rechtsstaat in German jurisprudence was strong; it was 
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also, as Martin Amis put it, “the most highly educated society there had ever been on 
Earth.”501 Why this cultured and educated society with its belief in the law governed 
state did not translate into a population and lawyer class more willing to challenge the 
National Socialist assault on constitutional democracy is still the historical and 
jurisprudential elephant in the room.  
The National Socialist onslaught on the Weimar constitution illustrated how 
prescribed constitutional methods could be used by politically repellent ideologies to 
dismantle constitutional democracy from within. The German people in 1945 may have 
become disillusioned with the Nazis after 12 years of a police state and six years of total 
war, but a plurality of voters had elected the National Socialists freely according to the 
provisions of the liberal democratic Weimar constitution in July 1932.
502
 Even as late as 
1939, one German writer suggests that “Hitler would still have been overwhelmingly re-
elected, even in a free and secret poll.”503 This point mattered, both as salutary warning 
about the dangers of unconstrained majority will and an orientation point for Germany’s 
emerging post-1949 constitutionalism and its militant democracy (streitbare 
Demokratie).  
Count One of the indictment at Nuremberg emphasised how the German people 
had been repressed by the Nazis.
504
 The desire not to be seen to blame the German 
people for supporting Hitler was seen as important for allowing Germany and its 
political institutions to recover and stabilise. However, the fact remains that while many 
groups and hundreds of thousands of Germans were repressed by the Nazis,
505
 there was 
still broad support for the regime till the end of the war. Even after the establishment of 
the Federal Republic in 1949, polling data indicates a longing for previous regimes. In a 
speech before the Bundestag in 2014 to celebrate the 65th anniversary of the Basic Law, 
Dr Navid Kermani cited a representative survey of Germans conducted in 1951 which 
asked when things had been best for Germans: 45 percent indicated the Kaiserreich 
(1871-1918), 7 percent indicated the Weimar Republic, 42 percent indicated the Nazi 
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period, but only 2 percent opted for the newly established Federal Republic.
506
 While 
this poll did not ask about support for Hitler or the National Socialists, the overall 
picture painted is of a population longing for any constitutional regime but the FRG. 
The potential challenge this environment posed for democracy and for constitutionalism 
was clear. 
When the details of a new German constitution were being debated and 
discussed by the Parliamentary Council in 1948 and 1949, some called for the Weimar 
Constitution to be revived, leading one member to observe that “a democracy which 
allows a tyranny to emerge from its midst with so little resistance, does not deserve 
being recreated for a second time.”507 Correcting these deficiencies in the post-war 
period emphasised a focus on two areas which were seen as the weak point of the 
Weimar Republic: 1. Bullet-proofing the constitutional structure through the dispersal 
and limitation of the powers of public authority; 2. Placing the fundamental rights of the 
individual at the heart of the constitutional order so that their rigorous application and 
protection in law became the sine qua non of all organs of power within the West 
German state.  
Following the end of the war, free elections were instituted by the allies at a 
local level as early as January 1946 before democratic parliaments were created at the 
Land (state) level a year later.
508
 Thus, as with the United States, the formation of the 
Federal Republic arose from a system of functional democratic accountability at the 
state level. The importance that the German founders attached to the federal and 
democratic structure of the state is reflected in the unamendable articles dealing with the 
“division of the Federation into Länder [states]” and the “democratic and social” 
character of the Federal Republic.
509
 Under the Basic Law power is divided horizontally 
within the federal state itself, and then divided again vertically by giving the individual 
German states a formal role in the national government,
510
 a structural feature which is 
absent in the American model.  
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The overwhelming focus on the deficiencies of the Weimar constitution by the 
Parliamentary Council could not conceal uncomfortable questions over the role of the 
German people in failing to support constitutional democracy. As Hucko put it,  
Looking back on the Nazi period, it was the German people who 
had failed in 1933, rather than the Weimar Constitution, and the 
concept of failure would appear to be more appropriate in this 
respect than the notion of guilt.
511
 
Blaming Weimar for what may also have been the failings of the German people was 
possibly the only serious political option in a society attempting to get back on its 
feet.
512
 Discussion of collective guilt (Kollektivschuld) was postponed for the sake of 
political, societal, and constitutional reconstruction. “Engaged democrats,” writes 
Forner, “rejected a uniform German guilt while exhorting fellow Germans to consider 
the degrees and modes of their own responsibility.”513  
If it was simply failure rather than guilt, then the question for Germany’s 
founders became how might the institutions of the Basic Law be structured more 
resiliently, and its values disseminated more effectively in German politics and society. 
Even with an apparently formidable constitutional structure in the form of the Basic 
Law and the elevation of rights to the summit of the new order, these remained 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for liberal democratic constitutionalism to take 
root in German society. Given the failures of Germany’s previous liberal constitutions, 
particularly Weimar and that of 1849, the question inevitably turned to which features 
of those constitutions could be resurrected and in which forms.  
Although the impoverished state of the German economy in the immediate post-
war period can hardly have helped, the idea that there was a political dimension to the 
longing among Germans for the Kaiserreich and Third Reich periods is also borne out 
by other sources. The opinion poll data also matches historical accounts of the wide 
variance between the more liberal democratic views of German elites in politics, the 
judiciary and the arts in the immediate post-war period, and the less enlightened views 
of segments of the German population. According to the historian Gitta Sereny, “the 
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majority of Germans wanted nothing more than that all trials, all writings, films and 
plays about that period would stop.” It was, she observes  
[the] intense preoccupation with their country’s past of 
leading writers, artists, thinkers, the judiciary and, yes, also 
of politicians in those early years, and their ability to 
maintain their convictions against the pressures of large 
sections of the public, which even more than the Marshall 
Plan and the resultant Wirtschaftswunder, has been the 
source of Germany’s remarkable moral recovery.514 
Sereny’s account highlights the crucial division in German society which produced the 
Basic Law. It was the country’s elites rather than the constituent power of the German 
people that dragged Germany into the post-war constitutional light. However, in 1949 
the conditions looked intensely inhospitable for constitutional democracy. The 
challenge for the FRG’s founders, politicians, and judges was how to strengthen the 
institutions of the new constitutionalism and build the kind of support for them within 
German society that was completely absent during Weimar. 
 The eventual emergence of German liberal democracy in the decades after the 
destruction of the Nazi state faced unprecedented challenges, reflecting historic ebbs 
and flows in the acceptance of constitutionalism in Germany.
515
 German liberals had 
been attempting to create a constitutional democracy for a century but had been beaten 
back by conservatives in 1849, then Bismarck, then Kaiser Wilhelm II and, finally, 
Hitler.
516
 While the tradition of the Rechtsstaat ran deep, instilling in Germans a 
profound respect for law, this did not extend to politics which was generally regarded 
with a mixture of detachment, if not contempt. This distaste for politics and reverence 
for law among ordinary Germans, even prior to the Nazi period, partly explains the 
relatively early respect accorded to the BVerfG after 1951.
517
  
Although the threats posed to German constitutionalism in 1949 were more 
acute than those America faced in 1789, both polities had to deal with the challenge of 
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creating a supportive constitutional culture. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
challenge for Madison and the other founders, as Bellah notes, had been the particular 
problem of developing “public virtues in democratic citizens.”518 The Constitution was 
designed to bring this about through the instrumentality of checks and balances to offset 
“the centrifugal and anarchic tendency of competitive individual and local self-
interest,”519 and so foster what Madison called the “permanent and aggregate interests 
of the community.” In 1949, as highlighted by the polling evidence earlier, the Basic 
Law had nothing to fall back on by way of a public virtue or a supportive culture. 
Reflecting on the failure of the previous German constitutions, Hucko writes: 
Basic rights, even those which have been enshrined in a 
constitutional document, require open breathing spaces where 
political life can organise and express itself. Above all, these must 
be defended and fought for day after day.
520
 
Although Hucko’s words were inspired by the unfulfilled promise of the 
German constitution of 1849 and certainly speak to the need for vibrant political 
processes, they also speak to the need for a civic space where the people can through 
their representatives shape and give meaning to constitutional values. Only the untested 
resilience of the streitbare Demokratie offered the possibility of a breathing space for a 
supportive constitutional culture to develop, and guard Germany from a re-run of its 
1932-45 experience.  
6.2 The Basic Law as a Charter of Justice 
In reaction to the assault on human dignity and democracy by the National 
Socialists, the founders of the Federal Republic “drew deep upon German tradition to 
found the legal order on moral and rational idealism, particularly that of Kant and 
Hegel.”521 Treating individuals always as an end in themselves and never as a means to 
an end was the most fundamental Kantian precept to undergird the Basic Law. Perhaps 
more significantly, the Basic Law includes a provision that makes international law an 
integral part of German federal law, thus signifying the country’s rejection of absolute 
sovereignty and its embrace of international human rights values, and a desire to play an 
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active role in European integration.
522
 The fundamentally normative character of the 
Basic Law is noted by Kommers and Miller. 
Germans no longer understand their constitution as the simple 
expression of an existential order of power. They commonly agree 
that the Basic Law is fundamentally a normative constitution 
embracing values, rights and duties. That the Basic Law is a value-
oriented document ─ indeed, one that establishes a hierarchical 
value order ─ is a familiar refrain in German constitutional case 
law.
523 
The Basic Law was drafted by The Parliamentary Council which met in 1948 
while the country was still in flux and going through the process of “de-Nazification”. 
Hans Kelsen, seen as the founder of the Austrian Constitutional Court, was also 
involved in drafting the proposals at the Parliamentary Council for a new constitutional 
tribunal.
524
 It was the ideas of American and Western constitutional government which 
“shaped the political ideas of the 70 men and women who produced the Basic Law in 
Bonn in just under 9 months.”525 Here, the experience of where democracy can go awry 
from the 1930s permeates practically every section of the Basic Law. Brenner writes: 
“The Basic Law clearly rejects direct democracy, regardless of the—at least 
ostensibly—greater potential it has for legitimation.”526 Instead, as Thornhill notes, “the 
constitution clearly construed state legitimacy as arising from a modification of classical 
concepts of the democratic-legal state to include principles of material equality.”527 
Achieving such a complex balance between individual rights, the collective agency of 
the people, and the state after the unfulfilled promise of Germany’s previous 
constitutions demanded that the new constitutional order be based on the one institution 
which might still be able to command the respect of the German people: the law. In this 
vein, Stern writes: 
Following the American constitutional tradition, the Basic Law 
provided from the very beginning a state system subject to law. 
The Constitution was adopted as a law of paramount obligation to 
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which all other law was – and is – subordinate. It has perhaps 
become more than anywhere else the legal rule of legal rules.
528
 
The emphasis on legal mechanisms and the judicial role in preserving and 
shaping the post-1949 German constitutional order and its separation of powers system 
allows individuals, state organs, and political parties to file constitutional complaints 
with the BVerfG when they perceive their rights have been violated by state authority. 
As with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with Carolene Products footnote four 
designed to ensure more searching judicial scrutiny where democratic processes and the 
political rights of minority groups were restricted, the BVerfG sees this constitutional 
complaints process in the German system as particularly crucial for the protection of 
minority parties in Parliament and to ensure important checks on government power. 
The constitutional complaint mechanism presented the BVerfG with the opportunity to 
greatly expand its own authority in a 1958 case
529
 where it articulated its “objective 
order of values” which permeates the country’s entire constitutional order. This is what 
Kommers calls “the gloss” that the Court has put on the text of the Basic Law.530 The 
enunciation of the Court’s value order was a significant development in German 
constitutionalism, and signified that human dignity and the free democratic basic order 
represented the most fundamental values of society.
531
 
6.3 Higher Law and Pre-Constitutional Rights as a Democratic Precondition 
The theoretical sources and normative principles which contributed to the 
framing of the Basic Law continue to play a role in its interpretation, while also helping 
us understand how the BVerfG perceives the role of the individual within the 
constitutional mix. Partly, these principles are “rooted in the dialectic between the 
liberal, socialist, and Christian natural-law traditions that shaped the original 
document”, but they are also derived from what the Court calls “supra-positive 
principles of law” that “bind legislators and other political decision makers”.532 Within 
the German constitutional order these principles contribute to what Kommers and Miller 
describe as “communitarian values” which are “suggestive of aspects of the Aristotelian 
polis as well as the early American traditions of civic republicanism.”533   
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In signifying the identity of the new order, those who created the Basic Law had, 
as Kommers and Miller note, “given up on the old positivist idea that law and morality 
– and justice are separate domains. Constitutional morality would now govern both law 
and politics.”534 Escaping from legal positivism meant that the Basic Law became a 
fundamental charter of justice. Legality would now be measured against supra-positive 
principles of justice. The Rechtsstaat of the Basic Law is no longer an end in itself; it is 
a means which serves the ends of the Verfassungsstaat (constitutional state).
535
  
Gustav Radbruch was the German legal thinker most responsible for setting out 
the distinction between positive law and justice. His 1946, article “Statutory Injustice 
and Suprastatutory Law”536 in which he provided a formula for dealing with the conflict 
between positive law and justice has been described as “one of the most important texts 
in 20
th
 century legal philosophy”,537 while the importance of Radbruch’s formula has 
been confirmed by a number of judgements of both the German Constitutional Court 
and the German High Court
538
. Most significantly, in the context of the Basic Law, 
Radbruch’s view that certain higher principles of justice trumped positive law has been 
repeatedly cited by the BVerfG.
539
 The Rabruch Formula was primarily a response to 
the abuse of written law by the Nazis in the interest of injustice. As the German legal 
philosopher, Ralf Dreier, put it, “Radbruch’s formula was a reaction to Auschwitz.”540 
The desire to embrace law but to reject positivism is reflective of an older German 
tradition of fidelity to the Rechtsstaat which meant more than simply the robotic 
adherence to statutory law associated with positivism. The Basic Law “represents a 
major break from this positivist tradition” by not conceiving of the state “as the source 
of fundamental rights. The core of individual freedom, like human dignity itself, is 
regarded as anterior to the state.”541  
 As Kommers and Miller note, “the notion of ‘inviolable and inalienable’ rights 
is also sharply at variance with the spirit of earlier German constitutions, for the Basic 
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Law is Germany’s first national constitution to recognise the pre-constitutional 
existence of guaranteed rights.”542 This post-war German view on the existence of pre-
constitutional rights vested in people by nature has become fused with a post-1945 
juridical-legal view where principles are often prioritised over written law or 
constitutional text: 
In Germany, where the courts are by the constitution stated to be 
‘bound to statute and to law’ (Gesetz and Recht), the reference to a 
body of law wider than the written statute law has been interpreted 
as requiring courts to expound fundamental principles implicit in 
the law, sometimes even in preference to the letter of the law. 543 
Rights are, thus, not derived from the Rechtsstaat, but their maintenance and protection 
requires, in the German legal mind, the presence of the order of legality (which the 
Rechtsstaat represents) at the centre of the constitutional order to maintain the 
coherence and unity of the system. 
 There is, however, a paradox in this view of rights as existing prior to the state. 
Rights are dependent on the state for their protection, but the post-1945 rights mindset 
emphasised the idea that rights were anterior to the state (in the sense of natural) and 
that their existence was not derived from the existence of the state. In Germany, the 
general post-1945 move towards legally recognised rights was fused with an older 
notion of the Rechtsstaat where human dignity and personal freedom were seen as being 
derived from rights laid down in law. The discontinuity with the pre-constitutional 
rights view is that the preservation of individual autonomy through the imposition of 
rules on the state “presupposes that the planning and acting that are to be protected must 
take place in a social environment.”544 The paradox is, thus, that rights in reality cannot 
be protected if the constitutional order that supports them collapses – this was one 
lesson from the Nazi period; but equally, the Nazi period also showed that rights could 
not just be seen to be derived from, or dependent on, state power. 
In the Court’s Elfes ruling of 1957, it further defined the nature of the value 
order and the constitutional implications of the move away from a German legal 
positivism that had too easily been used to equate law with justice. This would mean the 
Court’s interpretations of the Basic Law, and of unwritten higher law principles, and 
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parliamentary statutes represent the final word on constitutional meaning. The Court’s 
First Senate
545
 declared that under the Basic Law,  
Laws are not constitutional merely because they have been passed 
in conformity with procedural provisions. They must be 
substantively compatible with the highest values of a free and 
democratic order, and must also conform to unwritten fundamental 
constitutional principles […].546 
The implications of this new BVerfG shaped understanding―that rights were anterior to 
the state and to democracy itself―for the new constitutionalism and for representative 
democracy itself were startling. This was not an American liberty oriented conception 
of rights. Rather rights and democracy were joined at the hip and could only be 
exercised in the social and political landscape created by the Basic Law, and by the 
BVerfG.  
This was then the historical logical and the political imperative which shaped 
Germany’s postwar constitutionalism. Maintaining stability was a key political goal as 
much as it was a legal one to allow the country’s new constitutional institutions to 
become accepted. However, making democracy contingent on rights also meant 
defining the individual not as a lone isolated and free person―as in the U.S. conception 
of liberty―but as a person within the community. For reasons that will be explained in 
Section 6.6, the Court’s decision in the Lüth Case of 1958 to declare that the Basic Law 
governed not only public law, but also private law, automatically brought private 
relationships within the scope of constitutional protection, while also shaping 
Germany’s evolving conception of democracy. 
6.4 The Stability Renewal Transition 
The gradual transition from a constitutionalism of stability to one of renewal has 
been embodied in both the Court’s interpretational methodology and in its conception, 
echoing Koopmans
547
, of how minority opinions can become a majority. Within German 
constitutionalism, the ‘stability’ dynamic is squarely embodied in the concept of the 
militant democracy which dominated the Court’s jurisprudence in its first few decades. 
This was illustrated in cases which upheld the political status quo, such as when the 
Court upheld government raids on the offices of Der Spiegel magazine.
548
 By the 1970s 
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this balance shifted tentatively towards renewal, with decisions that embraced the 
imperative of political renewal
549
, and rejected the idea that even architectonic principles 
such as human dignity could have eternal definitions
550
. Through decisions in the 1980s 
that favoured the Green Party and accelerated its integration into the German political 
system, the Court was seen to have become more unsympathetic to the oligarchical 
tendencies in Germany’s established parties.551  
The problem that this ostensible transition from stability to renewal has raised is 
that it has seemingly been accompanied by a more opaque methodology and more 
erratic decision-making. While this transition towards renewal has been good for 
Germany’s smaller political parties such as the Greens and opposition groups whose 
interests the Court has sought to protect, in other areas it has resulted in a weakening of 
the Basic Law’s fundamental rights protections through the use of principles such as 
proportionality. Proportionality uses a means/ends test to evaluate any piece of 
legislation to decide the extent to which any subjective right (i.e. fundamental right) can 
be interfered with to realise an objective principle (i.e. a legitimate end of state power). 
The effect of the Court’s use of proportionality―which assumes that no right is 
absolute and has to be circumscribed by duties―has attracted criticism among German 
legal circles because it gives unlimited discretion to the BVerfG to weaken fundamental 
rights.
552
  
The tension between stability and renewal, and the paradoxical character of 
intrinsic values within German constitutionalism is highlighted by a famous opinion of 
the Court – the Life Imprisonment Case. Much like Justice Holmes’ opinion in Missouri 
v Holland
553
, this illustrates a fundamental antipathy to any interpretation based on 
originalist or permanent understandings.  
Any decision defining human dignity in concrete terms must be 
based on our present understanding of it, and not on any claim to a 
conception of timeless validity.554 
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In the parlance of the BVerfG, then, even the architectonic principle of human dignity 
can never be absolute as a right because it depends on a conception of the individual as 
part of a social unit. This change is inexorably linked to the development of the Court’s 
objective value order and its Aristotelian polis conception of German constitutionalism 
which effectively erodes the wall separating the private and the public spheres, and that 
between individual and community.  
Yet this poses an ostensible disjuncture between the eternal commitment to 
human dignity in the Basic Law and the BVerfG’s declaration against any conception of 
a timeless validity when defining human dignity. The only way to bridge this gap is 
through context, interpretation and meaning, which for writers like Bernhard Schlink is 
the real problem.
555
 The danger becomes that a fundamental principle like human 
dignity―that the framers of the Basic Law intended should be a subjective right against 
state intrusion―can be interpreted out of existence through a balancing exercise. So 
clear were Germany’s framers about the logic and premise of these principles that 
fundamental rights including human dignity were protected from constitutional 
amendment through their entrenchment under the eternity clause of Article 79. Given its 
protection under the eternity clause, there is clearly a problem if the Court can interpret 
human dignity to mean anything. This reflects the view of the Federal Republic’s 
founders that human dignity was “the right that could ‘trump’ all other rights” and “was 
not open to any form of balancing test”.556  
The whole point of the post-1945 codification of human rights and the concept of 
human dignity is that they were intended to draw a line in the sand; perhaps not so much 
a Fukuyama-esque end of history moment in terms of the triumph of liberalism, but 
certainly the idea that respect for the principle of fundamental human rights and human 
dignity are not negotiable.  
6.5 An Objective Value Order 
Philip Allott has called the Basic Law “the fine fleur, the ne plus ultra, of 
democratic rationalism, a pure distillation of long centuries of European 
constitutionalism.”557 Elmar Hucko echoes this when he writes: “the Basic Law has 
proved its worth. It is the fruit of a hundred years of German constitutional history, 
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combining with it the merits of the three previous constitutions, and at the same time 
avoiding their weaknesses.”558 The assertive value orientation of the Basic Law and its 
interpretation by the Bundesverfassungsgericht shapes every aspect of the constitutional 
order including the structuring of the institutions, the force of basic rights, and the 
relationship between the individual and society. The Basic Law is not a constitution 
which only has relevance in a court room when transgressions occur. Institutional and 
administrative elements of the German state measure official actions against what 
fidelity to the Basic Law demands.
 
The principle of legality (Gesetzmäßigkeit) is 
important in German administration and helps ensure that government actions conform 
to the law and the constitution.
559
  
The BVerfG’s enunciation of the Basic Law’s objective value order declared that 
a hierarchy of norms existed, with some more important than others. Thus, the value 
order is not merely an interpretational or balancing tool for the Court; the concept also 
imposes obligations on all institutions within the state to ensure that government actions 
are carried out in accordance with the constitution and with law. In analysing this value 
order and its implications for German representative democracy, of central importance 
are human dignity and the free democratic basic order. The value of human dignity 
implies a focus on how individual rights can be protected and realised within a context 
which includes the state, society and other individuals; the free democratic basic order 
value implies a focus on how popular sovereignty can be constrained both to protect 
individual rights and preserve the existence of the structure itself.  
Inevitably, these two values sometimes come into conflict when human dignity 
and liberty must be balanced against the security and preservation of the free democratic 
basic order.
560
 In interpretational terms, the ‘objective order of values’ can be seen a 
ranking of values in terms of their importance ― which the Court then uses as an 
interpretational framework when adjudicating cases. By identifying which values are at 
issue in a case and the relative weighting (in importance) of each value, the Court can 
use balancing principles such as ‘proportionality’ to come to a decision. The phrase 
‘objective order of values’, like the word ‘proportionality’ does not actually occur in the 
Basic Law, yet according to the Court, those values exist as an objective reality in the 
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constitution in the form of values such as the ‘free democratic basic order’ and ‘human 
dignity’. The BVerfG is the final arbiter on whether any constraints on democratic 
process may be justified by the state such as when the Court determines the 
constitutionality of political parties or other threats to the ‘free democratic basic order’. 
The BVerfG is due to deliver its verdict in January 2017 on whether the far right neo-
Nazi party the NPD is unconstitutional and will be banned.
561
  
Far from being a value neutral document, the Court has used the “objective 
value order” phraseology it created to interpret the Basic Law as being based on a 
particular vision of German society, a vision which the Court seeks to orient its rulings 
towards. The idea of the Court enunciating the existence of constitutional values of its 
own creation, which it then uses as a basis for further broad interpretations of the Basic 
Law may sound like a judicial tautology or constitutional chutzpah depending on one’s 
perspective. Carl Schmitt’s perspective, which will be assessed in Section 6.6, was even 
more hostile. As we will also see with some of the electoral threshold cases in Chapter 7 
and its decisions in other areas, the BVerfG cites itself far more than it cites the Basic 
Law,
562
 potentially raising methodological and interpretational concerns. The larger 
concern is that the Court’s rulings become understandable only through its own case 
law and its value order―and sometimes not even then―rather than the text of the Basic 
Law itself.  
In the first few years of its existence, the BVerfG enunciated a conception of the 
person where their individual rights were inextricably linked to their role within their 
community. This has been a much repeated phraseology in the Court’s case law.  
The image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, 
sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law has decided in favour 
of a relationship between individual and community in the sense of 
a person’s dependence on and commitment to the community, 
without infringing upon a person’s individual value.563 
Striking the correct balance between these two poles of ‘individual autonomy’ and the 
‘interests of the wider community’ will, of course, often come down to judicial 
interpretation of the written, unwritten and pre-constitutional principles within the 
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German constitutional order. Although the Court sees human dignity as the pre-eminent 
value of the Basic Law, it is a dignity which is realised most through the relationship 
between the individual and society. Most of the BVerfG’s jurisprudence and the effects 
of its pronouncements on German society arise out of the inter-relationship between the 
fundamental values of human dignity and the free democratic basic order.   
There is a sense here of an older tradition of rights which is neither uniquely 
German, nor can it be said to be pre-political in a natural law sense. In the American 
tradition the preservation of individual autonomy through the imposition of rules on the 
state “presupposes that the planning and acting that are to be protected must take place 
in a social environment.”564 Similarly, Kommers writes that “any realisation of dignity 
implies a fusion of individual rights and social responsibilities.”565 As indicated in 
earlier chapters, the significant difference between how autonomy is shaped in the 
American and German contexts is the complete absence of a role for the state (at least 
originally) in the former, and the instrumental role of the state in the latter. As important 
as dignity is for one person, the achievement of this right cannot impinge on the dignity 
of others. This illustrates the extent to which the constitutionalism of the Karlsruhe 
justices implies a commitment on the part of individuals to see their own rights within a 
social and communitarian context which also considers the effect that the exercise of 
those rights will have on others. The effect of this emphasis on the social and 
communitarian context was profound, not least in how it reinforced the idea that 
democracy in the Basic Law could never be an end in itself. Democracy could only be 
legitimate if it respected fundamental rights. 
6.6. Guarding the Constitution  
Writing in the early 1990s, Steinberger observed noted that “politicians and 
political scientists understand representative democracy to be primarily the antithesis of 
direct democracy.”566 Despite Germany having a more powerful form of constitutional 
review than that in the U.S., democratic values occupy a central position within the 
Basic Law. This democratic principle is also entrenched in the unamendable Article 20 
which states that “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal 
state.” 
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More than any other principle in the German constitution, the free democratic 
basic order is squarely rooted in the principle of the militant democracy. The concept of 
militant democracy does not speak to equality as much as to the survival of the potential 
for equality and dignity. Although the free democratic basic order and human dignity 
are the two architectonic principles of the Basic Law, dignity will not always emerge on 
top in a balancing exercise. In the Spiegel Case
567
 from the 1960s, which arose from 
Gestapo-like raids by the West German security services on the offices of Der Spiegel 
magazine over stolen military documents containing sensitive information, the Court 
was split 4-4 on whether the state actions were invalid. Murphy notes that this case 
provided “a pair of strong hints that, if squarely presented with a clear clash between 
dignity and security, the court will not automatically put dignity above survival, but will 
rationalize that survival is essential to dignity.”568  
In the post-1949 German constitutional framework, the ‘free democratic basic 
order’ is decidedly not negotiable. It is what Kommers calls the “architectonic political 
principle” which informs the Basic Law as a whole; based on the jurisprudence of the 
BVerfG, the preservation of this principle can, crucially, be used to limit all rights, even 
those cast in absolute terms.
569
 In practice, the principle can be used by the Court to 
declare as unconstitutional any political parties which might threaten the democratic 
system.
570
 Since the establishment of the Basic Law the Court has only exercised this 
power twice, banning two parties in its first decade.
571
  
Carl Schmitt’s question of who guards the constitution against the enemies of 
democracy
572
 dominated post-war legal debates,
573
 and avoiding the pitfalls of the 
Weimar Republic thus became the sine qua non of the 1949 German constitutional 
project. Possible contenders who could fight the enemies of democracy ranged, notes 
Müller, from “a strong president (who would have been Schmitt’s own choice), to the 
state bureaucracy and even the trade unions.”574 For Hans Kelsen, Schmitt’s long-time 
nemesis, the guardian of the constitution had to be a process of constitutional judicial 
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review by a dedicated tribunal.
575
 Through its 1958 Lüth ruling it was ultimately the 
BVerfG which emerged in this ‘enemy-fighting’ role in which “judicial review of 
almost any legal and political decision became legitimate.”576 In Lüth, the Court stated:   
The Basic Law is not a value-neutral document. Its section on 
basic rights establishes an objective order of values, and this order 
strongly reinforces the effective power of basic rights. This value 
system, which centres upon the dignity of the human personality 
developing freely within the social community must be looked 
upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all spheres 
of law, both public and private.
577 
 
Lüth is probably the Court’s most important ever case and effectively 
“constitutionalised the whole of German law.”578 As well as enunciating its objective 
value order and repeating its ‘image of man’ vision of the relationship between the 
individual and the community, it declared that the Basic Law applied to private 
relationships and contracts, and not just public authority as is the case with the U.S. 
Constitution. Indeed, the doctrine of Third Party Effect followed logically from the 
Court’s demolition of the border between public and private law, and from its 
Aristotelian conception of the individual as part of their community.  
It was in this newly created court that the ‘leave nothing to chance’ mantra of 
Karl Löwenstein’s militant democracy579 was made real. As Teitel puts it, “a militant 
constitutional order is vigilant not only to the excesses of state power but also to those 
of popular sovereignty.”580 Its end result, as Kommers notes, is that the unchangeable 
principle of democracy enshrined in the Basic Law now “finds itself locked in the 
permanent embrace of mutual tension with constitutionalism.”581 This represents a 
move from the value neutral democracy of Weimar to the constitutional democracy of 
the Federal Republic and its ‘objective order of values’ as promulgated by the justices 
in Karlsruhe. Such a democracy is, as Müller notes, “expressly not neutral about its own 
principles and values – and puts in place strong checks on those hostile to its 
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principles.”582 The concept of the militant democracy is perhaps best encapsulated in 
Popper’s observation on the ‘paradox of tolerance’ where “unlimited tolerance must 
lead to the disappearance of tolerance.”583 Following Saint-Just, the Basic Law’s 
mantra, particularly at its establishment, could be said to have been ‘no freedom for the 
enemies of freedom’. Article 18 allows for the “forfeiture” of basic rights for anyone 
using them “to combat the free democratic basic order”, which the BVerfG alone can 
decide. Even during a state of emergency the Court retains jurisdiction.
584
 “To avoid the 
possibility of ‘democratic suicide’ the constitution of the Federal Republic included an 
article, the so-called eternity clause, closing off the possibility of abrogating the 
fundamental principles underlying a liberal democratic order.”585   
Of the 18 articles contained in the Basic Rights section of the Basic Law, several 
are “word for word reproductions of corresponding articles in the Weimar Constitution 
of 1919”; the difference being that Weimar viewed the norms as being “aspirational” 
while in the Basic Law, these are “judicially enforceable norms”.586 Unlike the Weimar 
constitution, the Basic Law is supreme over the German parliament and all other organs 
of the state, and governs the entire German legal order. The rights provisions included 
in the Basic Law are treated as judicially enforceable norms and are declared by Article 
1, paragraph 3 “to bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly 
applicable law.” Article 20 underpins the supremacy of the Basic Law while also 
underscoring the difference from the legal positivist focus only on Gesetz, stating that: 
“the legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the 
judiciary by law (Gesetz) and justice (Recht). These and other sections of the Basic Law 
such as the Article 79 eternity clause (Ewigkeitsklausel) which forbids amendments to 
Article 1 or Article 20 creates the idea of the Basic Law being a protective shield for 
German democracy and German constitutionalism. Indeed such is the shadow that the 
experience of Weimar and the 1930s continues to cast that the German constitution 
paradoxically imposes certain constraints on democracy in the interests both of 
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constitutionalism and “the free democratic basic order”587 which is one of the most oft-
repeated and significant phrases in the Basic Law. The paradox inherent in curbing 
democratic processes to preserve the super principle of the free democratic basic order 
is a palpable feature of German constitutionalism.  
By the early 1980s after three decades of economic growth and with an 
apparently stable, if sometimes colourless, democracy the people and leaders of the 
Federal Republic could reasonably point to some success. Yet despite the militant 
democracy, doubts remained about how resilient a constitutional democracy the Bonn 
republic had actually become, revealing Böckenförde’s concern again. To some there 
was a suspicion that the stability of the political system was perhaps no more than a 
temporal illusion created by the increasing distance from 1945, where economic 
performance masked political commitment.
588
 If the Federal Republic was only a fair 
weather democracy, the concern was whether there was “a reliable political culture, a 
firm value orientation which would safeguard the democratic regime in time of 
crisis.”589  
While the fair weather democracy argument may have still been faintly plausible 
in the 1980s, this point still neglects two important aspects of Germany’s development 
after 1949. One was the important domestic debate over the Vergangenheitsbewältigung 
and the coming to terms with the so called NS Zeit which paralleled the growing sense 
of affinity between the German people and their Basic Law. However, the implications 
of the ‘Böckenförde Dilemma’ were that liberal democracies, especially Germany’s, lay 
perilously exposed without the internal bonding forces of God or country. Even more 
than today, for the Germany of 1964 country was certainly not an option, leaving only 
Böckenförde’s emphasis on religion as an acceptable internal source of cohesion. One 
other important source of cohesion in Germany was law itself. It was the deep cultural 
respect for Germans in law that predated the FRG which provided the newly established 
Bundesverfassungsgericht with enhanced legitimacy at a time when there was little trust 
in political institutions. The importance of law to the success of post-war German 
constitutionalism is addressed in the next section.  
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6.7 In Law Germany Trusts 
The Basic Law put in place mechanisms to divide and limit political power, and place 
law at the heart of the constitutional order. Positive law via the application of the 
German legal code was still relevant, but with the rights articles of the Basic Law and 
their associated values governing the entire legal order, all aspects of German law have 
increasingly taken on constitutional significance. Germany’s new constitutionalism 
differed markedly from the Weimar Republic and the previous German constitutions by 
emphasising, firstly, that “all state authority is derived from the people”590 to be 
exercised through the medium of representative democracy, and secondly, the central 
importance of law in political and economic matters. “The founders of the Federal 
Republic, successive legislators and, above all, the justices in the Federal Constitutional 
Court have relied upon the power of legal provisions to ensure the proper functioning of 
many important elements in the country’s political system.”591 To appreciate the special 
status given to legal mechanisms in binding Germany’s post-1949 constitutional system 
and political system one must recognise the historic affinity for law in Germany.  
Politics had been discredited by the Weimar Republic and the 
Third Reich, and the old German belief that politics was 
essentially a dirty business and law a clean one reappeared and 
gained confirmation. […] The German belief in the purity of law 
had always differentiated between law in its original and natural 
state, and that which lawyers and judges make of it. […] Dirty 
politics suffered from a deficit of legitimacy, while clean law and 
its representative, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, enjoyed a 
legitimacy “surplus”. These were the conditions that invited and 
demanded that the BVerfG take on an activist role.
592
 
In 1951, when the Court first began to hear cases, it remained to be seen how 
effective it would be in protecting the new democratic constitutional order, how 
authoritative would be its rulings, and whether it could instil in the German people a 
respect for constitutional government which had been discredited, first, by the 
shortcomings of Weimar, and then by the assault on the constitution by the Nazis. 
Constitutional courts of the German variety have fared well, writes Somek, “where the 
people are traditionally respectful towards, and heedful of, authority.”593 Of course, it 
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was this same excessive respect for authority in Germany that had made things so easy 
for the Nazis in the first place. While it may be some comfort that it is the benign 
justices of the BVerfG who are in change constitutionally, Germany would be a weak 
liberal democracy if its citizens simply respected the authority of judges rather than the 
substantive values they are enunciating.  
Rights, human dignity, and party democracy constitute the centrepiece of 
constitutionalism in the Basic Law.
594
 Compared to the American Bill of Rights which 
was only added to the Constitution as an afterthought through the amendment process, 
the fundamental and unamendable rights provisions of the German Basic Law are at the 
very start of the constitutional text.
595
 From the outset the framers of the Basic Law 
recognised that the document had to restore the faith of ordinary Germans in law after 
the 13 year assault on the Rechtsstaat by the National Socialists. Equally important, 
though, was rooting the new constitutional order in society through an emphasis on 
human dignity and law. Stern explains that in the Germany shaped by the Basic Law: 
We do not have a government of judges. What has evolved is that 
which was expressed by the Parliamentary Council (and which 
could also be said about the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America): 
The foundation of the state is at stake here: Law is either 
recognized as the basis of human society and enforced with the 
necessary guarantees for its implementation, or political 
expediency will rule the day, leading once again to the 
dangerous fundamentalist dogmas of the past where law is 
reduced simply to what benefits the people or the government or 
the state.
596
 
As Stern notes, this declaration echoes the choice of words used in the proclamation 
which the July 20
th
 plotters planned to sign in the event that they had succeeded in 
killing Hitler: 
Our first task is to re-establish the unimpaired majesty of the law. 
[…] No human society can exist without law; no one, not even 
those who fail to honor the law, can do without it.
597
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This was not mere prose. The continuity between the ideas of some of the plotters and 
Germany’s post-war constitutional order is perhaps best seen in the figure of Fabian von 
Schlabrendorff, who escaped almost certain execution in February 1945 when a U.S. 
bomb crashed through the roof of the Nazi People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) killing the 
notorious presiding judge Roland Freisler. In 1967 Von Schlabrendorff became a judge 
on the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The very basis on which the Federal Republic’s 
constitutional court was founded was a repudiation of the Nazi period where positivist 
law became a means to nefarious ends. It is impossible, as Bruce Ackerman notes, to 
understand the success of the BVerfG without recognizing that “the Basic Law has 
become, in the society at large, a central symbol of the nation’s break with its Nazi 
past.”598  
To ensure the Court’s removal from political pressure the country’s founders 
determined that it should be located in Karlsruhe, far away from the West German 
institutions of power in Bonn. In the 65 plus year existence of the Federal Republic, the 
Court’s judgements have profoundly influenced German life to such an extent that some 
speak of the ‘Karlsruhe Republic’.599 The central role of the BVerfG in constitutional 
interpretation and the respect which is afforded to it in modern Germany have had 
important consequences, such as in the moulding of the country’s political system. In 
the German context, however, some of these effects which the Court’s rulings have had 
on political and social life go beyond even the generally political nature of 
constitutional decision-making. They are the result of the specific circumstances of 
twentieth-century German history and of Germany’s political class coming to the 
conclusion after 1949 that rampant judicial authority pronouncing on political and social 
questions was a more acceptable alternative than strident political, or people power. As 
Möllers observes, “since its inception, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has been 
Germany’s most popular institution.”600  
For many modern theorists of constitutionalism, the German model of 
constitutionalism is correct precisely because it is, as Stern notes, a “legal constitution” 
based on fundamental normative principles and “legitimized by the ultimate source of 
state power, namely the people.”601 The key role of fundamental rights in post-war 
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German constitutionalism and the far more dominant position of the BVerfG within 
Germany’s constitutional system relative to the Supreme Court makes the U.S. centric 
academic debate over the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ seem redundant. Given the 
already mentioned contempt that many Germans have traditionally felt for politics, 
legitimacy was never seen as originating from democracy. Rather, the greater emphasis 
on the principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit is usually sufficient to overcome doubts over the 
democratic character of judicial review.
602
 Donald Kommers writes that Bickel’s 
‘difficulty’ is not relevant due to the preciseness with which the powers and role of the 
Constitutional Court are delineated, and the Court’s obligation to decide cases properly 
before it.
603
 “The Basic Law itself resolves the difficulty for no reliance on a theory of 
judicial review is necessary to justify the exercise of judicial power.”604 Partly this is 
due to the enhanced legitimacy which comes from the clarity of the Basic Law in 
establishing the [Constitutional] Court as the “supreme guardian”605 of the constitution, 
as well as the democratic mode
606
 of appointment of the justices. Heun’s observation 
that “self-restraint is considered as self-authorization which is constitutionally 
prohibited”607 illustrates the degree to which the Basic Law determines the powers, 
limits, and obligations of the Court, making the American political question doctrine, 
and the countermajoritarian difficulty a moot point in the context of German 
constitutional jurisprudence. Put simply, the Basic Law does not allow the justices of 
the BVerfG to escape their responsibilities through use of Bickelian ‘passive virtues’ to 
avoid making a decision in a case.
608
 Its function is “to resolve even doubtful questions 
of constitutionality, not to avoid them.”609 The unambiguous affirmation of judicial 
authority in the Basic Law is also one reason why neither original intent nor the notion 
of judicial restraint are salient issues in German constitutional jurisprudence.  
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For one thing, the clarity of the Basic Law provides a set of useful principles for 
separating matters which are properly political in nature, and those (primarily 
procedural) matters where it would be legitimate for the courts to rule. In the U.S. 
context this question might form part of what has come to be called – the political 
question doctrine. The Basic Law is clear on the difference between political and 
procedural matters. In Article 44(4):“The decisions of committees of inquiry shall not 
be subject to judicial review. The courts shall be free to evaluate and rule upon the facts 
that were the subject of the investigation.”610 
While original intent partly took on more significance in the U.S. due to feelings 
of reverence for the framers, the German need to avoid undue veneration of political 
figures after 12 years of the Führerprinzip perhaps made the BVerfG justices seem more 
acceptable objects of respect. As Collings observes, “West Germans embraced the 
Court’s immense power at a time when circumstances led them to view constitutional 
justice as a precondition to democracy rather than a restraint on it.”611 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the inauspicious circumstances for democracy in 
1950s Germany when the BVerfG began hearing cases. The lingering questions at the 
time over the willingness of so many Germans to support, actively or passively, the 
Nazi regime reinforced the need to establish not only a resistant militant democracy but 
a supportive constitutional culture, which would permit liberal democratic values to 
take root in Germany.  
In creating its so-called ‘Aristotelian polis’, the BVerfG was attempting to 
reinforce the German values of community as a force of cohesion in Böckenfördean 
terms, but without sacrificing the dignity of the individual in the community. What 
assisted the Court in being accepted is the immense cultural respect for law in Germany. 
What was uncertain was how much that respect for law could provide the basis for a 
democratic culture that respected fundamental rights. Law, as it emerged in the Basic 
Law was no longer rooted in the legal positivism of the Weimar Republic, but in supra 
positive principles of justice. The emergence of the Basic Law’s ‘objective value order’ 
as enunciated by the BVerfG built on this conception of justice as it sought to entrench 
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the fundamental values of human dignity and the free democratic basic order at the 
centre of the constitutional order.  
The question assessed in the next chapter with reference to the European 
Parliament (EP) electoral threshold cases is whether the balance the Court has struck 
between the imperative of the militant democracy and the rights of German citizens is 
the correct one. At issue is the BVerfG’s central role within Germany’s political and 
legal order, its decisions and reasoning in the EP cases, and the comments of its 
president that the Court is on the side of the people. The question posed is whether the 
Court’s position has become so powerful that is has effectively relegated the Bundestag 
to the position of an ersatz legislature, as a former justice put it,
612
 while overlooking 
potential threats to stability that are increasingly hard to miss. 
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Chapter 7 - Karlsruhe and The People 
Once the majority of voters in democratic elections vote for parties 
committed to rejecting or attacking the existing constitutional 
order, a political system no longer stands a chance.613 (Ulrich 
Wenner) 
There is hardly an essential process of constitutional life that 
cannot become embroiled in a proceeding before the Federal 
Constitutional Court.[…] Thus are the gates thrown open, despite 
various warnings and terrifying precedents from earlier times, to 
the double danger of a juridification of politics and a politicisation 
of justice. 
614
 (Werner Weber) 
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Donald Kommers observes that “the law of democracy in Germany represents a vast 
jurisprudence”.615 That there even is a ‘law of democracy’ in German constitutional 
jurisprudence is indicative of a German political system governed much more by law 
than is the case in the United States. Yet as Germany’s democratic culture has 
seemingly become more mature the need to maintain all of the different facets of the 
militant democracy has been questioned. Germany’s new constitutionalism as it 
emerged in the 1949 Basic Law had two main aims. First, to create a stable and 
democratic government based on the authority of the people derived from regular 
representative elections. Second, to protect the rights and dignity of all individuals 
against both state power and the unconstrained will of the people. The possibility of 
allowing voters a completely free choice between all political parties―including those 
which might abolish democracy―was never entertained because the German founders 
saw that rights and human dignity could only exist if the political order committed to 
upholding them survived. Or, as Murphy construed the Der Spiegel Case decision, 
“survival is essential to dignity.”616 However, the drawback was that this militant 
democracy could not be sustained, as Böckenförde identified, without the sacrifice of 
part of the liberal state’s liberalness.617  
This chapter broadly considers the relationship between German democracy and 
the German people as mediated by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. As noted in the 
previous chapter, it was at least in part the immense respect for law in German society 
and culture which bought the Federal Republic some breathing space with the German 
people in its early years. Also needed, though, was the creation of a supportive 
democratic culture. The roots of representative democracy in Germany could be traced 
back over a century to the revolution of 1848 and the short-lived constitution of 1849, 
but they were not deeply planted. Justin Collings observes that 
The principles of Demokratie and Rechtsstaat―of democracy and 
the rule of law―had parted paths after the failed revolution of 
1848. More recently, the Nazis had obliterated both principles. The 
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Court’s commission was to restore them; its supreme achievement 
was to reunite them. But the rule of law came first.
618
 
What was necessary, then, at least initially, was for Germany’s nascent democratic 
institutions to be reinforced through the already deep respect for law in the country. As 
will be shown, this has been partly achieved through the role of the constitutional 
complaint mechanism which has made Germans more acutely aware of their democratic 
and individual rights.
619
 The rest of this chapter considers the role of the BVerfG in the 
restoration of democracy within the German constitutional order through reference to 
the constitutional complaint mechanism, the Court’s support for German political 
parties, and the importance of law. 
This chapter will address this broad question with reference to how the BVerfG 
has balanced threats to stability within the German political system and the importance 
it attached to the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunity among political 
parties. It will do this by examining one important strand of the concept of militant 
democracy: the constitutionality of statutory barring clauses (“Sperrklauseln”) with 
respect to German political parties participating in elections within Germany and for the 
European Parliament. 
I will firstly examine the constitutional role of the Court in dealing with political 
parties in the German system, particularly through its historical role in managing the 
integration of new political parties, like the Greens, into the system. I will then assess 
the historical background regarding the necessity of having barring clauses 
(Sperrklauseln) in the context of the failure of the Weimar constitution and the 
establishment of the Basic Law, before examining the European Parliament cases. In the 
final section, I will examine the changing relationship of the Court with the German 
people before questioning whether its central role in the country’s constitutional order 
represents a risk to German democracy, or its strongest foundation.  
7.1 Overview 
The Basic Law does not explicitly define the term ‘democracy’; instead, the BVerfG has 
generally defined German democracy in the context of the related institutions and 
principles in the Basic Law.
620
 In Germany, the sovereign authority of the people is 
represented through the lower house of the German parliament, the Bundestag. As the 
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central and “the only directly democratically legitimated representative body” in the 
German system, the Bundestag has a special role in ensuring that “state power is 
actually based on the people’s recognition and approval.”621 One of the main puzzles in 
the relationship between the BVerfG and German democracy is that while its decisions 
in the European Parliament (EP) electoral threshold cases
622
 highlighted the importance 
of electoral equality, popular sovereignty and democracy, each of these opinions was 
also highly assertive of the Court’s power vis-à-vis the German Parliament and federal 
government. The Court’s decisions striking down the 5 percent and, then, 3 percent 
thresholds for EP elections in 2011 and 2014, respectively, scaled back aspects of the 
militant democracy, and restored the voting rights of those voting for smaller parties, 
even while overruling the elected representatives of the German people in the 
Bundestag. Given both the crucial role of parties in the German political system as 
organs of state “in the formation of the political will of the people”623 and the enduring 
memory of the fate of the Weimar Republic, any change to these thresholds, even at the 
EU Parliament level, remains contentious. As much as these decisions were criticised 
by politicians in Berlin, the larger complaint about the Court from constitutional 
scholars and even some of its former justices is the increasingly inconsistent reasoning 
by which it has reached some of its decisions.  
The European Parliament electoral threshold cases that have reached the Court 
highlight a number of specific problems related to these cases and broader problems 
with the Court’s methodology over several decades. Firstly, the extent to which the 
Court’s emphasis on material conditions at the time “Verhältnisse” may have made it 
overly responsive to a changing context and the forces of renewal, and insufficiently 
attentive to the Basic Law, its past case law, and its own reasoning in that case law. 
Secondly, the cases illustrate a development in the Court’s jurisprudence from the early 
days of the Federal Republic from an emphasis on stability to almost a reverence for 
renewal. In other words, the Court has become too ‘renewal’ focused and not placed 
enough emphasis on stability, both of the political system, and its own consistency. 
Third, that this emphasis on the changing context has made the Court too reliant on a 
living instrument means of interpretation that many judges in the ordinary German 
courts find troubling. Fourth, that the cases illustrate a broader tendency of the justices 
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on the court over decades, who have, notes Collings, “seemed to do more as the country 
has needed them less”624. While the BVerfG has been, and remains, an impressive and 
essential institution at the heart of Germany’s constitutional order, one question is 
whether the increasingly tenuous relationship between its decisions and the Basic Law 
poses risks to the Court’s position and standing with German citizens? 
Some comparison with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is also worthy of 
note. In rejecting any claim to a timeless validity in constitutional meaning with respect 
to the fundamental value of human dignity, the BVerfG has more clearly adopted a 
living constitution approach to constitutional interpretation. This approach, as will be 
shown, is quite common to modern constitutional courts.
625
 The criticism, however, of 
the BVerfG from a number of German constitutional scholars, some of its former 
justices, and a former judge of the European Court of Justice, is that the living 
instrument approach has been taken to such extremes by the Court that it is often 
difficult to make sense of its reasoning. 
As with the decision-making of the Supreme Court seen in the U.S. 
reapportionment cases which recognised the evolving conception of equality in society 
and American history, so the BVerfG’s decision to strike down the 5 percent, then 3 
percent, Sperrklauseln for European Parliament elections evidences a shifting balance 
away from the militant democracy and managing threats to stability, and towards a 
greater realisation of the value of equality and human dignity in the Basic Law’s 
fundamental rights section. One interpretation could be that the BVerfG is edging 
towards, at least at the EP level, a normalisation of German identity, meaning that 
German citizens voting for fringe parties no longer have to be disenfranchised to protect 
the political system.  
Are these developments the result of a change in the threats that the Court 
perceives to the free democratic basic order—that is to say a change in actual 
“conditions” [Verhältnisse] as it put it in the European Parliament II Case626—, are 
they merely the result of the Court re-formulating its decision according to a changing 
conception of equality, or does the Court’s willingness to reimagine constitutional 
principles suggest it is also reimagining its own constitutional and political role?  
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The shift towards constitutional case law in Germany and away from legal 
positivism is indicative of the effect that the BVerfG has wrought on the country’s legal 
order since it began hearing cases in 1951. That effect reflects a shift within from the 
traditional German legal concept of Begriffsjurisprudenz reflecting the scientific, 
systematic analysis of law associated with legal positivism, to a less methodologically 
consistent and more politically aware style of decision-making by the BVerfG.
627
 The 
important place given to law and the Karlsruhe justices in determining whether statutes, 
the actions of the state, and the judicial decisions of the ordinary courts conform with 
the Basic Law has led the BVerfG inexorably into areas of political and social policy. 
One of the reasons for this, which will be examined in Section 7.7, is that some of the 
Court’s most contentious decisions do not actually settle an issue in a way that decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court are accepted as settled even when people disagree over them. 
As will also be shown, though, this indeterminacy also allows for the possibility of the 
Court changing course.   
Bernhard Schlink’s criticism of the Court as a respected German legal scholar, 
and constitutional court judge of the federal state of Nord-Rhein Westfalen was 
significant.
628
 However, it is also important to state that his critique came during the 
most difficult period in the Court’s history. After a series of high profile and 
controversial cases dealing with free speech and freedom of religion, the BVerfG’s 
normally high favourability ratings sank dramatically with the German public. Writing 
in 1994, Schlink argues that the Court’s jurisprudence has simply allowed the losers in 
the legislative sphere to get their policies enacted by submitting to the rule of 
Karlsruhe.
629
 One aspect of this is the abstract review process where recognised organs 
of state, including parliamentary groups of sufficient size, can challenge political 
decisions that go against them by appealing to the justices in Karlsruhe. In this way, the 
parliamentary opposition defeated in the Bundestag, or the state (Land) that sees a 
decision go against it in the Federal Council (Bundesrat) is “given a new chance to 
challenge the winning majority and to continue to debate their differences of 
opinion.”630  
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Schlink has suggested, the methodological consistency of the rulings of the 
BVerfG has been found wanting as it increasingly intervenes judicially in areas of social 
and political life based on its feel for what decision might best fit the rubric of society. 
There are risks here if the Court is calibrating the correctness of its decisions less 
against the fundamental precepts of the Basic Law and more against what Schlink calls 
its “feel for what is indicated by social and political life—for what is accepted and ‘fits’ 
into the social and political landscape.”631 If the Court has simply become another actor 
in Germany’s political firmament the concern would be that it is endangering not only 
its position as one of the country’s most respected institutions, but the respect Germans 
have for law itself.  
Moreover, as Collings notes, the Court “cites itself far more often than it cites 
the constitution”632 which raises concerns about whether German constitutionalism is 
metamorphosing as a result of developing understandings of the Basic Law or the 
Court’s own enormous case law. The threshold between where constitutional 
understandings end and the BVerfG’s repetition of its own case law begins is 
increasingly hard to define. One example is the rule of optimization for basic rights, 
which when subjected to the Court’s balancing exercise makes basic rights more of a 
lottery than a constitutional guarantee. 
The ‘rule of optimization’―as much individual freedom as can be 
realised in accordance with what is legally and actually 
possible―is such an open-ended concept that it can justify any 
state intrusions upon freedoms. Although the BVerfG does not 
actually permit every state intrusion, its decision to confirm or 
reject a particular intrusion may often come as a surprise, pleasant 
or unpleasant, depending upon one’s point of view. 633 
Thus, even under the tightly defined structures of the Basic Law, the interpretive 
methodology of the BVerfG is something of a moving target. The perception that 
judicial decisions are being made in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner is a 
particular damaging one for the credibility of any court.
634
 Decision-making which 
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jettisons the Court’s own long-standing case law and actual circumstances in favour of a 
“feel”635 for preferred or popular outcomes risks undermining the stability which has 
underpinned the success of post-war German constitutionalism.  
7.2 Electoral Thresholds: The Lessons of Weimar 
Although the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s power to ban political parties that 
threaten the free democratic basic order is its most high profile weapon, it is the 
statutory 5 percent threshold for electoral success (or Sperrklausel)
 636
 which is the most 
counter-majoritarian element of Germany’s democracy. Only political parties that gain 
5 percent of the national vote or more will get seats in the Bundestag, while those voting 
for parties that fail to reach the 5 percent threshold see their vote wasted. Since the 
founding of the Federal Republic, the high democratic cost of the Sperrklausel has been 
seen in the FRG as a price worth paying to avoid the fate of the Weimar Republic.  
 It is reasonable, of course, to compare the effective nullification of the votes of 
German citizens who choose parties garnering less than 5 percent of the vote with the 
devaluation of the votes of urban residents in the U.S. due to malapportionment. Both 
involve the disenfranchisement of certain citizens, but while the devaluation of the votes 
of urban residents happened for arbitrary reasons to maintain the unconstitutional hold 
on power of rural representatives, the effective nullification of the votes of German 
citizens who vote for certain parties is justified, according to the BVerfG and statutes, in 
order to preserve the legislature’s ability to function.637  
The Court’s decisions need to be seen against the backdrop of the stability 
versus renewal paradigm seen in earlier chapters, where the Court has often tried to 
balance the need of a German parliament capable of functioning against the oligarchical 
inclinations among established parties to prevent new entrants into the process. 
Although a statutory rather than constitutional provision, electoral thresholds 
(Sperrklauseln) have often been seen by the Court as necessary to prevent the type of 
fragmentation that proved so damaging during Weimar. The Court’s decisions to strike 
down these Sperrklauseln at the EP level were highly contentious since they did away 
with an important statutory power of the Bundestag to control the effectiveness of the 
European Parliament. While the 5 percent threshold remains in place for Bundestag 
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elections, some question whether the EP decisions may signal a reappraisal of even this 
semi-sacred barring clause which has been in existence since the foundation of the FRG. 
Minimum thresholds for electoral success (Sperrklauseln) have been part of the 
architecture of the German constitutionalism since the Basic Law was established. The 
introduction of electoral thresholds in electoral laws in the 1950s can only be 
understood against the background of the development and ultimate collapse of the 
Weimar Republic.
638
 Wenner notes that the fact that “the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic was also due to the fragmentation of the party system […] is often seen as 
confirmation of the ‘Weimar experience’ and an argument―also accepted by the 
BVerfG―for the necessity of a restriction on electoral equality.”639 
The inability of the Weimar parliament to function due to the fragmentation 
effect of smaller parties resulted in government’s increasing reliance on executive 
institutions and channels, which were often supplemented by unofficial networks 
parallel to the state apparatus. It was into these well-oiled executive mechanisms that 
Hitler gratefully stepped in 1933. Thus, Germany's founders in 1949 well understood 
from Weimar how dangerous power vacuums could be and as a consequence the 
constructive vote of no confidence was enshrined in the Basic Law to ensure that no 
federal chancellor could be removed without the election of a replacement. During 
Weimar, the Parliament’s inability to agree on replacement chancellors was made more 
acute by the plethora of small parties which prevented an agreement among more 
moderate parties taking shape. The lesson that democracy needed to be credible even at 
the risk of sacrificing a little democracy to the demands of a stable process was one the 
German founders took to heart.  
The experience of Weimar and the 1930s demonstrated that aspirational rights 
provisions were meaningless if the constitutional order which guaranteed them was 
overthrown through democratic mechanisms. This was the paradox of the constituent 
moment which created the Basic Law where preserving democracy meant limiting 
democracy, and preserving the individual rights of the people meant limiting the power 
of the people. Since political disunity was seen as one of the major flaws that crippled 
the Weimar Republic, the question for the German framers became how to ensure an 
electoral system that would be both representative and promote political unity. The rule 
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that parties should achieve a minimum threshold of electoral success in order to enter 
the Bundestag has been a feature of the German electoral system since 1949 and by 
1952 a 5 percent rule had been adopted at almost every level of the federal 
government.
640
 Many of the parliaments of the German states also prescribed electoral 
hurdles, so the principle of electing a parliament capable of functioning preceded the 
Basic Law.
641
  
Nevertheless, at the Parliamentary Council which drafted the Basic Law, there 
was disagreement over the part played by smaller parties in the demise of Weimar. 
Some representatives of smaller parties were strongly against the proposal for a 5 
percent electoral hurdle which they saw as an effort to permanently stabilise the position 
of the larger parties.
642
 Some representatives “clearly saw the danger that the dynamism 
of political life could be considerably restricted” by an electoral hurdle and that “a 
young, powerful movement that bursts forth among the people and tries to rectify the 
misgovernment of larger parties” would be brought to a halt by the constitution.643 Of 
course, the smaller parties had a point, which is why the debate over electoral hurdles 
has never gone away. However, in 1948 when this debate was taking place, the majority 
of delegates had seen quite enough of young powerful movements that burst forth from 
the people. 
When judging the constitutionality of barring clauses―which “justify 
distinctions between votes”―the legislature’s ability to function stands out as a 
fundamental criterion in the context of the history of the Basic Law and the BVerfG’s 
jurisprudence.
644
 In Weimar, as stated, the fragmentation of the Reichstag due to the 
plethora of smaller parties brought the legislature to a standstill and democracy into 
disrepute, with inevitable and terrible consequences. The rise of right-wing populist 
politicians in liberal democracies who have capitalised on both political dysfunction and 
liberal values underline the importance of constitutionalism in striking a balance 
between preserving the viability and functionality of legislatures on the one hand and 
upholding the importance of principles of equal suffrage on the other.  
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While members of the Court and German public figures have perhaps rightly 
chastised the established political parties for creating a sense of ossification within the 
system, the maintenance of the 5 percent threshold at the EU level does not seem to fit 
into this category. Rather it seems a reasonable measure to ensure that the only 
institution to be democratically elected by all EU citizens is able to function. 14 EU 
states currently have electoral thresholds for EP elections. The argument is sometimes 
made by those opposing the hurdle that many far right parties such as the Front National 
in France clear the threshold easily and so it chiefly serves to exclude smaller, esoteric 
and generally non extremist parties such as (in Germany) the Animal Protection Party 
(Tierschutzpartei) and the Pirate Party (Piraten), to name just a couple. The risk, 
however, is that too many such small parties can prevent the mainstream parties from 
forming a governing coalition and it is the extremist parties that capitalise on that 
situation. 
Decisions which seek to strike the right balance between the requirements of the 
militant democracy and ensuring the election of a parliament which reflects the party 
choices made by the electorate are always likely to attract criticism from some quarter, 
particularly from supporters of parties losing out. The main route for political parties 
and citizens challenging rules such as the 5 percent threshold is the constitutional 
complaint mechanism, allowing them to file a petition with the BVerfG when they 
consider one of their constitutional rights has been interfered with. Apart from 
providing the means by which the electoral threshold for EP elections was ruled 
unconstitutional, the mechanism for constitutional complaints (or 
Verfassungsbeschwerden) has played a hugely important role in establishing a 
democratic constitutional culture in Germany. It will now be considered.  
7.3 Constitutional Complaints 
The creation of a reliable constitutional culture in Germany has been seen as an 
important adjunct to the structural safeguards in the Basic Law. It might also be the 
case, however, that elements of the structure of the constitution have contributed to the 
forging of a constitutional culture. The ability of German citizens, and political and state 
actors to file constitutional complaints with the BVerfG represents an interesting 
German variation on separation of powers principles. Within Germany’s constitutional 
system, the Basic Law confers independent rights on five institutions: the federal 
government (chancellor and cabinet), president, Bundestag (lower house of parliament), 
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Bundesrat (upper house of parliament), and Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal 
Constitutional Court), and are the Federal Republic’s highest constitutional organs.645 
The Constitutional Court is primus inter pares among these organs, writes Kommers, 
because “it has the authority to define the others’ institutional rights and duties when 
resolving conflicts between them.”646 Where conflicts do occur, such as between 
individual political parties, or between political parties and the Bundestag, they can 
become the subject of Organstreit proceedings before the BVerfG. Constitutional 
scholars tend to see separation of powers in terms of a “creative tension” between the 
Parliament and federal government, a view, says Kommers, that is anchored in the 
Basic Law itself.
647
  
Verfassungsbeschwerden (Constitutional Complaints) 
The Basic Law allows “any person alleging that one of his basic rights […] has 
been infringed by public authority”648 to file a complaint directly with the Court. 
Although originally existing only as a statutory privilege to petition the Court, the 
popularity of this direct route to the Court led the German parliament to amend the 
Basic Law making the right of petition a constitutional and not just statutory right. By 
1970 the Court had received over 21,000 constitutional complaints, representing 96 
percent of its caseload.
649
 In 2015, the BVerfG received 5,739 constitutional complaints, 
representing 97 percent of its caseload.
650
 Between 1951, when it began hearing cases, 
and 2001 the Court heard 135,000 constitutional complaints, 96 percent of which came 
from private citizens.
651
 The right to petition the Court which is now a constitutional 
right is significant in two ways. Firstly, the popularity of this complaints procedure 
among ordinary Germans seems indicative of a German public which, to paraphrase 
Ronald Dworkin, take their rights seriously, seeing in the BVerfG a body which is 
worthy of respect. As Rinken notes, “by protecting his/her basic rights and enforcing 
his/her interests, the citizen is also fighting for the realisation of the fundamental 
principles of the constitution.”652 Perhaps just as significant is that in the the post-1949 
period the right to petition was viewed by the Court “as an important means of 
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instructing Germans in the ways of the Constitution and alerting them to their 
constitutional rights and responsibilities.”653 Nonetheless, the chances of a constitutional 
complaint succeeding in Karlsruhe are quite remote. Of the 117,528 complaints 
submitted between 1951 and 1998, only 3000 were upheld (2.62 percent).
654
 Insofar as 
German citizens have embraced the notion of constitutional petition to the BVerfG and 
view the Karlsruhe court in positive terms it might be suggested that a constitutional 
culture of sorts has taken hold in Germany.  
Organstreitverfahren (Organ of State Law Suits) 
The jurisprudence of the Basic Law rests principally on the theory that 
separation of powers in modern parliamentary democracies “manifests itself most 
effectively not in the checks and balances among branches of government but in the 
duty of opposition parties to confront and publicize the misdeeds of the ruling 
majority.”655 The Christian Democrats (CDU), which led German governments until the 
late 1960s had hoped that there would be strong ties between the federal government 
and the BVerfG; the Social Democrats (SPD) hoped the Court would serve as an 
instrument of opposition.
656
 Ultimately it was the SPD hope that was realised. The 
Court’s repeated affirmation of the “constitutional legitimacy and democratic necessity 
of parliamentary opposition” has, Collings observes, proved to be “one of the early 
Court’s greatest contributions to the democratisation of West German politics.”657 The 
Weltanschauung of the Basic Law, as enunciated by Karlsruhe, is that opposition forces 
need the support of law in order to subject state authority to proper scrutiny, and rests 
on the assumption that without the enforcement of institutional rules, mechanisms and 
hurdles, there would be no impediments to the abuse of power. Where such rules and 
safeguards are solely enforced and applied by the political branches―as seen with the 
U.S. malapportionment issue―political parties and disenfranchised or disempowered 
groups are left with few, if any, remedies available to them within the parameters of the 
political system itself. Taking the fight against malapportionment into the federal court 
system was seen (at the time) as an extraordinary step, whereas under the Basic Law, 
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political actors or individuals going to Karlsruhe to get redress when rules have been 
broken or rights violated is seen as axiomatic.  
One condition for realising the values of the Verfassungsstaat is that there is a 
vibrant system of political opposition, which the Court has enunciated in a number of 
Organstreit proceedings, which are cases involving disputes between different organs of 
the state. Political parties are also recognised as organs of state in the Basic Law, as they 
are seen as crucial in the “formation of the political will of the people”658. Roman 
Herzog, the former BVerfG president (and president of Germany), credits the party 
system for its stabilising effect on the state created by the Basic Law, at least over the 
first forty years of the Federal Republic.
659
 Yet as we will see in Section 7.5, through its 
decisions regarding the 5 percent electoral threshold (Sperrklausel) at the EU and 
domestic level―which arose out of constitutional complaints filed by German citizens 
and German political parties―the Court has been controversially prepared to inject new 
life into the party system where it perceives no threats to stability.  
 Political organs of the state (including parties) will file Organstreit complaints 
with the Bundesverfassungsgericht when, for example, they feel that the majority 
parties have attempted to deny them reasonable representation in parliamentary 
committees, or have otherwise sought to use their majority position to subvert principles 
found in the Basic Law. This interesting utilisation of the Court as an ally by German 
political parties illustrates how Germany evinces a more nuanced picture of 
constitutionalism than a simple conflict between judicial and political channels.
 660
  
German political parties are only too eager to file an Organstreit complaint with 
the BVerfG, such as the Green Party did in the 1980s when it was excluded on national 
security grounds from the committee that controlled the German secret service.
661
 From 
the rough and tumble perspective of politics in the U.K. or the U.S., it may seem strange 
and even problematic for the health of political debate when politicians run to Karlsruhe 
every time a political decision goes against them. However, according to the Basic Law, 
members of the Bundestag are “representatives of the whole people, not bound by 
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orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience.”662 Thus, if the rights of 
parties in the Bundestag are not respected, then the implications are that the people’s 
rights are not being respected either. Through its interactions with other organs of state 
in order to resolve tensions and questions of constitutional interpretation the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht is actively involved in preserving the representative character 
of German democracy, while also seeking to ensure that minority and opposition parties 
in the Bundestag are afforded their parliamentary rights.  
Compared with the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court which 
restricts the way that cases can come before it, there are far more avenues by which 
cases and questions can come before the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Organstreit 
proceedings are a form of abstract judicial review, and can originate from the 
government, from members of the German parliament (the Bundestag), or from political 
parties, which are specially recognised in the Basic Law as the vehicles by which the 
popular sovereignty of the people is manifested. Since Organstreit proceedings can be 
initiated at the request of political parties or other parts of the government this means 
there are also more avenues for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to intervene in the 
political process. Nowhere has this been more apparent than the Court’s involvement in 
shaking up the Germany party system. 
7.4 Shaking up the Party System 
 Existing in a strange tension within the value system of the Basic Law is, on the 
one hand, the ‘über-Prinzip’ of the free democratic basic order and, on the other, the 
principle of representative government. The latter is intended to dilute and limit the 
vagaries and extremities of popular will, firstly, through a system of proportional 
representation and, secondly, through the exclusion from the German parliament of 
parties that fail to break through the 5 percent threshold. For decades, this adherence to 
the militant democracy and the inability of any smaller parties to jump over the hurdle 
meant that party politics in West Germany was limited to a duopoly: the Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats.
663
  
As discussed briefly in the previous section, the role of political parties is 
prescribed in the Basic Law, making them organs of state responsible for the “formation 
of the political will of the people”. During the 67 years of the Basic Law’s existence, the 
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BVerfG has played an important role in safeguarding the stability of the party system 
and slowly integrating newer parties into the constitutional order. With its decisions in 
the European Parliament electoral threshold cases, however, the Court has demonstrated 
a distinct preference for renewal over stability.   
The de facto two-party system created by the Basic Law remained in place until 
the emergence of the Green Party in the 1980s. There were, of course, good historical 
reasons for wanting to keep the German people's wishes more tightly circumscribed,
664
 
but as German politics and society stabilized into predictability, so came the risk of 
political and societal ossification. While the rights that strengthened the free democratic 
basic order and free speech were prioritised,
665
 the militant democracy principle tended 
to be resistant to new political forces and parties. As one of the most prominent justices 
in the Court’s history, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, complained about the oligarchical 
tendency in Germany’s established parties666, even as federal president Richard von 
Weizsäcker criticised them for their ossification and lack of creativity.
667
 The Court is 
itself, however, a product of Germany’s party system, given that half of its justices are 
appointed by the lower house of the German parliament (the Bundestag) and half by the 
upper house representing the German states (the Bundesrat). However, the Green Party 
finally managed to break through the 5 percent threshold in 1983 and, following 
reunification, the East German left party managed to do the same in 1998.
668
 Over 
decades the Court handed down an unambiguous line of jurisprudence that the 5 percent 
hurdle promoted political unity
669
, one of the chief goals of the stability minded German 
framers following the demise of Weimar. Although the rise of the Green Party changed 
the configurational complexity of German party politics, it did not affect the overall pre-
eminence of the SPD and CDU in coalition building.  
The Court’s role in breathing new life into Germany’s rather grey democracy 
can be seen in the example of the Green Party who went from pariahs in the 
1970s―when they were seen as a threat to stability due to the presence of communists 
in their ranks―to becoming part of Gerhard Schroeder’s government in 1998 with its 
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former leader Joscha Fischer becoming foreign minister and vice-chancellor.
670
 During 
the 1980s the Greens were excluded from a parliamentary committee handling the 
German Secret Service on security grounds.
671
 However, their journey from pariahs to 
the establishment was completed in January 2001 when Brun-Otto Bryde became the 
first justice appointed to the BVerfG on the Greens’ recommendation.672 Collings notes 
that the Greens’ “engagement and occasional victories in Karlsruhe played an important 
role in the party’s trajectory towards the constitutional and political mainstream.”673 It is 
therefore, “a telling example both of the Court’s role in integrating the country’s 
political forces and of its related effect of taming the country’s political process.”674  
Overall, the Court’s involvement in the integration of the Greens into the 
political system has illustrated that it has often had a better awareness of the changing 
social context than the political branches or established parties. This awareness has not 
always come swiftly, as decisions that went against the Greens indicated. However, 
even then, the powerful dissent of Justice Böckenförde
675
 seemingly laid the conditions 
for future victories for the Greens in Karlsruhe. In his dissent against the Greens’ 
exclusion from the Bundestag’s Secret Service committee on arbitrary grounds, 
Böckenförde argued that it is the  
general participation in the formation of the political will of 
Parliament―a process emanating from general intellectual and 
political discussion and argumentation―that legitimates the 
inherent right of a parliamentary majority to decide issues of 
public policy. One process cannot be separated from the other.[…] 
The principle of complete participation of all―including 
individuals and parliamentary parties―is not merely an axiom but 
is also an inalienable principle of a representative parliamentary 
democracy.
676
 
Böckenförde’s dissent in the Green Party Exclusion case (above) helps explain, I think, 
why Geck saw the Court has being so instrumental to the development of democratic 
understanding in post-war Germany.
677
 Six months after the Greens lost in the 
Exclusion Case, they won a victory in Karlsruhe when the Court struck down a 
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provision in a tax statute affecting political parties. Böckenförde wrote a separate 
opinion noting that he would have gone further to protect small parties like the Greens, 
writing that legislation that bolsters the “oligarchical” and “careerist” elements of the 
established parties erodes Parliament’s representative character.678 The Court sees its 
role in helping the political opposition in the Bundestag as an important one, both to 
ensure that state power is held to account and thus to ensure the representative rights of 
all German citizens are fulfilled by ensuring that the parliamentary majority meets its 
obligations.  
The Court may well have seen the European Parliament Cases in the same 
context as those from the 1980s onwards in which it supported the Greens in their 
battles with the established parties. In other words, the EP cases of 2011 and 2014, like 
the Greens’ struggles, were also constitutional battles by smaller parties against the 
established ones. However, Germany’s political position has changed in Europe since 
the 1980s and there are more significant threats to stability than those in 1979 when the 
Court last addressed the question of the electoral threshold at the EP level. The 
European Parliament of 1979 was a much weaker institution than in 2016, yet the Court 
upheld the 5 percent threshold despite it mattering far less than today whether the 
Parliament could function or not. Today, Germany is pivotal to the success of European 
integration and the EU, yet for all the Court’s references in EPII Case and EPIII Case to 
the importance of changing its reasoning if the context changes, their decisions to strike 
down the electoral thresholds seemed to ignore the much greater threats to stability 
which have existed in recent years.  
Things began to change ahead of the 2005 German federal election when the 
Democratic Socialist Party (PDS), the post-reunification successor to the (ruling) East 
German Socialist Unity Party, formed an alliance with disaffected elements of 
Schroeder’s SPD. The new Linke Partei (Left Party) represented a significant new 
political force, polling more than the Greens in the 2005 election. The sudden presence 
of new parties on the political scene was a challenge to the established dominance of the 
CDU and the SPD, but it also posed challenges to the Constitutional Court. The Left 
Party was already comfortably above the 5 percent threshold after 2005, but the new 
party political landscape appears to have induced the BVerfG to reconsider long 
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established justifications for keeping the rule in place at the European Parliament level. 
It is to this question that we now turn. 
7.5 The European Parliament Cases  
7.5.1 Case Overview – European Parliament II and III Cases 
In its decision in 1979 the Bundesverfassungsgericht had held that the 5 
percent threshold was valid for European Parliament elections. Following 
Organstreit (organ of state) proceedings and constitutional complaints the Court 
revisited the constitutionality of the barring clauses (Sperrklauseln) again in 
2011. By a bare 5-3 majority in EPII the Court ruled that the 5 percent electoral 
threshold was unconstitutional. In response, the Bundestag passed a revised 
statute authorising a 3 percent threshold for European Parliament elections. EPIII 
arose from a combination of Organstreit proceedings and individual 
constitutional complaints from voters. There was no automatic presumption on 
the BVerfG’s part that the 3 percent threshold would be unconstitutional as its 
effects might be different; therefore, a separate substantive assessment was 
required.679 In its 2014 decision, the Court struck down the 3 percent threshold 
as well, again with a 5-3 majority despite a change in some of the justices in the 
interim. One of the key questions raised by the EP case decisions was whether it 
was just a matter of time before the Court struck down the 5 percent threshold 
for Bundestag elections.  
*** 
Since the BVerfG electoral threshold decisions in 2011 and 2014, anti-EU and 
far right parties have continued to perform increasingly well across Europe, particularly 
in the EU Parliament elections of 2014. There are numerous critiques of the Court’s 
decisions on their methodological grounds―i.e. that they ignore its previous case law or 
are based on questionable assumptions. Both of these criticisms are addressed below. 
However, the larger problem with the Court’s decisions, it seems, is that they are based 
on the premise that when the conditions that justify the Sperrklausel change, the 
decision should be reassessed. This would be reasonable but for the fact that the change 
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in conditions―that is to say, the increase in the powers of the European Parliament, and 
the greater threat of right-ring parties since its previous decision in 1979―has changed. 
However, that change was in a direction which according to the logic of the Court’s 
previous decisions―which emphasised the need to maintain stability and preserve the 
ability of a legislature to function―would have suggested there was even more cause to 
maintain the electoral hurdle, not strike them down. In this section and the next, I will 
assess the decisions and the dissents in the EP cases, and the criticisms from 
commentators and even a former president of the Court, and ask whether a decision 
which restores the important principle of electoral equality―or ‘one man one vote’680, 
as a German commentator wrote―fits the model of German constitutionalism advanced 
thus far if it threatens stability and when its rationale seems arbitrary and opaque.  
In the European Parliament II case of 2011, the Court further demonstrated its 
willingness to jettison long-standing aspects of its jurisprudence in response to a 
perceived change in circumstances.  
A barring clause once perceived as permissible may not, in 
consequence, be regarded as constitutional in perpetuity. Rather, a 
different constitutional judgement may arise if circumstances 
materially change. If the electoral lawmaker finds him or herself in 
changed conditions in this sense, so he or she must take them into 
account. Only the current circumstances are relevant to the 
question of further retention of the barring clause.
681  
The decision to hold the 5 percent electoral threshold as unconstitutional took many 
commentators of German constitutional law by surprise. As Strohmeier noted: 
Even though changes in the case law of the BVerfG, especially in 
the area of electoral law, are by now less the exception and rather 
more the rule, this turnaround is especially surprising.
682
 
Although less direct than Schlink’s critique of the Court, Strohmeier’s remarks are 
suggestive of the less methodologically consistent style of decision-making from the 
Court that Schlink critiqued. Such surprises cut against the grain of what we imagine the 
purpose of constitutionalism to be about―to reduce uncertainty.683 A decision 
                                                          
680
 See infra note 706. 
681
 European Parliament II Case  
682
 Gerd Strohmeier, 'Funktioniert Weimar Auf EU-Ebene? Reflektionen Zur Europawahl 2014 Ohne 
Sperrklausel', ZfP Zeitschrift für Politik, 61, (2014), 352. My translation from “Auch wenn 
Rechtsprechungsänderungen des BVerfG, gerade im Bereich des Wahlrechts, mittlerweile weniger die 
Ausnahme, sonder vielmehr die Regel darstellen, überrascht diese Kehrtwende in besonderer Weise.” 
683
 See for example Kay, pp. 22-27. 
205 
 
expanding the scope of equality which might be seen by many public commentators as 
progressive and positive becomes more disconcerting if it has been arrived at through a 
process that seems arbitrary or has been based on questionable assumptions. Both of 
these complaints seem relevant to the Court’s 2011 and 2014 EP decisions.   
 Aside from such a significant change in the Court’s case law being based on a 
bare (5-3) majority of the Court, also highlighted was the effect that abolishing the 5 
percent hurdle would have on the ability of the EP to form a majority on certain issues. 
Contrary to the logic behind the BVerfG ruling, the existing fragmentation of the EP is 
already very high, and a majority of the members can often only be achieved through 
cooperation of both of the largest parliamentary groupings.
684
 The ghosts of Weimar 
continue to animate debates over the necessity of particular features of the militant 
democracy, perhaps none more so than the capacity of a parliament to function, and the 
political consequences when it is unable to.  
In the Bundestag, one member of the CDU argued that without the 5 percent 
hurdle, the 13 or 14 parties which would then come from Germany would be those 
which  
neither belong to the party families, which could join together with 
political groups in the European Parliament, nor be integrated 
within them. In this respect, without the barring clause, we would 
produce a number of non-attached parliamentarians who could 
significantly endanger the institution’s increasingly important 
function of cooperation.
685
  
The criticism of the decision, then, is that in contrast to when the Court last looked at 
this question in 1979 and upheld the 5 percent hurdle, the direction of travel has been 
towards a more powerful EU parliament where its ability to function matters far more 
now than it did for the weaker parliament of the late 1970s.  
In its ruling striking down the three percent threshold for European elections, the 
key words in the decision—repeated 37 times each—were ‘Wahlrechtsgleichheit’ 
(‘electoral equality’) and ‘Chancengleichheit’ (‘equal opportunity’); the broader context 
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in which the Court invoked these principles—repeated 5 times—was “die Grundsätze 
der Wahlrechtsgleichheit und Chancengleichheit der politischen Parteien” (the 
fundamental principles of electoral equality and equal opportunities among political 
parties). According to one commentator, the main principle enunciated in the Court’s 
opinion was nothing less than “the fundamental idea of democracy itself – one man, one 
vote.”686  
In justifying its decision in EPIII, the majority opinion argued that electoral law 
was subject to a high standard of constitutional review.  
The design of electoral law is subject to strict constitutional 
review. This follows from the general consideration that, in a way, 
the parliamentary majority acts in its own interest with regulations 
that affect the conditions of political competition, and that the risk 
that the respective parliamentary majority is guided by the aim to 
preserve its power, instead of considerations of the common good, 
is especially high in electoral law..
687
  
The reference to the ‘common good’ reflects both its Aristotelian polis conception of 
the Basic Law, and the already stated commitment of the Court to maintain a vibrant 
political opposition. 
The Court then argued that while a threshold could be justified “for the election 
and continued support of a viable government,” such an aspiration at the EP level is 
“still in its infancy”.688 In other words, the lack of a government attached to the 
European Parliament meant, the Court implied, that the Parliament could tolerate a level 
of party fragmentation which would be unacceptable in the Bundestag: 
An actual impact on the European Parliament's ability to function 
is currently not foreseeable, which means that there is no basis for 
the legislature's prognosis that, without the three-percent electoral 
threshold, an impairment of the European Parliament's functioning 
is looming.
689  
The dissent by Justice Mueller in EPIII sees the Court as having replaced the 
judgment of the legislature with its own: 
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It is not for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to replace the reasonable 
decision of the legislature with its own reasonable decision. 
Ultimately, the Senate's decision leads to accepting the risk of an 
impairment of the European Parliament's functioning for the 
duration of at least one election period. I cannot perceive this as a 
constitutional requirement. The impairment of the European 
Parliament's ability to function is sufficiently important to justify 
an interference with the principles of electoral equality and equal 
opportunities of political parties.
690
  
The difference in emphasis between on the one hand, the majority opinion, and on the 
other, the dissenting opinion and the views of the federal government hinges on the 
word ‘foreseeable’. For the majority opinion, the lack of a foreseeable threat to stability 
meant that the high cost of interfering with the democratic will of the people through an 
electoral threshold was unjustified. Yet it was the unforeseeable implications of 
removing the threshold on the ability of the European Parliament to function which 
dismayed the dissenting justices, the federal government, and EU officials.
691
 Equally 
perplexing were the Court’s prognostications (below) in EPIII regarding how the 
decisions might affect voter behaviour. By any standard of evaluating judicial decisions, 
this seems speculative.  
It is also possible that clearer political differences between the 
individual parliamentary groups will increase their internal 
cohesion. In addition, a changed perception of the European 
Parliament, resulting from raising the party-specific profiles more 
strongly, might induce voters more than previously to vote 
strategically and thus counteract an increase in the number of 
parties represented in the European Parliament.
692
    
The critique of the Court, then, is that it has substituted its highly speculative judgments 
and knowledge for that of the Bundestag with regard to the workings of the European 
Parliament, while accepting the risk of smaller parties frustrating the formation of a 
functional majority.  
One particular criticism of the Court’s decision to strike down the 5 percent 
threshold in European Parliament II Case (2011) is that its justification for the decision 
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painted a picture of the EP not as it was in 2011 but as it was in 1979.
693
 What was 
peculiar, according to Strohmeier, was that the significant expansion of the EP’s powers 
and competencies since the BVerfG upheld the 5 percent threshold in 1979 logically 
pointed in completely the opposite direction to its 2011 decision striking it down.
694
 The 
Court’s argument was that the EU Parliament did not have a government attached to it 
and, thus, it was less dependent on the formation of a stable majority to function. 
However, as Strohmeier notes, that logic more accurately reflected the weakness of the 
EP in 1979 when the Court last decided the issue, but not the more powerful parliament 
of 2011. The whole point of Sperrklauseln is to allow a parliament to function by 
ensuring that splinter parties cannot get into Parliament and so bring the system to a halt. 
Thus, for Strohmeier, the 1979 decision upholding the Sperrklauseln better fitted the 
circumstances of today while the 2011 decision better reflected the conditions in1979.
695
  
 If the conditions which the Court highlighted to justify its decision actually 
suggest the opposite—as three dissenting justices also suggested—did the decision 
simply represent a misunderstanding on the part of the BVerfG of how the EP functions 
and democracy works at the EU level, or was there some other basis for it? The Court’s 
decision seems to speak less about the intricacies of how the EP functions and reaches 
decisions, and more about changing times and the impermissibility of restricting the 
principle of equal suffrage or equal opportunity between parties without good reason.  
 Two of the three dissenting justices criticised the decision of the Court’s Second 
Senate for accepting a “possible impairment of the European Parliament’s ability to 
function in spite of its increased political responsibility.”696 Directly addressing the point 
that circumstances supported the 5 percent threshold even more than in 1979, the 
dissenting justices noted, 1) that the majority on the Court had chosen to strike down the 
blocking clause despite the growth in the EP’s competences and its increasing political 
significance, suggesting even more justification for maintaining it than in 1979; 2) that 
the Court had taken the decision without explaining how the standards of assessment 
had changed since 1979.
697
 In its language striking down the 5 percent hurdle, the 
BVerfG has emphasised the heavy toll that barring clauses exact on popular sovereignty 
and the constitutional right of all Germans to participate in their representative 
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democracy. The apparent error in the Court holding that an impact on the Parliament’s 
ability to function was not “foreseeable” was illustrated only a couple of months later. 
7.6 Implications and Aftermath of the Decisions 
In the EU Parliament elections of 2014, eurosceptic parties doubled their 
representation compared to 2009.
698
 Apart from UKIP’s strong showing, France’s 
National Front won 24 out of 74 seats, making it the largest French party in the EP.
699
 
Seven German political parties from the left and right won one seat each in 2014 as a 
result of the BVerfG decisions in 2011 and 2014, including the first Neo-Nazi 
representative to come from Germany. Given these events, it is arguable that the 
BVerfG too cavalierly dismissed concerns over the impact that removing the 5 percent 
threshold would have on stability. Thus, instability and the absence of threats in the 
political environment preceding the abolition of the 5 percent and 3 percent thresholds 
might suddenly be manifested as a result of its removal. This instability might be both 
as a result of the destabilizing effects on the EP itself and on German domestic politics 
as more extreme parties are given a higher profile by the result.  
It was certainly the case that eurosceptic parties such as Alternativ für 
Deutschland praised the BVerfG decision, calling it “a good signal for democracy in 
Europe.”700 The Sperrklauseln decisions of 2011 and 2014 thus bring us back to the 
scholarly critiques of those decisions, of the Court’s role in German political life, and of 
the increasingly unpredictable manner in which it seems to be making decisions. One 
possible explanation may lie in the increasingly normative bent of German 
constitutional jurisprudence highlighted by Kommers: that Germans no longer see the 
Basic Law as “the simple expression of an existential order of power” but as 
“fundamentally a normative constitution embracing values, rights and duties.”701 In 
other words, that the Court is prioritising normative preferences over what the situation 
demands. The distinctly normative tenor of the Basic Law has been an important feature 
of German constitutionalism since 1949. Yet absent a reasonably consistent BVerfG 
methodology where deviations from its existing case law are convincingly justified, 
judicially created values may be a fickle orienting star in changing circumstances.  
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There are several critiques of the Court’s decision to strike down the 5 percent 
Sperrklausel for EP elections. First is that the decision did not sufficiently pay attention 
to the difficulties that could come from the splintering effect of many smaller parties 
entering the EP and preventing the formation of a majority within the EP.
702
 Second, is 
the actual threat to political stability in Germany that could arise due to the higher 
profile that extremist parties would gain through a seat in the EP. Third, was the due 
respect for separation of powers, and the legislative intent and greater knowledge of 
legislators regarding the possible effects of scrapping the Sperrklausel on the EP.
703
 On 
this point, two of the dissenting justices in European Parliament II Case noted:
704
 
Electoral-law issues are subject to the legislature's political 
freedom of drafting whose legislative duty imposes restraint on the 
Federal Constitutional Court with a view to the general nature of 
the electoral principles.
705
 
The concern with the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the European Parliament 
decisions, particularly that of 2014, which overturned the Bundestag’s considered 
legislative response to the 2011 decision, is that some of the justices are playing fast and 
loose with the stability of a supranational parliament on the basis of limited knowledge 
and questionable suppositions.  
Some have argued that the EPIII decision may open up the argument over 
whether to maintain the (previously sacrosanct) 5 percent hurdle for Bundestag 
elections. One Court observer noted that the BVerfG may well have boxed itself into a 
corner with respect to the EPIII decision, committing it to revisit the constitutionality of 
the electoral threshold at the domestic level.   
Either the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not really take the 
European Parliament seriously, regarding it as a lesser parliament 
(detractors would say ‘a talking shop’) for which efficiency is not 
so important; or the hurdle must be abolished for Bundestag 
elections sooner or later.
706
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Some writers like Maximilian Steinbeis argue more directly that the democratic cost of 
maintaining the 5 percent hurdle domestically has become too high.
707
 For Steinbeis, the 
results of the 2013 elections when, as he puts it, 15 percent of the total votes cast or 7 
million votes were thrown in the bin, creates a Bundestag that does not accurately 
reflect what Germany looks like politically.
708
 He believes that as well as simply 
balancing electoral equality against the ability of a parliament to function, the Court 
should also include the principle of Repräsentivität, and consider in its balancing 
exercise whether a parliament is a true reflection of a country’s political diversity.709 
Fourteen parties achieved between 0.1 percent of the vote and 4.7 percent of the vote 
and therefore failed to get a seat in parliament, but only four of these parties achieved 1 
percent or more.
710
 However, 15 percent of the vote split between 10 or more parties 
that get seats in the Bundestag, would seem precisely the type of Weimar-like situation 
that would dictate they be excluded. In other words, while there is undoubtedly an 
increased democratic cost the higher the percentage of votes goes to waste, that in itself 
would constitute an ever large proportion of the parliament being fragmented into ever 
smaller parts were the parties to get seats in the parliament.  
Kommers and Miller argue that the ‘stability’ imperative makes the domestic 5 
percent threshold safe for now. The Bundesverfassungsgericht remains convinced, they 
argue, that “whatever its cost in democratic terms, the five percent minimum threshold 
is still necessary to ensure Parliament’s stability and efficacy.”711 It is this different 
standard, though, that has so frustrated MEPs and the federal government in Berlin. In 
other words, that the BVerfG was using the EP as a guinea pig by allowing parties into it 
that it would not tolerate in the Bundestag, and without having to deal with the 
consequences. Indeed, Justice Mueller’s dissent about the impairment of the EP’s 
function raises this problem.
712
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The risk if the Court struck down the 5 percent hurdle domestically is that would 
make it harder for a majority to reach decisions, and would in itself likely prompt 
further referrals and constitutional complaints to Karlsruhe. The end result in such 
circumstances might then be a zombie parliament that cannot function, and an ever 
greater reliance on the Court. A former president of the Court, Hans-Jürgen Papier, 
sharply criticised the 2014 EPIII decision, calling it “correct neither in its result nor in 
its argumentation.”713 Papier voiced concerns that the 5 percent threshold for Bundestag 
elections might be at risk of being struck down and went on to suggest that a 
constitutional amendment should be adopted to create clearer conditions for its use, 
possibly with a view to reintroducing the 5 percent threshold at the EP level and 
ensuring its remains in place domestically.
714
  
When an ex-president of the Court argues that the 5 percent threshold should be 
protected by constitutional amendment from the attention of his former colleagues in 
Karlsruhe, this suggests at the very least that the justices should re-evaluate their 
reasoning in the EP cases before turning their attention to the Bundestag electoral 
Sperrklausel. The three dissenting opinions in both EPII and EPIII provide a good basis 
for a change of course, which, as noted by Rinken, is what German constitutional 
jurisprudence allows for.
715
 Moreover, the increased threats to stability across Europe 
and the greater fragmentation within German politics with the rise of AfD certainly 
represent a change in material conditions, or (‘Verhältnisse’), its oft-invoked word for 
determining whether a change in its case law is in order. The rather ossified German 
political system that Justice Böckenförde identified in the 1980s may well have needed 
a shot of adrenalin, which it got with the integration of the Greens into the party system. 
However, whether in terms of reassessing the EP case decisions or any change to the 5 
percent hurdle for Bundestag elections, the present ‘conditions’ of fragmentation and far 
right parties in the ascendancy indicate that a parliament capable of functioning may be 
more important than judicially administered democratic infusions.  
7.7 On the Side of the People 
After several high profile BVerfG decisions which were seen as anti-European 
including the Lisbon Treaty decision in 2009 and the abolition of the 5 percent rule for 
the EP election in 2011, and with decisions pending on the constitutionality of the 
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ECB’s bond buying programme, and the constitutionality of the (now) 3 percent hurdle 
for the EP elections, the Court’s president, Andreas Voßkuhle, went to Strasbourg in 
2013 to address around 30 members of the European Parliament (MEPs).
716
 For two 
hours, many of the MEPs grilled Voßkuhle about the BVerfG’s attitude to the EU, and 
charged that the Court “doesn’t comprehend Europe’s idea of democracy”. Eventually 
Voßkuhle hit back, telling the parliamentarians: “Not a single person here has 
mentioned the words ‘citizens’ or ‘voters’,” he said, seeking to rebuke the politicians. 
“Is your own power the only thing you care about?”717 President Voßkuhle’s comments 
did not go down well. Since the Court had repeatedly upheld the 5 percent threshold for 
the German Bundestag, the parliamentarians told Voßkuhle that a decision to quash the 
3 percent hurdle
718
 would send a clear message that European Parliamentary Democracy 
was inferior to its German counterpart.
719
  
Recent constitutional tensions have led to criticism that the role of the BVerfG as 
the ultimate arbiter of all legal and constitutional questions has become too overtly 
political, based on the perception of it adjudicating in ever increasing areas of social 
policy and politics.
720
 Responding to these criticisms, including some from the German 
government in Berlin, Voßkuhle commented that the court is on the side of the people 
and that without the aid of the legal system they wouldn’t have a voice.721 Such 
comments from the most senior judge in Europe’s largest country at first seem startling 
and taken at face value might suggest a lack of faith in Germany’s democratic 
institutions.  
In other remarks Voßkuhle argued that the role of the courts is merely to “define 
parameters within which politics can unfold.” 722 Even this more ‘limited’ estimation of 
the political power of the courts does nothing to dispel the notion of judges as platonic 
guardians. Although Voßkuhle’s comments sound superficially similar to Supreme 
Court Justice Stephen Breyer’s that the Court is the “boundary commission” of the 
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Constitution, they seem to envisage very different judicial roles.
723
 Echoing Rostow’s 
idea that “man can be free because the state is not”724, Breyer sees the Constitution as 
creating a vast open space where citizens can live their lives. For Voßkuhle, however, 
the role of courts is defining not just the boundaries of political activity, but the playing 
field as well. Such an expansive view of the judicial role seems surprising to Anglo-
American sensibilities. There is inevitably a natural tendency for senior judges to 
downplay the significance of their roles, not necessarily due to false modesty but 
because that is honestly how they believe judicial power works, or should work. 
External perspectives, on the other hand, may often attribute too much significance to 
these courts due to the momentary drama of high profile cases.  
All decisions of the BVerfG begin with the words, “In Namen des Volkes” (In 
the name of the people). Voßkuhle’s view that the Court is on the side of the people 
may perhaps be more understandable in the historical context of the Karlsruhe Court 
and the constitutional complaint mechanism. After all, well over a hundred thousand 
Germans have petitioned the Court since its establishment, even if only around 2 
percent of complaints are upheld. Perhaps this statistic tells its own story about the 
development of German constitutionalism since 1949. That the very possibility of the 
civic conscious citizen being aware of their fundamental rights and being able to file a 
constitutional complaint with the Court represented liberal democratic progress. As 
Rinken puts it, the constitutional complaint procedure “crystallises the importance of 
the basic rights for the whole constitutional order.”725 
However, for the president of the BVerfG to view the justices as being on the 
side of the people would seem unthinkable from a senior judge in the United States. 
Does Voßkuhle perhaps see the BVerfG as having a superior relationship with the 
German people than they have with their elected representatives, or simply a different 
one? Certainly Voßkuhle is not the first BVerfG judge to find fault with Germany’s 
political institutions as Böckenförde’s complaint about the oligarchical tendency among 
the established parties indicates. One potential danger in Germany, though, a society 
which still has a healthy respect for authority, is that if the German people see the Court 
as the best means of having their political and social needs addressed, they may feel less 
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need to participate in the mechanisms of representative democracy, and so remain 
engaged and vigilant in defending their constitutional order.
726
 
7.8 Ivory Tower Decision-Making 
One of Bernhard Schlink’s concerns in 1994 was not merely the BVerfG’s 
increasingly opaque methodology but the absence of robust critiques of its decisions 
among German academics. Since Schlink’s critique of the Court and the scholarship 
surrounding its case law, legal and constitutional law scholars have launched powerful 
broadsides against the Court’s rulings in the electoral threshold cases and other 
contentious decisions.
727
 In this respect, the common law practice of dissenting and 
discursive opinions, which are not part of the German civil law tradition but which the 
Court has embraced since the FCCA was amended to permit them in 1971, has 
contributed to an improvement in the quality of decision-making. Rinken writes that 
dissenting opinions have allowed for more transparent decision-making that is “more 
accessible to journalistic and academic criticism”.728 This leaves open a forum for 
debate which permits re-evaluations of decision-making and an eventual change in the 
Court’s interpretation.729 Some observers of the Court think such open debates cause 
problems of their own. One is that its open ended opinions and penchant for lengthy 
obiter dicta often fuels debate and controversies with German politics and society rather 
than settling them.
730
 Since the purpose of courts is usually thought of as primarily 
being about settling issues, such debates then invariably convey, often correctly, that the 
Court is neck deep in the creation of policy.
731
 However, since transparency is usually 
seen as an important facet of the rule of law, it is hard to see open debate which permits 
a re-evaluation of the Court’s decision-making as necessarily being a negative.    
Common to most constitutional courts including Germany’s is that a significant 
majority of its justices are drawn from academia rather than being the type of 
professional judges found in the ordinary German courts of law. Article 94 of the Basic 
Law and paragraph 4 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act specifies that three of the 
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eight justices from each senate must be chosen from one of the federal supreme courts, 
leaving the remaining ones to be chosen from the ranks of law professors, bureaucrats 
and politicians.
732
 In my interview with him in October 2013, Judge David Edward, a 
former UK judge of the European Court of Justice, highlighted one of the critiques of 
the BVerfG from judges on the ordinary German courts of law: 
The German ordinary courts, the courts of law, are sometimes 
resistant to the way in which the Constitutional Court makes law 
[…] that this is a sort of dreaming up law, rather than a rigorous 
analysis. 
The problem that Judge Edward identifies is the idea that the living instrument view of 
constitutional interpretation has been taken to extremes by constitutional courts in 
general, and the BVerfG in particular.  
If you go to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
you’ll get exactly the same [idea]: that this is a living instrument 
which we have to interpret in today’s light. But the ordinary courts 
find this troubling because they feel that the law is being made on 
the hoof.
733
  
Such constitutional courts are, as Issacharoff puts it, “little detained by concerns over the 
authority for judicial review”,734 while the counter-majoritarian difficulty becomes “a 
striking irrelevance”735. The very nature of constitutional courts is, of course, that in 
monitoring the political process and guarding the gates of democracy, tensions are 
created with the political branches of government. What is entirely absent in the 
BVerfG’s approach to decision-making is any hint of the American judicial tradition of 
“self-doubt”, of “agonising over legitimacy, or ‘exercising the utmost care’ whenever 
‘breaking new ground’ in constitutional matters”.736 The danger is that the combination 
of what I call the Court’s normative exuberance, its nonchalance with its own case law, 
its “less consistent legal methodology”737, along with a living instrument approach to 
constitutional interpretation, may sooner or later become a perfect storm which damages 
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its crucial role within Europe’s largest democracy. In this respect, as Collings puts it, 
“the court requires sensibility to history as well as dogma.”738 
 Over time, the Court’s case load of constitutional complaints from German 
citizens grew and, as seen, now represents over ninety percent of its work. Taken 
together with the potential mutability of human dignity, BVerfG President Voßkuhle’s 
comments suggests a growing inclination on the part of the Court that the values of 
liberal constitutionalism have firmly taken root in German society, allowing it to step 
back from the more electorally intrusive aspects of militant democracy. Does the Court’s 
decision in the European Parliament III case therefore represent a considered analysis 
on the part of the five justice majority regarding the circumstances in existence at the EP 
level or, as one of the three dissenting justices argued, has the Court merely replaced 
“the reasonable decision of the legislature with its own reasonable decision”739? The 
critique of some German politicians after the two EP decisions is that the BVerfG simply 
has no conception of how democracy functions at the European level. Perhaps a bigger 
concern for the Court, however, is the suspicion that is does not even understand 
democracy at the German domestic level.  
As part of its general equality jurisprudence―which is functionally similar to 
the U.S. Equal Protection Clause―the BVerfG will review legislation if it differentiates 
between people (i.e. treats them unequally) without any justification.
740
 This should be 
unproblematic. However, the Court has expanded the scope of its general equality 
jurisprudence to review legislation for “consistency, congruity and coherence”741. The 
problem, as Collings notes, is that  
legislation is often inconsistent for a noble purpose: it is the 
product of a compromise. Ban legislative incoherence and you risk 
rendering parliamentary compromise impossible. What’s more, 
parliamentary decisions are supposed to reflect the wishes of the 
citizenry, and those wishes are themselves often inconsistent. Strip 
parliaments of the right to act irrationally, and you kill 
democracy.
742
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Baer notes that general equality jurisprudence is based on the doctrine of 
Systemgerechtigkeit which “posits an internal logical coherence of the Grundgesetz and 
evaluates the constitutionality of a law based on its consistency with such logical 
coherence.”743 This is, as Collings hints at, a high standard of rationality for a legislature 
to meet.  
The dangers of such a doctrinaire approach which, as Collings indicates, 
effectively outlaws legislative compromise, are manifold. If the Bundestag can no 
longer compromise out of fear of running afoul of Karlsruhe’s edicts and if it can no 
longer represent the people’s interests politically, then the Court runs the risk of 
bringing legislative process into the same sort of disrepute as was seen during Weimar 
due to the splintering effect of smaller parties. The irony then is that while the Court 
may maintain the 5 percent threshold domestically to ensure the Bundestag can still 
function and to keep out smaller extremist parties, if the legislation produced by that 
legislature is struck down on the basis of self-reverential Court doctrines like 
congruence, the reputational damage to the legislature and to Germany’s representative 
democracy for being unable to resolve pressing social and political problems seems real. 
Extremist parties like the NPD and rising forces like AfD would certainly be the first to 
make capital from a perception of legislative impotence.  
Throughout his impressive English language history of the BVerfG, Justin 
Collings refers to the president (“Präsident”) of the Court as the ‘chief justice’, perhaps 
to put the continental European nomenclature of judicial titles in terms that an Anglo-
American readership might better relate to. Yet the title ‘chief justice’ does not quite 
convey the respect accorded to the president of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. One 
previous Court president, Roman Herzog, went on to occupy the largely ceremonial 
position of German federal president and in 2012 Angela Merkel offered the current 
Court president, Andreas Voßkuhle, the position of federal president. Voßkuhle turned 
Merkel down. As president of the BVerfG, Cicero magazine jested, Voßkuhle was 
already Germany’s “real head of state”.744 This comment reflects a strong element of 
truth, but also a potential problem for the Court. The BVerfG wields enormous power 
and some German politicians have often been eager for the Court to take contentious 
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decisions that would have been too politically costly for politicians to take.
745
 This is the 
problem with the Court’s power; it has grown with the eating, while legislators have 
increasingly retreated from the more politically contentious aspects of constitutional 
government.  
Germany’s post-war recovery has been characterised by the gradual shift from 
stability at all costs to a greater acceptance of renewal, a trend best illustrated by the 
journey of the Greens from political pariahs to the centre of the political establishment. 
Integrating the Greens has been one of the Court’s undoubted successes and it came, as 
with the political reaction to its EP rulings, against a backdrop of resistance from the 
established parties. Does this mean the circumstances are alike? I would argue not. As 
far as outcomes go, then, the Court’s effort to balance stability with renewal and breathe 
some new life into the German political system through the integration of the Greens 
and the striking down of the 5 percent thresholds at the EU level can be viewed 
positively. But―and this is the repeated complaint from Schlink’s critique in the 1990s 
to more recent criticisms from legal scholars and a former BVerfG justice―if the Court 
arrives at these outcomes “more or less politically” rather than through reasoning 
grounded in the Basic Law it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it has simply become 
another political institution. In this respect, the Court could perhaps learn from Neil 
MacCormick’s dictum that “not all legal problems can be solved legally” but require 
“political judgment”746. If that is true for law, it is even more certain that not all political 
problems can be solved legally.  
Ultimately, the end result of the BVerfG striking down the 5 percent threshold 
may be a shot in the arm for German politics, at least in its manifestation at the 
European Parliament level. What one can criticise is its methodology-light, outcome 
driven approach which departed wholesale from the logic of its 1979 decision, but 
without stating the factors which motivated that departure. When a constitutional court 
repeatedly delivers surprises—whether pleasant or unpleasant, as Schlink would put it—
the suspicion is that it is basing its decisions on some other metric than a constitution. It 
matters little that the normative outcomes the Court is arriving at are ones which we 
might agree with when the judicial path to those decisions seems so arbitrary. The 
danger with such opaqueness in a Court that is upholding a constitution as detailed and 
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specific as the Basic Law is that the justices who today may be promoting electoral 
equality between voters and equal opportunity between parties may tomorrow be 
restricting it in an equally ad hoc manner. “One of the most serious injuries the state can 
inflict on its subjects,” Richard Kay writes, “is to commit them to lives of perpetual 
uncertainty.”747 That such uncertainty is currently relatively benign and issues from the 
ivory towers of the Bundesverfassungsgericht rather than the midnight knock at the door 
from the Gestapo cannot disguise the disconcerting scale of the departure from the 
stability centric Weltanschauung of post-war German constitutionalism.    
7.9 Conclusion 
In recent decades, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has had to continually steer a 
middle course between its role as guardian of the Basic Law, without it becoming 
overtly political. It is fair to say it has often steered quite badly. Absent a clear 
methodology the only real explanation for the Court’s decisions in the European 
Parliament cases is perhaps a changed understanding on the part of the justices as to 
what sort of guardianship German democracy and society needs from Karlsruhe in the 
second decade of the twenty-first century. On one level, the Court may have been 
responding precisely to the type of charge highlighted by Collings: that it has sometimes 
done more as the country needed it less. The logic of ‘less’ might well mean striking 
down those tools of the militant democracy, including electoral thresholds, which a 
mature and liberal German society has made redundant. This view is certainly implicit in 
the language of current BVerfG president, Andreas Voßkühle, whose criticism of the 
MEPs he addressed in Strasbourg was that not once had any of them mentioned 
‘citizens’ or ‘voters’.  
There is a deep paradox though that in finding, rightly or wrongly, that there was 
no longer a justification for a 5 percent and then a 3 percent hurdle at the EU level, this 
change from the status quo looked like exactly the sort of political decision-making the 
BVerfG has so often been criticised for. The Court’s problem here is that ‘doing less’ 
through removing the electoral hurdles at the EU level actually meant shaking up the 
political orders at the domestic and European level on a bare 5-3 majority. Moreover, the 
decision to second-guess the considered judgment of legislators in the Bundestag, who 
had responded to the 2011 decision by instituting a revised 3 percent hurdle at the EU 
                                                          
747
 Kay, pp. 22-23. 
221 
 
level, seemed to smack of hubris.
748
 The Court’s decision seemed as incomprehensible 
as it was badly timed when just months later eurosceptic far-right parties from across 
Europe doubled their representation in the European Parliament.   
 Carl Schmitt and, from a more liberal perspective, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde 
criticised the ‘tyranny of values’, which they saw as a poor and potentially dangerous 
substitute for religion or some other homogenising force like nation as a support for the 
liberal democratic state. It was dangerous, first, because such a value order 
compromised liberalism by placing its destiny in the hands of an all-powerful court 
rather than with the people. The other danger, though, was that the value order came to 
usurp the Basic Law itself, leaving society at the mercy of the changing whims of 
constitutional court judges. Set against the backdrop of Andreas Voßkuhle’s remarks 
that the Court is “on the side of the people” and the concerns raised by numerous critics 
of its second-guessing of legislative decision-making based on a futile quest for 
coherence and consistency, the risk is that some justices on the Court may be seeing 
themselves as precisely what one of its former justices, Wiltraut Rupp Von-Brunneck, 
warned: an ersatz legislature
749
.  
 In this chapter, I have generally offered a critical account of the Court’s recent 
decision-making, particularly with respect to its European Parliament decisions. While 
one can wholeheartedly agree with the principle―as with the reapportionment 
cases―that all votes should count equally, the special circumstances of German history 
require, it could be argued, more sensitivity to political stability than the BVerfG has 
shown. This is not a reflection on the German people of today. Liberal democratic 
values currently appear stronger in Germany than perhaps any other country in the world 
at present. The problem is not trust in the people as much as understanding the effects of 
legislative fragmentation during the Weimar Republic, and recognising the propensity of 
opportunistic and extremist groups and parties to take advantage of a legislative 
impasse.  
 As noted in this chapter and the previous one, the Court’s role in upholding 
fundamental rights and the willingness of Germans to launch constitutional complaints 
helped cement in the public mind the idea that democratic legitimacy depended on 
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respect for legality and human dignity. However, if the ability to petition the Court has 
helped make the German people better citizens, the reverse may also be true. I think it is 
possibly also the case that receiving five thousand petitions per year has given the 
justices in Karlsruhe an insight into the concerns of German society that may not always 
be as apparent to politicians. The Court’s awareness of the type of concerns and issues 
animating German citizens may also serve as an early warning system for emerging 
problems in society or with the misuse or misapplication of state power in its dealings 
with citizens.  
Thus, the role of the BVerfG in fielding constitutional complaints may be useful 
in identifying any change in what I have called the ‘identity deficit’. In other words, the 
extent to which citizens identify more or less with their liberal democratic constitutional 
values in comparison to the traditional “internal bonding forces of society”750 such as 
religion, or nation, that Böckenförde suggested were necessary to sustain liberal 
democracy. As I have argued through the previous chapters, Germany’s sui generis 
nature and its inspiring moral recovery through confronting its traumatic past have lent 
to the liberal values of human dignity and fundamental rights in German 
constitutionalism the same force as the more conventional sources of identity and 
bonding forces identified by Böckenförde. That does not mean that Germany’s 
constitutional order is completely immune to the current ascendancy of populist forces 
in the West, but its strength is that its citizens identify far more with their liberal 
democratic constitutional values than with traditional, and often more reactionary, 
sources of identity.  
Der Spiegel noted in 2014 following the European Parliament decisions that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht was “now criticised as seldom before” and that its justices felt 
“misunderstood” 751. Yet such tensions should be welcomed if it helps ensure that the 
Weimar Republic and the regime which followed it remain historical tragedies rather 
than models to be emulated. With liberal democracy seemingly under renewed threat on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and around the world, the Bundesverfassungsgericht remains 
a fundamental institution of German democracy. Criticism, contestation, and 
constructive tension are, I have suggested, the essential attributes of constitutionalism 
that are needed to maintain the constitutional order in a state of equilibrium. Germans 
know only too well from the 1930s what happens when that tension dissipates and the 
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balance is tipped. That is why, despite the critiques I have highlighted, the German 
people would undoubtedly reject a Germany without the Bundesverfassungsgericht as 
much as they would reject a Germany without their Grundgesetz, a constitution that they 
did not ask for, were not consulted on, but which they have, like the red robed justices in 
Karlsruhe, come to appreciate.  
The Court has experienced crises approximately every twenty years since its 
establishment in 1951, yet all seem to blow over leaving the relationship of trust it has 
with the German people undiminished.
 752
 The concern would be if Germans respected 
the Court solely because they respected authority. This does not seem to be the case. For 
Collings, “the Court’s remarkable rise and the public’s remarkable trust in the Court 
have been the product, not of some persistent national sequacity and deference to 
authority, but of the Court’s perceived role in redeeming the country from its 
authoritarian past and restoring it to the community of liberal democracies.”753  
One might even say that the Court itself has taken on a quasi-religious character 
such is the trust that it is held in with the German people. Given Böckenförde’s original 
concerns about the social cohesion difficulties the liberal secular state might face 
without religion, one irony is that the Court is now trusted more than the Pope or any 
church or religion in the country. According to a 2016 opinion survey, 72 percent of 
respondents trust the Court as an institution, more than any other part of the 
government.
754
 Perhaps, then, the Court itself has seemingly filled the religious void that 
Böckenförde highlighted. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
Germany and America are bound by values – democracy, freedom, 
as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of the 
individual, regardless of their origin, skin colour, creed, gender, 
sexual orientation, or political views. On the basis of these values, 
I offer close cooperation to the future president of the United 
States of America. (Angela Merkel, 9 November 2016) 
A constitutional government will always be a weak government 
when compared with an arbitrary one. There will be many 
desirable things, as well as undesirable, which are easy for a 
despotism but impossible elsewhere. Constitutionalism suffers 
from the defects inherent in its own merits. Because it cannot do 
some evil it is precluded from doing some good. Shall we, then, 
forego the good to prevent the evil, or shall we submit to the evil 
to secure the good? This is the fundamental practical question of 
all constitutionalism. It is the foremost issue in the present political 
world; and it is amazing, and to many of us very alarming, to 
consider to what insufferable barbarities nation after nation today 
is showing a willingness to submit, for the recompense it thinks it 
is getting or hopes to get from an arbitrary government.
755
 (Charles 
McIlwain, ‘The Messenger Lectures’ - 1938-39). 
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The central dilemma which this investigation has sought to address is the 
paradox that the state is dependent on its citizens for its survival, but they are ultimately 
dependent on the state for their liberty. Despite its flaws, representative democracy 
remains the essential vehicle in the modern state by which citizens can play a role in 
how they are governed, in order to maintain their own freedoms. The role of 
constitutional courts, then, whether in the guise of the Supreme Court or the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, has been to a lesser or greater extent to scrutinise this 
democratic process when called upon to do so.  
What I have argued is that the particular characteristics of each country’s 
constitutionalism―whether it is more inclined towards liberty or dignity―have 
determined the nature of the polis that was established. This, in turn, has determined 
how interventions in the processes of representative democracy occur, and whether 
values are formalised or inculcated. The problem, though, as I have emphasised 
throughout, is that in establishing the terms and (liberty or dignity imbued-) parameters 
of the polis, constitutionalism creates a civic space, and a legal / institutional space. 
Thus, the net effect, and accepted ideology of the American constitution was the 
creation of a zone of liberty where, as Rostow put it, man can be free because the state 
is not; this, however created a disconnect between the freedom of the citizen, and the 
activities or “political action”756 which was required of them to uphold their 
representative government and the state.  
8.1 Distinctive Features of the Thesis 
The enquiry undertaken in the preceding chapters has sought to illuminate 
distinctive aspects of American and German constitutionalism. The case studies 
examined addressed the constitutionality of the apportionment of electoral districts at 
the U.S. state and federal level, and of German statutory rules for electoral success, but 
through an analysis of the historical development of constitutionalism in each country.   
The novelty of such a comparative analysis was that it examined both the theory of 
American and German constitutionalism and the practical impact of these respective 
‘constitutionalisms’ on the electoral and democratic processes of each country.  
A key aim of the analysis was to focus on the much understudied question of 
why, to a greater or lesser extent, particular aspects of American and German 
representative democracy became subject to judicial scrutiny in the way they did, and 
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how the historical development of constitutionalism in each country shaped that 
process. Moreover, the U.S. reapportionment cases of the 1960s and Germany’s 
electoral threshold cases of 2011 and 2014 have not been examined in depth within a 
single comparative study before.   
8.1.1 Comparative Reading of the Two Courts 
The distinctiveness of the comparative analysis of the two courts has been shown in 
four main ways. Firstly, the responses of each court to the reapportionment and electoral 
threshold cases was primarily shaped by the liberty-dignity facets of American and 
German constitutionalism. Thus, as noted earlier, because democracy in the German 
context was derived from the Basic Law’s architectonic principle, human dignity, and 
because the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s authority is textually grounded in the 
constitution, the Court neither faced the scale of criticism that the Supreme Court did in 
the reapportionment cases nor did it have to justify its role in restoring its notion of 
electoral equality in EPII Case and EPIII Case as the Supreme Court had to in Baker v 
Carr and Reynolds v Sims.  
Secondly, a unique feature of the argument was the dichotomy between the 
formalisation of values by the Supreme Court in American constitutionalism arising out 
of the state of liberty in the civic space, and the inculcation of values into the civic space 
by the BVerfG in German constitutionalism. One inspiration for the concept of value 
formalisation by the Supreme Court was Tocqueville’s idea that once a majority of the 
community comes to accept a new value orientation in society those who were in 
opposition fall in behind the new consensus.
757
 Thus, on multiple issues, the Supreme 
Court generally lagged behind rather than led democratic debates and civil society 
struggles regarding human rights issues. This was true with respect to issues including 
slavery, segregation and redistributionist policies during the progressive era which were 
only belatedly formalised in court decisions.  
Third, the distinctive stability / renewal paradigm examined throughout the 
thesis provides an additional comparative lens with which to assess the actions of both 
courts. A key focus of the analysis was the relationship between legal and democratic 
institutions in the modern state and the role of constitutionalism and the courts in 
sustaining a constructive tension between the need for stability and the demands of a 
changing society. The Supreme Court and BVerfG, respectively, have either recognised 
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an evolving conception of equality or dignity in society
758
, or, have rejected absolute 
stability through the rejection of any notion of timeless validity
759
 to understandings of 
human dignity.   
Fourth, the liberty-dignity dynamic also informs another distinctive dimension 
of the comparative analysis of the courts: the views of Associate Justice Stephen Breyer 
of the Supreme Court, and BVerfG president, Andreas Voßkuhle on the role of their 
respective courts within society and politics. Breyer’s view of the Supreme Court as the 
“boundary commission”760 of the Constitution sees, I have suggested, a minimalist role 
for the Court within America’s liberty framed constitutionalism that leaves a vast space 
for citizens to live their lives. By contrast, Voßkuhle’s view of the role of German 
courts as defining the parameters within which politics can unfold
761
 fits, I have argued, 
the more comprehensive dignity orientation of German constitutionalism where rights 
are a necessary precondition
762
 for democracy.  
8.1.2 Other Distinctive Features 
The distinctiveness in the analytical approach undertaken involved, firstly, an 
explanation of the theoretical distinction between the civic and institutional space, and 
how the interaction between each space works differently in the liberty-centric 
American constitutionalism, where emerging norms in the civic space have been largely 
formalised by the Supreme Court as constitutional values, and the dignity oriented 
German constitutionalism where constitutional values have been inculcated in the civic 
space, particularly through the constitutional complaint mechanism.  
Secondly, the distinctiveness of the thesis involved a clarification of the 
practical dichotomy between, on the one hand, the theoretical risk to liberal democracy 
from unlimited democratic access which allows anti-democrats or illiberal autocrats to 
take control, or more restricted access which may lead to an ossified and oligarchical 
polity, and on the other hand, how the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht have practically attempted to manage these ‘theoretical risks’ 
through their interventions in US districting policies and Germany electoral processes. 
A further distinctive element of this analysis included the question of how the Supreme 
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Court and BVerfG have dealt with oligarchical tendencies which have attempted to 
exclude certain voters or parties from the processes of democratic politics; this was seen 
through the dilution of votes through malapportionment, through the discrimination 
against the German Greens in the Bundestag, and, of course, the effective nullification 
of votes that fail to exceed a minimum threshold for electoral success.  
The interview with the former European Court of Justice judge, David Edward 
QC, provided a uniquely original insight into both the juridical view of 
constitutionalism, human rights and law after 1945 (Chapter 2). Additionally, Judge 
Edward’s interactions with German judges while on the ECJ highlighted some of the 
particular methodological criticisms from the ordinary German courts with respect to 
the way in which the BVerfG reaches some of its decisions (Chapter 7).  
The utilisation of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s ideas in Chapter 3 and 
throughout the thesis in relation to German and American constitutionalism represented 
one of the most distinctive aspects of the analysis. The significance of Böckenförde’s 
ideas as manifested in ‘the Böckenförde Dilemma’―that “the liberal, secularised state 
is nourished by presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee”―has been somewhat 
neglected outside Germany, yet its relevance for the relationship between citizen and 
state in all liberal democracies is especially pertinent. The continued relevance of 
Böckenförde’s ideas to current political challenges in Germany and beyond was 
highlighted only recently by Angela Merkel, who directly referred to Böckenförde and 
his ideas, and commented on their implications for the role of citizens and civil society 
in liberal democratic states. Merkel indicated that the implications of Böckenförde’s 
dilemma was that nobody feels they are responsible for their society.
763
 In response, 
Merkel praised those Germans taking part in a number of Sunday demonstrations in 
support of the European idea and said that such civil society involvement was 
indispensable.
764
 
8.2 Comparison 
One of the key puzzles which this thesis has examined is how constitutionalism 
provides a means of dealing with such overt threats to democratic processes as 1930s 
Germany, or such pernicious long-term threats as malapportionment. Here I have 
argued that the response of American or German constitutionalism is partly contingent 
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on the nature of the original constituent act, the circumstances in which the polity was 
established and how that shaped the constitutional text produced. The circumstances of 
the U.S. founding which was effectively a compromise between significantly different 
interests created a more general constitutional text which, partly through omission and 
part design, restrained the state but left the citizen free.
765
 It is this ‘liberty’ 
consciousness within American constitutionalism which tends to lead to a more 
tentative application of judicial authority. In the case of Germany―where a 
predominantly normative constitution was designed to preserve human dignity and 
create a resistant state and a society of liberal democrats―judicial power was applied 
more assertively.   
Important for both countries is the need for a vigilant citizenry, familiar with 
their constitution, its values and the principle of “equal concern and respect”766 upon 
which their liberty and the freedom of others ultimately depends. To this extent, 
whether it is a constitutional court that is instructing its citizens and politicians on the 
constitution and civics, what matters most is that some institution is doing it. Moreover, 
if the principles of the polis are accepted by citizens and political actors, it seems to 
matter less whether it was created by a court out of an objective order of values than 
whether the citizens charged with safekeeping it in the present are doing a good job.  
Both of the case studies have looked at the question of citizen participation and 
exclusion from the civic space, and the role of the courts in addressing this issue. Due to 
the constraints of this thesis, the analysis has been confined to the problem of citizens 
being excluded from the civic space by external actors, either unconstitutionally or 
constitutionally (i.e. the U.S. states, or the German state); it has not been possible to 
explore the very interesting question of when citizens exclude themselves from the civic 
space through apathy or other factors, or do not engage in their democratic process. 
Although the thesis has looked at this question indirectly through the ability of 
American and German constitutionalism and the courts to exert influence over the civic 
space and support constitutional democracy, the motivations of individual voters has not 
been considered.   
This, however, raises the question of whether self-exclusion from the civic space 
by the citizen is the fault (or problem) of the citizen, or whether it is primarily the state’s 
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responsibility for establishing the conditions which are conducive for the citizen to 
participate in their democracy. Here, in a nutshell is the liberty and dignity dichotomy, 
which has been at the heart of this enquiry. America’s liberty constitutionalism created a 
zone of autonomy for the citizen, but then it was up to the citizen, individually or 
through religious and other forms of civic associational practices to stay involved in 
their government. Germany’s dignity oriented constitutionalism had two specific tasks 
to fulfil in 1949: to create firstly a viable and stable constitutional order that could 
sustain liberal democracy and promote economic prosperity, and secondly establish a 
supportive and inclusive democratic culture based on respect for individual rights, 
without which the first objective, as Dahl indicated, would be vulnerable.
767
 
Despite the generality of the American Constitution compared to the Basic Law, 
it is often outlier groups and those with the most extreme views within a polity who are 
often most certain what the gaps in the constitutional text imply. Of course, this does 
not help the judge charged with interpretation, but this is precisely the paradox that 
Justice Stephen Breyer meant recently about the document leaving “vast space” for 
people to decide what kind of a nation they want.
768
 Breyer was referring to a civic 
space within which citizens can participate in building the kind of polis that they want. 
It is not a legal space. This is the difference which has been addressed throughout the 
thesis between the civic space created by constitutionalism and the more limited legal 
space in which interpretation occurs. It is only when citizens or groups in the polis find 
their civic space restricted,―for example, when politicians or legislatures do not 
reapportion, or when voters find their vote is wasted because they have chosen a party 
that does not clear the 5 percent hurdle―that the courts must step in. 
The BVerfG’s rejection of any interpretation of human dignity based on a 
timeless validity is Holmesian in its organic and evolutionary conception of 
constitutional meaning. The surprise decisions in the electoral threshold cases in 2011 
and 2014 represent just such an organic conception of constitutionalism but, I think, 
taken to an extreme that Holmes would have balked at. The German Basic Law was, 
after all, not a compromise between different views as was the American Constitution, 
but rather an unambiguous normative battering ram intended to safeguard the state and 
inculcate its liberal democratic values in society. Whether the Court now sees its role as 
to ‘normalise’ a German identity which it feels, based on the EP decisions, no longer 
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needs the restraints of the militant democracy, or whether it is in search of some new 
value system is unclear.   
8.3 United States 
In the reapportionment cases, upholding their representative government was 
what civil society actors and individual voters had been attempting to do for decades. In 
the United States, engaged civil society actors were involved in the unsuccessful 
political efforts against malapportionment, and then the successful legal effort to get 
Baker v Carr heard in the federal courts. Sager rightly notes that many observers of 
constitutional institutions are “strongly inclined to see the insulation of constitutional 
judgment from ongoing politics as a virtue, not a liability.”769 The complaint about the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the U.S. Supreme Court, however, is that they are not 
divorced from politics enough. Indeed, Dahl’s view of the Court as a majoritarian and 
policy making institution suggests that the insulation of the judicial branch from 
ordinary politics is non-existent.  
Decisions such as Citizens United would have likely only strengthened Dahl’s 
convictions. Writing about the backlash against judicial constitutionalism in the wake of 
the social and progressive rulings of the Warren Court, Post and Siegel highlighted the 
question of whether the public might lose confidence in the authority of the courts to 
declare constitutional law if they are seen “to yield to political pressure.”770 There are 
different ways of seeing this, however. In the reapportionment cases, the Court was 
reacting to widespread concern among civil society actors about malapportionment, yet 
its decisions certainly found favour with the Kennedy Administration, as they probably 
would have with the Eisenhower Administration based on the early support from J. Lee 
Rankin.
771
 Notwithstanding Oliver Wendell Holmes’ view on the necessity of judicial 
review to check states’ laws and Whittington’s analysis of how the Court has often 
acted as an agent of national power against the states, the Warren Court’s decisions on 
reapportionment were neither dictated by the federal government, nor opposed by the 
public.
772
  
The nature of the civic space created by each constitutionalism determines how 
political action and interpretation takes place. This, however, is determined by whether 
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the original constitution established―through sins of omission or design―is an 
American liberty oriented polis or a German dignity/normative focused one. As seen in 
Chapter 4, it was the generality of the Janus-facing constitution that created 
opportunities, but also problems when people came to interpret. The U.S. Constitution 
began with a compact between thirteen sovereign states, but just as significant was the 
compromise between the widely differing interests within those states.
773
 The 
compromises necessary to bridge the differences between these interests was channelled 
into a document that few were happy with and which profoundly dismayed Madison. It 
was from such meagre ingredients, which the compromises of the founding period 
produced, that the people, representatives, and institutions of the U.S. were commanded 
to go forth and fashion a viable constitutional order. While these principles of the 
American constitutional experiment have remained largely unaltered in theory, the 
societal context in which they have been interpreted has changed dramatically. 
The Bickelian angst over the countermajoritarian difficulty is a result of the 
original constitution generality over what the document means. These tensions were 
behind the Court’s problems during the Lochner era, and its subsequent clash with 
Franklin Roosevelt over his new deal legislation. Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner 
that a constitution is for “people of fundamentally different views” and did not prescribe 
eternally applicable economic theories rejected both the notion of a unitary 
constitutional intent, and the presumption that experience and the changing needs of 
society had nothing to teach constitutional interpretation.  
8.4 Germany 
The role of constitutionalism and the courts in ensuring that the institutions of 
representative democracy functioned as intended has been central to this enquiry. Yet in 
both the United States and Germany, constitutional values, traditional sources of 
cohesion, and the balance between majority and minority interests have shaped this 
institutional narrative in important ways. The emergence of a strong constitutional 
culture in Germany has been important in sustaining post-war constitutionalism, yet for 
the first decades of the Federal Republic this was shaped overwhelmingly by the 
country’s framers, politicians, elites and, perhaps most significantly, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. However much Germany’s weak constitutional culture 
required this civic pedagogy in 1951, there is an obvious short-term price to be paid in 
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“liberalness”774, as Böckenförde noted, to ensure a citizenry who are able to uphold 
their liberty in the future. The ‘fine line’ is ensuring that political institutions do not 
become captured by oligarchical tendencies once it is clear that the stability of the state 
is no longer at risk. Through Organstreit complaints filed by the Green Party during the 
1980s and a series of decisions which criticised the established parties for oligarchical 
tendencies, the BVerfG was able to inject new life into Germany’s staid party system. 
The Böckenförde dilemma has immense relevance for how a constitutional order 
should respond to the forces of renewal in society. As has been suggested in previous 
chapters, the constitutional complaint mechanism of the Basic Law possibly gives the 
BVerfG an insight into emerging trends and tensions within German society which 
politicians may be less aware of. These trends may reflect threats, or new, emerging, or 
existing forces of social cohesion or disruption. Taking democracy seriously in 
Germany has hitherto meant German citizens trusting in the Court to maintain stability 
using the tools of the militant democracy, and deciding whether the forces of ‘renewal’ 
are ones which can be safely integrated within the constitutional order of the Basic Law 
as the Greens were in the 1980s, or whether they must be resisted as the SRP and KPD 
were in the 1950s.
775
 
If courts become too immersed in policy-making, political issues, or answering 
important questions that society and political representatives should be grappling 
with—due to activism on the courts’ part or due to legislators using the courts to take 
politically difficult decisions
776—then voters may get complacent about engaging in 
democratic processes and taking the trouble to elect representatives who are committed 
to public life and to solving complex issues. The danger, then, is that apathy breeds 
carelessness and the mistakes of the 1930s in Germany become more, not less, likely. I 
am not convinced, though, that this is what has happened, at least in Germany As Rolf 
Lamprecht put it,  
The common civil right in being able to call upon Karlsruhe at any 
time helped foster democratic self-confidence. Whoever 
recognised this possibility, and, if necessary, made use of it, no 
longer had to view themselves as subjects.
777
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Due to Germany’s unique and traumatic history the values and institutions of 
German constitutionalism have had to bear an unusually heavy burden in restoring the 
country’s moral core. While Germany retains a strong religious tradition in its culture, 
and even in its tax code, the country’s impressive moral recovery since World War Two 
seems overwhelmingly driven by secular factors, most especially the willingness of 
ordinary Germans from the 1960s onwards to acknowledge and debate their country’s 
traumatic past. Had this debate not taken place then Böckenförde’s concerns from the 
1960s about a value order imposed purely from above could have become a source of 
tension. Instead, the architectonic values of human dignity and democracy have over 
time become more deeply entrenched within Germany’s constitutional culture, assisted 
in part by the constitutional complaint mechanism and in part by the debate about the 
past. The mechanism itself gave Germans a greater civic consciousness and created an 
awareness among individuals and officials about how the citizen should be treated in the 
constitutional state. Overall, the values of German constitutionalism seem to have 
reinforced the process of coming to terms with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) by 
constantly providing both aspirational values and a reminder of what happens when a 
country loses sight of important moral values. 
Throughout the previous chapters I have stressed the sui generis nature of the 
German and American historical experiences which have contributed to the 
development of constitutionalism in each country. While German exceptionalism may 
represent constitutional and historical conditions as difficult to replicate as those of 
American exceptionalism, the extent to which both constitutions have been extensively 
copied by new democracies around the world makes them essential subjects of analysis 
if we are to understand how judicial scrutiny of representative democracy should or 
should not proceed. From an outside perspective, the perceived juridification of the 
German political and legal space can seem disconcerting. However, in challenging 
times for Western liberal democracies, where populist and other reactionary forces seem 
emboldened, it is perhaps useful to observe the institutional constitutional conditions 
which did so much to establish Germany's strong constitutional democracy when 
circumstances had perhaps never seen bleaker.   
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Although German democracy has made impressive strides since 1949, the 
elephant in the room remains the support of ordinary Germans for Hitler in the 1930s. 
Neil MacCormick observed that legal authority is “empty without general acceptance in 
a society of the decisions taken by those in authority” and consequently that “without 
the backing of political power this cannot practically be achieved.”778 This has 
implications for Germany. The authority of the BVerfG today is bolstered by the support 
that it has enjoyed among the German public, the maintenance of which has shielded the 
institution from more stinging criticism
779
 or attempts to reign in some of its authority. 
If Germans continue to realise, as Dirk Kurbjuweit suggests, that “they still have to 
practice democracy” and that they are still on the training programme then they may be 
less likely to become complacent about protecting their constitutional order. In its first 
few decades the BVerfG’s role was partly to inculcate Germans regarding the majesty of 
law, but within a hierarchical constitutional order that firmly established individual 
rights and human dignity as fundamental values. If the role of the Supreme Court was, 
as I suggested in Chapter 5, one of formalising existing value changes in society, the 
role of the BVerfG from the early 1950s onwards was one of instilling the values of the 
new constitutional order in German politics and society. 
We have come full circle from Bockenforde's dilemma about the liberal, secular 
state, which illustrated what I would call the identity deficit between the liberal 
constitutional values which underwrite and characterize state power and the values 
which ensure social cohesion, be it religion or nation. In Germany, those values of 
liberal constitutionalism including human dignity, constitutional justice, and the militant 
democracy which issued forth from Karlsruhe in response to constitutional complaints 
defied Bockenforde's fears and became over decades important sources of social 
cohesion and symbols of Germany’s moral recovery. However, it is also important to 
recognize that this recovery in Germany may not have occurred without the sui generis 
debate on the country's traumatic past which erupted in the mid-1960s. Even here 
though, the Court played a role in laying the groundwork for the later 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung debate with decisions in the 1950s about the Gestapo and 
the presence of Nazis in the civil service and judiciary.
780
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Despite all of the critiques of the BVerfG’s reasoning identified in the previous 
chapter―particularly its ivory tower mentality which so vexes both politicians and 
judges in the ordinary courts of law―such tension must ultimately be regarded as the 
lesser of two evils given the alternative. The fragile ‘Bonn Republic’ founded in 1949 
survived the initial challenge of internal anti-democratic forces and the external 
challenge of its Cold War adversaries to become Germany’s longest enduring 
constitutional order. That it remains a stable liberal democratic constitutional order in an 
era when illiberal democracies are becoming less the exception and more the rule is no 
small feat. The BVerfG’s role in the federal republic’s longevity and stability seems 
clear, as is the continued trust which almost three-quarters of Germans have in it. 
8.5 Conclusions  
The Böckenförde dilemma that “the liberal, secularised state is nourished by 
presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee” illustrates a problem that is no longer 
unique to Germany: how a state can maintain social cohesion and a system of liberal 
democratic values without imposing them and thereby compromising its liberalism. 
Although written as a warning that Germany probably needed a more socially cohesive 
value system than the BVerfG’s objective value order, it highlighted a vulnerability in 
liberal democratic value systems that has become increasingly apparent with the rise of 
populist forces in Europe and the United States since the financial crisis of 2008. 
Without religion or another value system which serves to reinforce the liberal 
democratic values of the state, the danger is that the citizens start following a value 
system that is antithetical to the liberal democratic state, or none at all. An electorate 
that is, to paraphrase Wolin,
781
 unduly lethargic in not taking an interest in politics, may 
be as dangerous to a tolerant and open society as the concerted few seeking to 
undermine it. 
Filling that identity deficit and closing the divide between constitutional values 
and those of social cohesion will take on different forms in different countries. The 
importance of a vibrant, inclusive, and broad civil society seems obvious in achieving 
this reconciliation between values. Although one might be tempted to say that reports of 
the death of nationalism have been exaggerated, this does not, at least yet, seem like the 
nationalism of the 1930s. While there are exceptions such as Scotland and Catalonia, 
the rise of the new nationalism in the first world of Europe and, now, the United States, 
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seems less about the expression of innate nationhood and more about anxiety in the face 
of global uncertainty, some political disenchantment, and a waning of cultural 
homogeneity.  
While there are various factors at play in explaining why voters in so many 
wealthy Western countries seem willing to vote for populist, far-right and anti-
immigrant parties, the general disenchantment may also be linked to a decline in 
community, and in those forces of social cohesion which animated Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde’s concerns. Those on the right in the U.S. decried the ‘liberal’ decisions of 
the Warren Court as representing urban and cosmopolitan values and not those of 
middle America. Through decisions such as Brown, Baker and Reynolds, the 
jurisprudence handed down by the Warren Court for fifteen years tilted American 
constitutionalism dramatically towards a conception of human dignity and equality 
where the emancipated individual was not completely isolated as liberty would dictate.   
When Böckenförde made his remarks in 1964, they seemed relevant only to the 
fragility of liberal values in the Federal Republic. A particular irony is that Germany 
today is the most politically stable liberal democracy in the western world and has 
generally bucked the populist trends seen in other countries.
782
 In Germany, the value 
system of the political system created by the Basic Law seems to have created an 
unusually strong liberal constitutional democracy and culture from the most 
inauspicious circumstances.  
A reformulation of our understanding of the gap between the public and private 
spheres which opened up in 1789 may be overdue. One lesson from the political 
turbulence of 2016 may be that the liberal constitutional values found in the public 
sphere―that is to say in government and in the legal control of public authority―may 
not necessarily be cohesive enough to resonate in civil society. Jefferson feared, as 
Arendt notes, that a paradox existed in republican government which could undermine 
it. While government was meant to be representative, it could only work if it was 
present in the lives of the people, rather than only materialising at election times.
783
 Of 
course, dangers of autocracy exist in attempting to reconcile the values of the public and 
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private spheres if the prevailing sentiment in either is illiberal and reactionary. Arendt 
alluded to this in terms of “the tendency of public power to expand and to trespass on 
private interests”784 in the pre-modern era, although she did not formulate it in terms of 
values. The solution, reflecting “Jefferson’s preoccupation with the dangers of public 
power and this remedy against them”785 was the legal bulwark provided by the Bill of 
Rights. As seen in Chapter 4, however, this was a legal wall of separation between the 
public and private spheres which Jefferson saw as a “legal check” in the “hands of the 
judiciary”786. But then, having erected a legal barrier to protect private interests from 
public power, the question then became how to pierce or break down that barrier to 
ensure that the ‘protected’ citizen retained an affinity or even affection for their 
government.
787
 Therein lies the problem, though not perhaps an insurmountable one. 
Jefferson’s concern on protecting private interests from state power while also 
ensuring the individual stays involved in upholding their government is, I have 
suggested, effectively trying to answer the same existential question as Böckenförde 
posed: how to preserve representative democracy and its constitutional guarantees while 
retaining the bond between the people and their government? Jefferson saw the answer 
was through the citizen playing an active role in government at their local level, for, as 
Arendt notes, “no one could be called either happy or free without participating, and 
having a share, in public power.”788 For Böckenförde, the dilemma and the answer lay 
in how to ensure that the “internal bonding forces” that the state could draw 
on―whether religion or nation―could support the values of the liberal secular state and 
the “opportunity for liberty” that provides.789  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s intervention in the reapportionment cases was 
regarded as highly successful. By restoring truly representative government at the state 
and congressional level and enunciating the principle of one person one vote, the Court 
illustrated its institutional ability to correct deficiencies in electoral processes, as John 
Hart Ely argued.
790
 However, the lasting impact of its reapportionment decisions were 
incrementally eroded through a resurgence of gerrymandering, while the Supreme 
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Court’s more limited role means that it has been able to do nothing to improve the 
quality of the civic space or prevent the collapse of the centre-ground in U.S. politics. 
While the BVerfG’s interventions in the European Parliament cases were 
methodologically suspect and ill-timed, the Court’s decades long role as the guardian of 
German democracy has helped foster a strong constitutional democracy against all the 
odds.  
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